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Abstract
This doctoral thesis empirically investigates the response of the U.S. market-wide and cross-
sectional stock returns to monetary policy shocks after the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meetings, across different sentiment states between June-89 to October-14. It also
examines the impact of investor sentiment states on the market-wide stock price drift before the
scheduled FOMC announcements.
Chapter 1 demonstrates that the state of investor sentiment strongly affects the transmis-
sion of conventional and non-conventional monetary policy to the stock market. In particular,
monetary policy shocks significantly affect market-wide stock returns only during sentiment-
correction periods. In contrast, during periods of optimism build-up, the stock market response
is statistically insignificant. The sentiment-based state dependence in the response of stock
market returns to monetary policy shocks sheds important light on a sentiment channel in the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
We extend our empirical analysis to cross-sectional stock returns in Chapter 2. Our estimates
show that monetary policy shocks significantly affect cross-sectional stock returns only during
sentiment-correction periods. We construct a long-short strategy, according to which we define
the stocks which are more exposed to investor sentiment as the short leg. Our results show that
monetary policy shocks positively drive the long-short spread, with a larger impact on the short
leg stocks. Specially, Federal Funds Rate (FFR) surprises have larger impacts on the stocks with
high accruals, young stocks, stocks with high asset growth rate, stocks with low book-to-market
ratio, stocks with high cash to asset ratio, stocks with low gross profitability, high investment
stocks, past loser stocks, stocks with high net operating assets, stocks with low asset tangibility,
less profitable stocks, stocks with high return volatility, and large stocks before the zero lower
bound (ZLB) was reached. The long-short strategy is reconstructed after the ZLB was reached
due to changes in stocks’ sensitivity to investor sentiment. However, it is still the short leg stocks
that are more affected by the path surprises. The stronger response of the short leg implies that
the stocks which are more exposed to investor sentiment are also more sensitive to monetary
policy shocks.
Finally in Chapter 3 we examine how investor sentiment states affect the stock price drift
before the scheduled FOMC announcements. We find that the returns on the S&P500 index
increase significantly over the pre-FOMC window only during periods of high sentiment. We
i
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also find that investors allocate assets from low risk short-term T-bills to stocks on the pre-
FOMC window during periods of high sentiment. Our findings on the pre-FOMC announcement
order imbalance show that there are more buyer-initiated trade than seller-initiated trade on the
S&P500 constituents during periods of high sentiment. These findings provide a behavioural
explanation to the pre-FOMC announcement puzzle.
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Introduction
The ultimate goals of monetary policy are to promote maximum sustainable output and employ-
ment and to promote stable prices. However, the most immediate impact of monetary policy
is on financial markets; by affecting asset prices and returns, policymakers are able to modify
economic behavior to achieve their ultimate objectives (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). In gen-
eral, the Fed employs two kinds of monetary tools. For the majority outside the financial crisis,
the Fed employs conventional monetary policy, which mainly focuses on adjusting the target
Federal Funds Rate (FFR). However, in order to combat the declining financial and economic
conditions during the 2008 crisis, the FOMC kept cutting the target FFR, and finally pushed it
towards the zero-lower bound (ZLB) in late 2008. After that, the ability of the Fed to boost
financial markets and stimulate economic growth using the conventional monetary policy tools
is restricted. Realizing the limits of the conventional monetary policy, the Fed started to employ
unconventional monetary policy. In late 2007, the Fed began to provide non-sterilized liquidity
facilities. More measures including more explicit forward guidance through FOMC statements
and large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programmes were employed at 2009, after the ZLB was
reached.
The financial economics literature documents a significant stock price response to monetary
policy shifts (Thorbecke (1997); Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005);
Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013); Maio (2014)). Stock prices respond positively to monetary
easing. These studies typically interpret their findings within the efficient markets framework
in which stock prices adjust efficiently as rational agents incorporate monetary policy news. As
suggested by a dividend discount model of stock valuation, shifts in monetary policy affect stock
prices through changes in the rates that market participants use to discount future cash flows,
and through changes in the expected cash flows (Patelis (1997)).1 In these studies, investor
sentiment has no role affecting the response of stock returns to monetary policy news.
On the other hand, behavioural financial economists question the assumptions underlying
rational asset pricing, and establish that investor sentiment affects stock prices (Lee, Shleifer,
and Thaler (1991); Kumar and Lee (2006); Baker and Wurgler (2006); Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2012); Chung, Hung, and Yeh (2012); Shen, Yu, and Zhao (2017)). However, despite
1Using a returns variance decomposition framework, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that revisions in ex-
pected returns, that is, discount rate news, explain the impact of monetary policy shocks on the stock market.
2
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the importance of investor sentiment on asset prices, little has been done on the role that senti-
ment plays in the transmission of news to the stock market. An exception is the study of Mian
and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), who investigate the impact of sentiment in the incorporation of
accounting information into stock prices.
Motivated by these findings, this thesis investigates how investor sentiment affect the impact
of monetary policy shocks on asset prices over the June-1989 to October-2014 sample period.
We consider both market-wide stock returns (see Chapter 1) and the cross-section of stock re-
turns (see Chapter 2). Moreover, we also examine how inventor sentiment affects the pre-FOMC
stock price drift documented by Lucca and Moench (2015) (see Chapter 3).
Chapter 1 investigates the role that investor sentiment plays in the response of U.S. market-
wide stock returns to monetary policy shocks over June-1989 to October-2014. We find that
the state of investor sentiment strongly affects the transmission of monetary policy shocks to
the stock market. For conventional monetary policy prior to the ZLB, our key findings are as
follows. First, the impact of monetary policy shocks on the stock market concentrates on the
sentiment-correction phase that follows overvaluation episodes, particularly when sentiment is
high at the start of the year but then falls. In contrast, during periods when sentiment starts at
low level but then increases and optimism grows, the stock market does not show a statistically
significant price reaction to monetary policy shocks. Importantly, these effects of sentiment are
not driven by economic recessions or the incorporation of the recent financial crisis in the pre-
ZLB sample. Our findings that the market response to the monetary policy news is dependent
on the state of sentiment is stronger during monetary policy easing cycles.
Second, the stock market impact of monetary policy shocks is characterized by sign asym-
metry. The market response following periods of high sentiment is significant for expansionary
FFR surprises, but not tightening surprises. Third, our evidence indicates that accounting for
endogeneity does not alter our conclusions. Fourth, the effect of FFR surprises is predominantly
contemporaneous and displays only very short-run persistence. Fifth, the positive returns asso-
ciated with expansionary policy shocks are broad-based across U.S. industries and their pattern
is consistent with the implications of the CAPM. The industry effects are also conditional on the
state of investor sentiment.
Furthermore, we find that the impact of path surprises is statistically significant only during
periods when sentiment decreases. In contrast to the findings from FFR shocks prior to the ZLB,
the effect of path surprises is not only driven by expansionary news. We show that, amongst liq-
uidity facilities’ and LSAPs’ announcements, only those related to the establishment of central
bank liquidity swaps matter. Conditional on the state of investor sentiment, the stock market
reacted positively to these announcements. Finally, we show that our results remain strong and
consistent to a host of robustness checks.
Importantly, this chapter contributes to the nascent line of work that seeks to incorporate
findings from behavioural finance to examine the stock market reaction to news, as well as the
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established literature that studies the effects of the Fed’s conventional and non-conventional
policy actions on financial markets. We develop a new measure of sentiment states, based upon
changes in sentiment and show that it reveals important information about the trading behaviour
of investors during periods of sentiment adjustment. Hence, we extend the previous literature
on the asset pricing implications of sentiment, which overlooks the dynamic behaviour of senti-
ment. Our work is also related to the literature on state dependence in the relationship between
stock market and monetary policy. Several studies consider business cycle effects and show
that the stock market response is stronger during recessions (Basistha and Kurov (2008); Perez-
Quiros and Timmermann (2000)). In contrast, our focus is on sentiment states, which have small
or zero correlation with the business cycle. Furthermore, sentiment corrections are not solely
associated with bear markets but also occur during bull markets. Hence, our analysis is distinct
from previous studies that condition the stock market response to policy surprises on bull-bear
regimes (Chen (2007); Jansen and Tsai (2010); Kurov (2010)).
This chapter also relates to a recent study by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), who
examine whether stock price changes in response to firm-specific earnings surprises are affected
by lagged sentiment. They conclude that behavioral biases affect how accounting information
is impounded into stock prices. Our work has a different angle by focusing on market-wide
news that stem from shifts in monetary policy, as opposed to firm-specific news. Two other
related recent studies are those of Garcia (2013) and Cenesizoglu (2014), who also argue that
investors’ sensitivity to news is characterised by state dependence. In Garcia’s (2013) analysis,
however, this is related to the state of the business cycle, with the sensitivity to news being
stronger during economic downturns; whereas we focus on sentiment downturns that, as we
argue above, are distinct from recessions. Similarly, in Cenesizoglu (2014) it is the underlying
state of the economy that matters. This chapter extends previous work by Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005), Lucca and Moench (2015) and Savor and Wilson (2014), among others, who find that the
CAPM performs well on days associated with monetary policy news. We show that the CAPM
does a good job in explaining the observed cross-industry variation of FOMC announcement-
day returns only during sentiment-correction phases. Different from our event study analysis,
Antoniou et al. (2015) use monthly data for asset-pricing tests and show that the security market
line is positively slopped only following low sentiment periods. Finally, a related strand of the
literature tests for pre-announcement effects on returns and/or order imbalance and volatility,
without, however, accounting for the possible impact of sentiment states (Lucca and Moench
(2015); Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016); Kurov et al. (2017); Neuhierl and Weber (2017); Cieslak
et al. (2018)).
In Chapter 2 we analyzes the effect of investor sentiment states on the response of cross-
sectional stock returns to monetary policy news using an event study approach over the Jun-89
to Oct-14 sample period. We consider 15 portfolio sorts which are commonly used by previous
literature on stock market anomalies: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-
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to-market ratio (BM), cash to asset (CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv),
momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980), asset tangibility
(PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma)
and market value of equity (Size).
We first construct a long-short strategy for each portfolio. Specifically, we consider the
extreme deciles, 1 and 10 only. We classify the short leg as the decile which is more exposed
to investor sentiment. For the pre-ZLB period, we define the deciles which are with lower
returns following periods of high sentiment as with higher sentiment-sensitivity. For the ZLB
period, because the level of investor sentiment is always low, we define the deciles with higher
average returns as with higher sentiment-sensitivity. Our results show that, before the ZLB was
reached, stocks with high accruals, young stocks, stocks with high asset growth rate, stocks with
low book-to-market ratio, stocks with high cash to asset ratio, stocks with low gross profitability,
high investment stocks, past loser stocks, stocks with high net operating assets, distressed stocks,
stocks with low asset tangibility, less profitable stocks, stocks with high return volatility, and
large stocks are defined as the short leg. However, sentiment-sensitivity for portfolios sorted by
total accruals, asset growth, book-to-market ratio, investment to asset, net operating assets, and
size have changed, after the ZLB was reached. The short leg of those portfolios at the pre-ZLB
period become the long leg at the ZLB period.
Further, we find that, in line with our results on market-wide stock returns in Chapter 1,
conventional monetary policy news affect the cross-sectional stock returns only following pe-
riods of high sentiment. Unconventional monetary policy affect cross-sectional stock returns
only during periods of decreasing sentiment. Importantly, the effect of monetary policy shocks
differs across the cross-section of stocks. For the conventional monetary policy shocks, we find
a positive and significant impact on the long-short spread of most portfolios following periods
of high sentiment, which results from the larger impact on the short-leg. For instance, consider
the size-sorted portfolio, the impact of FFR shocks on the short-leg (large) stocks is about four
times larger than the impact on the long-leg (small) stocks (-8.01 vs. -1.73). For the unconven-
tional monetary policy shocks, although our results suggest changes in the long-short strategy
for some portfolios, we still find that path surprises positively drive the long-short spread, only
during periods of decreasing sentiment. It is also the short leg stocks that are more affected.
For example, the stocks with high asset growth rate are more exposed to investor sentiment at
the pre-ZLB period. During the ZLB period, however, the stocks with low asset growth rate are
more sensitive to investor sentiment. Our results point out that, stocks with high asset growth
rate are more affected by conventional monetary policy at the pre-ZLB period, and stocks with
low asset growth rate are more affected by unconventional monetary policy at the ZLB period.
These results indicate that stocks which are more sensitive to investor sentiment, are also more
sensitive to monetary policy shocks.
This chapter enhances our argument in Chapter 1, that the state of investor sentiment strongly
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affects the transmission of conventional and non-convectional monetary policy to asset prices.
By investigating the responses of 15 stock portfolios, this chapter contributes to previous studies
that examine the differential impact of monetary policy shocks on the returns of portfolios con-
structed on the basis of fundamental characteristics (Thorbecke (1997); Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2004); Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013); Maio (2014)), which cover only the value, size, mo-
mentum and financial constrain anomalies. In addition, our evidence that the region of the cross-
section of stocks that are more exposed to investor sentiment are also likely to be more sensitive
to monetary policy news indicates the existence of a behavioural channel in the transmission of
monetary policy shocks to stock returns.
In Chapter 3, we examine the impact of investor sentiment on the pre-FOMC announcement
stock price drift over the period from February 1994 to October 2015. We show that, the state of
investor sentiment strongly affects stock returns over the pre-FOMC window, which we define
as one day before the scheduled FOMC announcement day, the last trading day before investors
can observe signals about policy decisions. We find that the positive drift of the S&P500 index
over the pre-FOMC window concentrates only on the sentiment-exuberance state. Specifically,
in high sentiment months, the S&P500 index increases about 23 basis points on the pre-FOMC
window. In contrast, in low sentiment months, FOMC meetings do not feature statistically
significant pre-announcement returns.
Further, we find that the pre-FOMC drift does not contain information about the subsequent
outcome of the FOMC announcement. The positive and significant pre-FOMC drift during high
sentiment months occurs, regardless of whether the subsequent FOMC announcement delivers
an unexpected cut or rise in the FFR. We also find a pre-FOMC effect in the short-term fixed
income securities during periods of high sentiment.
Moreover, other macroeconomic releases do not feature statistically significant preannounce-
ment returns, even after we consider the state of investor sentiment. Using the Google Search
Volume Index (SVI) as a proxy for investor attention, we show that, compared with other
macroeconomic announcements, FOMC announcement grabs more attention among investors.
We also find that, the pre-FOMC drift is not related to the business cycle. It is also unrelated
to the yet-to-be-realized policy decision, as measured by the unexpected change in the FFR, as
defined in Kuttner (2001), or the market participants’ expectation about the future path of mon-
etary policy, as measured using the approach of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005). Finally,
our evidence shows that there are more buying activities than selling activities, i.e., a positive
order imbalance, over the pre-FOMC window during high sentiment months, which points out
potential behavioural explanation for the pre-FOMC puzzle.
This chapter contributes to the developing standard of literature that how stock price changes
in anticipation of macro-economy and/or monetary policy announcement (Lucca and Moench
(2015); Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016); Kurov et al. (2017)). We extend the literature by in-
corporating insides behavioural finance. This chapter is the first to show that the positive drift
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of the S&P500 index occurs only during periods of high sentiment. Our findings of the senti-
ment conditionality of pre-FOMC drift, together with the inability of the rational based stories
to explain the drift, points to a behavioural explanation. Our findings also relates to the studies
on pre-announcement drifts of individual stock returns before earnings announcements (see, for
example Lamont and Frazzini (2007)). Most of these studies point to the behavioral “attention-
grabbing" effect as a potential explanation. Our results offers a new angle by considering the
state of investor sentiment.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the effect of monetary policy shifts on stock
prices (Thorbecke (1997); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Chen (2007); Wright (2012); Swanson
(2015)). These studies mainly focus on the price effect on FOMC announcement days.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. We first review the literature that has
been cited in this thesis, and then present the chapters with empirical studies. In Chapter 1 we
investigate the impact of investor sentiment states on the response of the U.S market-wide stock
returns to monetary policy shocks over the June-1989 to October-2014 sample. In Chapter 2
we investigate the responses of U.S. portfolio returns to monetary policy shocks across differ-
ent sentiment states over the June-1989 to October-2014 sample. In Chapter 3 we investigate
how investor sentiment states affect the pre-FOMC drift in stock returns over February-1994 to
October-2015. Chapter 4 concludes. The estimates presented in Chapters 3 has been submitted
to a special issue of the European Journal of Finance. The working paper derived from Chapter
1 is available at SSRN (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3184974), and the
working paper derived from Chapter 2 will be available online soon.
Literature review
The relationship between monetary policy and asset returns has been extensively researched in
the past decades. Recent studies also document the important role that investor sentiment plays
in asset pricing. Moreover, researchers also document that there is a stock price drift ahead of
FOMC announcements. Given the sheer volume and scope of material, it is important to outline
which studies are included in this thesis. In Chapter 1 of this thesis we examine the impact of
Federal Funds rate (FFR) shocks on the U.S. market-wide stock returns across different senti-
ment states following the event study methodology in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). In Chapter
2 we extend the analyses in Chapter 1, we investigate the impact of FFR shocks on the cross-
sectional stock returns across different sentiment states. We consider 15 stock portfolios which
have been widely used in previous studies (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2006); Stambaugh
et al. (2012); Novy-Marx (2013)). In Chapter 3 we provide a behaviorial explanation to the
pre-FOMC drift introduced by Lucca and Moench (2015). In this chapter, we review the papers
which cited these studies. We start by reviewing the frameworks which examine the impact of
monetary policy on stock returns. We subsequently review the studies on investor sentiment and
stock returns. Finally, we evaluate the empirical studies which link monetary policy to investor
sentiment.
On monetary policy and stock returns
The response of stock returns to monetary policy
There is a large number of studies on monetary policy and stock returns in the past decades. Most
of the early studies use the VAR model to examine the response of stock returns to monetary
policy. Since 1990s, more and more studies started to use the event study methodology to
analyse the impact of monetary policy on stock returns. According to Rigobon and Sack (2004)
the event study methodology avoids the pitfalls of endogeneity and lack of identification by
developing and employing a truly exogenous measure of monetary policy shocks. In this thesis,
we also employ an event study methodology to examine the impact of monetary policy on stock
returns across different sentiment states. Thus, in this literature review section, we mainly focus
on the papers which employ an event-study methodology or examine the state-dependence of
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monetary policy impact.
Thorbecke (1997) examine the impact of monetary policy on stock returns with both the
VAR and the event study methodology. In their event study analysis, they measure monetary
policy shocks as the changes in the federal funds rate. They find that changes in the federal
funds rate are negatively related to stock returns, which is the same as the results they obtained
from the VAR model. Their evidence on the size-sorted stock portfolio show that monetary
shocks have larger effects on small firms than large firms.
Krueger and Kuttner (1996) argue that the Fed funds futures rate could be used as a predictor
of federal reserve policy. The show that FFR futures provided efficient and unbiased forecasts
of the target FFR. They find that there is a very small risk premium in FFR futures, and that they
were good at forecasting potential future target FFR changes by the Fed. They concluded that
“traders, investors, or economists interested in predicting near-term Fed actions would be hard
pressed to improve on the Fed funds futures rate." In a subsequent study, Kuttner (2001) provide
a measure of monetary policy surprises extracted from the FFR futures contract. The measure is
defined as the difference between the actual realised target FFR and the expected FFR gauged
from the one-month ahead 30-Day FFR futures contract which tracked the underlying instrument
of the effective FFR. They employ an event study analysis, and the event-dates considered are
the FOMC meeting days when the Fed changed the target FFR. On each event-day, they measure
measured the unexpected component of FFR changes (∆iut ) as the change in the implied rate on
the spot-month FFR futures contract ( f 0m,t), as traded on the CBOT, relative to the day before
the change ( f 0m,t−1). In order to counteract the fact that the settlement price for the FFR future
contract was based upon the average effective FFR over the month, they developed a scaling
adjustment for the unexpected FFR changes related to the number of days in the month affected
by the change. Equation 1 presents the definition of the unexpected FFR shocks.
∆iut =
D
D− t ( f
0
m,t− f 0m,t−1) (1)
Where f 0m,t is the current-month implied futures rate (100 minus the futures contract price),
and D is the number of days in the month. Moreover, when the FOMC meeting falls on one of
the last three days of the month, the unscaled change in the one-month futures rate ( f 1m,t– f
1
m,t−1)
is used to calculate the FFR surprise. Also, when the FOMC meeting occurs on the first day
of the month, f 1m−1,D, instead of f
0
m,t−1, is used to measure the surprise. They also consider the
expect component of FFR change, which is calculated as the actual target FFR changes minus
the computed unexpected FFR changes:
∆iet = ∆it−∆iut (2)
They then examine the impact of ∆iet and ∆iut on bill, note, and bond yields. They find
that there is a strong relationship between the unexpected component of FFR changes and the
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market interest rates. However, the response to expected changes is small. This methodology
of defining unexpected FFR changes subsequently became one of the most popular measures of
defining monetary policy shocks in the empirical literature.
Following the event study analysis of Kuttner (2001), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) examine
the impact of monetary policy on daily stock returns on the FOMC meeting days. They consider
both scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meetings over June 1989 to December 2002. They also
investigate the impact of both expected and unexpected FFR changes.
Rt = β0+β1∆it + εt (3)
Rt = β0+β1∆iet +β2∆i
u
t + εt (4)
Their evidence show that there is no significant impact of the actual target FFR changes on
market-wide stock returns. However, they find that unexpected component of the FFR changes
significantly affect stock returns on the FOMC meeting days. Specifically, an unanticipated
25-basis-point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated with about a 1% increase in
broad stock indexes. Moreover, consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis, according to
which that the expected component of monetary policy has already been priced into the market,
they find that the impact of the expected FFR changes on stock returns is statistically insignifi-
cant. They further a sub-sample analysis, which is from February 1994 to December 2002. In
February 1994 the Fed started to announce its decisions and publish accompanying statements,
a development that enhanced transparency in monetary policy. They find that the coefficient of
unexpect FFR changes on market-wide stock returns become larger (-8.13%) and statistically
significant for the post-1994 period. The coefficient decrease in magnitude, but remains sig-
nificant after controlling for outliers. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) also develop a measure of
monthly FFR shocks.
∆iut =
1
D
D
∑
d=1
it,d− f 1m−1,D (5)
where it,d is the funds rate target on day d of month t, and f 1m−1,D is the rate corresponding to
the 1-month futures contract on the last (Dth) day of month t-1.
They examine the responses of Fama-French industry portfolio returns to expected and un-
expected FFR changes, using monthly data. They find that the 10 stock portfolio returns are
negatively related to FFR unexpected changes, however insignificant responses were observed
for Energy and Utilities. The strongest significant negative responses were yielded for Tele-
coms (-16.10%), High Tech (-14.73%) and Durables (-12.45%). They also investigate whether
monetary policy affects stock values through its effects on real interest rates,expected future
dividends,or expected future stock returns. They use the VAR based decomposition method
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of Campbell and Ammer (1993), and they find that monetary policy’s impact on equity prices
comes predominantly through its effect on expected future excess equity returns.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) also analyses the effects of U.S. monetary policy on stock
markets using an event study methodology. They also focus on the unexpected component of
monetary policy. Similar to Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), monetary policy
surprise is defined as the difference between the announcement of the FOMC decision and the
market expectation. However, different to these studies, they did not extract the unexpected
component of FFR from the FFR futures contract. Instead, the expectation data for monetary
policy decisions originate from a Reuters poll among market participants, conducted on Fridays
before each FOMC meeting. They use the mean of the survey as the expectations measure. They
find that monetary policy affects individual stocks in a strongly heterogeneous fashion. Indus-
trial sectors that are cyclical and capital-intensive react frequently two to three times stronger to
U.S. monetary policy than non-cyclical industries. They also find that firms that are financially
constrained respond significantly more to monetary policy than less constrained ones. Specifi-
cally, firms with low cash flows, small size, poor credit ratings, low debt to capital ratios, high
price-earnings ratios, or a high Tobin’s q are affected significantly more by monetary policy.
Chen (2007) provide evidence that the impact of monetary policy on stock returns is state de-
pendent. They employ the Markov-switching model framework and consider various measures
of monetary policy, including discount rate changes, FFR changes and orthogonalized innova-
tions from VAR models. They find that monetary policy has larger effects on stock returns in
bear markets. Because the aggregate measures considered were subject to critique concerning
potential endogeneity and measurement error associated with aggregate monthly data, they also
employ an event study methodology. Similar to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), they measure
FFR shocks by gauging expectations from survey data, and extending the linear specification
of their model to a Markov-switching framework. Their event study results also show that the
impact of monetary policy shocks on stock returns is larger in the bear market. Jansen and Tsai
(2010) also find similar results, that monetary policy shocks have larger impact on stock returns
in the bear market. Moreover, they show that controlling for the capacity for external finance,
stock returns of firms in bear states respond more than firms in bull states. Capacity for external
finance is more important in a bear market, as it partially mitigates the larger impact of monetary
policy in a bear market.
Basistha and Kurov (2008) examines cyclical variation in the effect of Fed policy on the
stock market. They utilise an equivalent dataset and employ the same event study methodology
of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). They find that the effect of unexpected changes in the fed funds
target rate on stock returns depends on the state of the business cycle and on credit market condi-
tions. Specifically, during the NBER recession periods, the coefficient of the monetary surprise
in recession is about -6.83, which indicates that a hypothetical unexpected 100-basis point cut
of the fed funds target during recessions lead to a stock prices jump of 6.83 percent. In contrast,
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during economic expansion, the coefficient is only -2.68. The impact of FFR shocks on stock
returns during recessions is more than double the size of the impact in expansions. They also
investigate the impact of FFR shocks on stock returns across different credit conditions. They
consider two credit conditions indicators: the percentage of loan officers reporting tightening
credit standards, and the spread between higher yielding bonds and AAA rated bond yields,
both normalised by sample mean and standard deviation. The response of stock returns to FFR
shocks doubled in magnitude when the credit conditions variable increased by one standard de-
viation. This implies that stocks are associated with larger magnitude responses to monetary
policy shocks during periods of tightening credit market conditions. Moreover, in the cross-
section, they show that financially constrained firms respond more than relatively unconstrained
firms to monetary shocks in adverse macroeconomic conditions.
Kontonikas, MacDonald, and Saggu (2013) examine the response of US stock returns to
FFR surprises between 1989 and 2012, with an emphasis on the impact of the recent financial
crisis, using the same event study methodology of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). They find
that outside the crisis period, there is a significant negative relationship between FFR shocks
and stock returns. However, an important structural shift occurs during the crisis, changing the
response of stock returns to FFR shocks and the nature of state dependence. Throughout the
crisis period, stocks did not react positively to unexpected FFR cuts, which were interpreted as
signals of worsening future economic conditions. Their findings highlight the severity of the
crisis and the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero lower bound.
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, due to the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary
policy, the Fed applied unconventional monetary policy, which includes the forward guidance,
the provision of non-sterilized liquidity facilities and the large scale purchases of longer-term
assets from the private sector.
Forward guidance implies that the central bank attempts to influence the path of future short-
term rates by communicating to the public and financial markets. Forward guidance has been
intensively used since 2009, but it has long been a part of the Fed’s toolkit, with elements of
it traced to FOMC statements of the Greenspan era. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)
develop a methodology to identify two dimensions of the Fed’s policy: changes in the current
FFR target and changes in forward guidance. They show that both target surprises and path
surprises are useful to describe monetary policy shocks. Path surprises should capture news
conveyed to market participants by the FOMC’s statement about the expected path of policy
above and beyond what they learn for the FFR target level. They calculate path surprises using
principal component analysis. Using an event study methodology, they find that path surprises
have no significant impact on stock returns over the January 1990 to December 2004 sample
period. However, they find that path surprises have a great impact on longer-term Treasury
yields.
Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) examines the impact of macroeconomic and financial sector policy
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announcements in the United States, the United Kingdom, the euro area, and Japan on interbank
credit and liquidity risk premia during the crisis. Using an event study methodology, they find
that market significantly moves surrounding announcements related to central bank liquidity
swaps. Wright (2012) use a high-frequency event-study approach to examine the impact of the
LSAP program. They find that stimulative monetary policy shocks lower Treasury and corporate
bond yields, but the effects die off fairly fast, with an estimated half-life of about two months.
In a subsequent paper, Rogers et al. (2014) examine the effects of unconventional monetary
policy by the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, European Central Bank and Bank of Japan
on bond yields, stock prices and exchange rates. They use intraday data to identify monetary
policy surprises (MPS) through changes in bond yields. Specifically, they focus on the days with
LSAP announcements. They findings show that the unconventional monetary policy are indeed
effective in easing broad financial conditions.
Stock price drift before monetary policy announcements
In the past few decades, the majority of the studies on monetary policy focus on the post-FOMC
announcement response of stock returns. However, there are also several studies which examine
the pre-announcement drift in the stock market. Bomfim (2003) examine pre-announcement
effects on the stock market in the context of public disclosure of monetary policy decisions.
They focus on a pre-announcement window which is one day right before a scheduled FOMC
announcement. They find that the conditional volatility is abnormally high on FOMC announce-
ment days. However, on the pre-announcement window, they find a “calm-before-the-storm" ef-
fects in the stock market, according to which the conditional volatility is abnormally low. They
also document that the effect is significant only after February 1994, when the FOMC started to
adopt the practice of making its policy decisions during the days of regularly scheduled FOMC
meetings.
In a recent paper, Lucca and Moench (2015) find large average excess returns on U.S.equities
in anticipation of monetary policy decisions made at scheduled meetings of the FOMC in the
past few decades. They refer this phenomenon as the pre-FOMC announcement drift. They use
intraday data on the S&P500 index over February 1994 to March 2011, and they employ a pre-
announcement window, which is from 2p.m on the day before a scheduled FOMC announcement
to 2pm on the announcement days. Their findings show that since 1994, there is an increase of
49 basis points in the S&P500 index in the 24 hours before scheduled FOMC announcements.
These returns do not revert in subsequent trading days and are orders of magnitude larger than
those outside the 24-hour pre-FOMC window. As a result, about 80% of annual realized excess
stock returns since 1994 are accounted for by the pre-FOMC announcement drift. They also
find that the realized volatility and trading volume are lower in the pre-announcement window
as compared to other days. Moreover, they show that the pre-FOMC drift happens in other
major international equity indices. However, there is no such effect in U.S. Treasury securities
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and money market futures. Furthermore, they show that there is no significant stock price drift
ahead of other major U.S. macroeconomic news announcements. They also show that the pre-
FOMC drift is not affected by business or monetary cycles. They examine several explanations,
however, none of them could fully explain the pre-FOMC drift. First, the pre-FOMC drift cannot
be explained by the traditional asset pricing theory, according to which higher returns are earned
as compensations for higher systematic risks. Their evidence shows that both the realized and
implied volatility are actually lower on the pre-announcement window. They also consider the
information leakage story. However, they find that the pre-FOMC drift is not related to the
monetary policy shocks after the announcements. Moreover, motivated by the lower trading
volume and volatility level on the pre-FOMC window, they consider another explanation based
on the “volatility feed" back effect. According to Campbell and Hentschel (1992), because
of its persistence, an unexpected decline in volatility leads to a downward revision in future
expected volatility, and thus to lower risk and higher contemporaneous returns. They examine
the pre-FOMC drift again after controlling for the liquidly and volatility. Their findings show
that, although decreases by about 20% in magnitude, the pre-FOMC drift is still statistically
significant. Thus the “volatility feed" back effect can only partially explain the pre-FOMC drift.
They call the pre-FOMC drift as a “puzzle".
Following Lucca and Moench (2015), Bernile et al. (2016) also examine the pre-FOMC
drift. Different to Lucca and Moench (2015), they employ a narrow (1-hour) window ahead of
scheduled FOMC announcements, with an emphasis on the news embargo periods. They find
that investors’ trading activity, as proxied by the E-mini S&P500 futures’ abnormal order imbal-
ances (measured as the difference between buyer- and seller-initiated trading volumes divided
by the total trading volume), is in the direction of subsequent policy surprises and contain infor-
mation that predicts the market reaction to the policy announcements during the embargo peri-
ods. Specifically, the abnormal order imbalances are 7.75–8.73% higher for FOMC surprise an-
nouncements compared with non-surprise ones. They argue that information leakage is the main
drive of the pre-FOMC drift during such periods. They find similar pre-FOMC drift in the order
imbalances of some other futures contracts. However, there is no evidence of pre-announcement
drift ahead of other macro-economic announcements. Kurov et al. (2017) also investigate the
pre-announcement drift with an expanded set of 20 macroeconomic announcements. They also
find evidence of informed trading on the pre-announcement window. With a detailed discus-
sion of the pre-announcement information leakage, they show that pre-announcement informed
trading is limited neither to the FOMC announcements nor to the last minute before the official
release time. Specifically, their findings show that the pre-announcement information leakage
is most likely to happen ahead of announcements released by organizations that are not subject
to Principal Federal Economic Indicator (PFEI) guidelines. Moreover, they also find that the
pre-announcement information leakage is related to the release procedures. The release proce-
dures fall into one of three categories. The first category involves posting the announcement on
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the organization’s website at the official release time, so that all market participants can access
the information at the same time. The second category involves pre-releasing the information to
selected journalists in “lock-up rooms". The third category involves the least secure pre-release
procedure: Instead of being pre-released in lock-up rooms, these announcements are electron-
ically transmitted to journalists who are asked not to share the information with others. They
find that the announcements pre-released under the least secure procedure are associated with a
stronger pre-announcement drift. In a most recent study, Boguth et al. (2018) show that a large
risk premium is earned in the 24 hours preceding FOMC announcements. They argue that the
large risk premium corresponds with high uncertainly and high investor attention level. Thus
the pre-FOMC drift is a result of investors’ massive attention on the FOMC meetings. More-
over, they show that, since 2011, the large risk premium and stock price drift ahead of a FOMC
announcement occur only if the Chair of the Federal Reserve holds a press conference after the
FOMC announcement. The risk premium is small ahead of the FOMC announcements which
are not followed by a press conference and there is no pre-FOMC stock price drift either. One
possible explanation is that if there is no scheduled press conference after a FOMC meeting,
investors will not pay too much attention to that meeting. The lack of attention leads to the
disappearing pre-FOMC drift on these days.
On investor sentiment and stock returns
“Classical finance theory leaves no role for investor sentiment." (Baker and Wurgler (2006))
Investor sentiment, defined broadly, is a belief about future cash flows and investment risks
that is not justified by the facts at hand (Baker and Wurgler (2007)). Traditional finance model,
according to which investors are fully rational, suggests that investors will diversify to optimize
the statistical properties of their portfolios. This leads to the equilibrium that stock price equals
the rational present value of expected future cash flows. However, in the real world, there are
many events that defy the rational explanation: the Great Crash of 1929, the Tronics Boom of
the early 1960s, the Go-Go Years of the late 1960s, the Nifty Fifty bubble of the early 1970s,
the Black Monday crash of October 1987, and the Internet or Dot.com bubble of the 1990s.
Therefore, researchers in behavioral finance challenge the view that investors are fully rational,
and present evidence that psychological and behavioral elements impact stock prices.
De Long et al. (1990) examine the noise trader risk in the financial market. They develop
a model according to which there are two types of investors in the stock market: rational and
irrational traders. Rational traders (who are usually treated as arbitrageurs) are sentiment-free.
Irrational (noise) traders, however, are subject to exogenous sentiment. They provide evidence
that the unpredictable noise traders’ beliefs create a risk in the price of the asset, as a result, noise
trading could drive the market price away from its fundamental values, even in the absence of
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fundamental risk. They argue that the attractiveness of arbitrage are reduced due to the risk
created by the opinions of irrational traders. In a market where noise traders are presented,
rational arbitrageurs are limited in various ways. Because movements in investor sentiment are
unpredictable, arbitrageurs need to run the risk to bet against mispricing. As a consequence of
such ‘noise trader risk,’ arbitrage positions can lose money in the short run. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) expand the discussions on the limits of arbitrage. They develop a model in which both
the noise traders and the arbitrageurs are considered. Their evidence also shows that betting
against sentimental investors is costly and risky. The assumptions developed in these studies,
that investors are subject to sentiment and there are limits to arbitrage, have been widely used
by researchers in behaviorial finance.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) develop the prospect theory, according to which investors
evaluate outcomes according to their perception on gains and losses relative to a reference point,
typically the purchase price. They do not concern final wealth levels; investors are more sensi-
tive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude (loss aversion); and investors are risk-averse
for gains and risk seeking for losses. Thus, investors’ behaviorial biases can produce overreac-
tion to some events and underreaction to others (Barberis et al. (1998)). The study of Hong and
Stein (1999) shows that the medium-term momentum phenomena can be understood by appeal-
ing to investor underreaction due to the slowly diffusing news about future fundamentals. In
principle, underraction can be linked with varies behavioral mechanisms. For example, Barberis
et al. (1998) argue that it is the conservatism bias (see also Edwards (1968)) that leads to the
underraction. Baker and Stein (2004) link underreaction with investor sentiment. According to
the model they develop, when short-sales constraint is considered, as dumb (sentiment) investors
become more optimistic, smart investors will be driven to the sidelines. Because overconfident
dumb investors rely more on their own private information, and underreact to the information
contained in trade, the market become more liquid. They argue that liquidity is a good proxy
of investor sentiment. If a market is unusually liquid, then the prices are being dominated by
irrational investors, who tend to underreact to the information embodied in either order flow
or equity issues. Thus high liquidity is a sign that the sentiment of these irrational investors is
positive, and that expected returns are therefore abnormally low.
These theoretical studies show that investor sentiment plays an important role in asset pric-
ing. However, the sentiment sources are not straightforward to measure. In order to empirically
examine the role of investor sentiment in the capital market, researchers employed several prox-
ies of investor sentiment in the past few decades. Most of these studies focus on either (or both)
(1) the relation between changes in a proxy for sentiment and contemporaneous returns or (2)
the relation between a proxy for sentiment levels and subsequent returns. Moreover, the liter-
ature examines these issues for both the market (e.g., do high sentiment levels forecast lower
future market returns?) and the cross-section of returns (e.g., do high sentiment levels forecast
small stocks subsequently underperforming large stocks?).
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Investor Surveys. A direct measure of investor sentiment could be obtained by asking in-
vestors how optimistic they are. There are several survey-based sentiment measures that have
been widely used in previous studies. For example, the bull-bear spread extracted from the
Investors Intelligence surveys. Investors Intelligence compiles a weekly bull-bear spread by
categorizing approximately 150 market newsletters. Each week, the newsletters are read and
marked as bullish, bearish, or neutral again based on the expectation of future market move-
ments. Another commonly used sentiment measure is the Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI)
compiled by the University of Michigan. The CSI is based on surveys conducted by the Univer-
sity of Michigan in which 500 U.S. participants are asked questions about their outlook on the
economy. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) compiled by the Conference Board is also a
survey-based sentiment index that has been widely used in previous studies. Compared with the
CSI, it uses a larger pool of respondents (5,000) and somewhat different questions. Using these
sentiment measures, researchers find empirical evidence that investor sentiment plays an impor-
tant role in asset valuation. Brown and Cliff (2005) shows that the bull-bear spread extracted
from the Investors Intelligence surveys could predict future stock returns. They find that market
pricing errors implied by an independent valuation model are positively related to sentiment.
Moreover, they find that high investor sentiment is followed by lower market returns over the
next 1–3 years. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) explore the time-series relationship between
investor sentiment and the small-stock premium using CCI as a measure of investor optimism.
They find that investor sentiment forecasts the returns of small stocks and stocks with low insti-
tutional ownership in a manner consistent with the predictions of models based on noise-trader
sentiment. Moreover, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) explore the role of investor sentiment
in a broad set of anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. They argue that, due to the short-
sale impediments, overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing. Then, anomalies
should be stronger following periods of high sentiment, to the extent that the anomalies reflect
mispricing. Using CSI as a measure of investor sentiment, they find evidence that support their
view. Periods of high sentiment are followed by low returns in both the long and the short legs.
Specifically, because the short legs of the strategies are more exposed to investor sentiment, the
returns of the short legs go much lower, as compared to the long legs, which leads to the stronger
anomalies following periods of high sentiment.
Investor Mood. There are also papers that measure fluctuations in investor sentiment as ex-
ogenous changes in human emotions. Using an event study methodology, previous studies have
linked stock returns either to a single event or to a continuous variable that impacts investor
mood. For example, Kamstra et al. (2003) find that the market-wide stock returns are on aver-
age lower through the fall and winter, during which the seasonal depression is more pronounced.
They argue that declining hours of daylight in the winter affect human sentiment, risk tolerance,
and in turn, stock returns. They report patterns from different latitudes and both hemispheres
which also appear consistent with this interpretation. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) investi-
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gate the relationship between weather and stock returns. They find that morning sunshine in the
city of a country’s leading stock exchange is strongly significantly correlated with stock returns.
They attribute this phenomena to the phycological argument that sunny weather is associated
with upbeat mood, and optimism among investors leads to an increase in the stock returns. Ed-
mans et al. (2007) also examine the stock market reaction to sudden changes in investor mood.
They proxy investor mood by international soccer results. They find a significant market decline
after soccer losses. For example, a loss in the World Cup elimination stage leads to a next day
abnormal stock return of −49 basis points. This loss effect is stronger in small stocks and in
more important games. They also find a loss effect after international cricket, rugby, and basket-
ball games. However, there is no evidence of a corresponding reaction to wins in any of these
sports. Moreover, Cao and Wei (2005) link temperature to market-wide stock returns. They find
a significant negative relationship between temperature and stock returns in eight international
markets. They attribute this to the notion that lower temperatures can cause aggression, which
in turn, leads to high stock returns.
Retail Investor Trades. Because the inexperienced retail or individual investor is more likely
than the professional to be subject to sentiment. It is reasonable to proxy investor sentiment by
retail investor trades. Using the transaction data of 1.85 million retail investors over 1991–1996,
Kumar and Lee (2006) show that retail investors buy and sell stocks in concert, which is consis-
tent with systematic sentiment. Moreover, they find that the retail investor sentiment proxied by
retail investor trades has incremental explanatory power (over the standard risk factors and inno-
vations in macroeconomic variables) for small stocks, value stocks, stocks with low institutional
ownership, and stocks with lower prices. When retail investors grow relatively bullish (bearish),
the stocks in these portfolios enjoy higher (lower) contemporaneous excess returns. They also
find that, stocks which are difficult to arbitrage are more sensitive to changes in retail sentiment.
In a following study, Barber and Odean (2007) investigate the implications of retail investor
trades for subsequent, rather than contemporaneous, cross-sectional returns over a longer sam-
ple period. They find that small trade order imbalance forecasts future returns; stocks heavily
bought underperform stocks heavily sold by 4.4 percentage points the following year. They also
document that small stocks are most likely to be influenced by trades of retail investors.
Mutual Fund Flows. According to Frazzini and Lamont (2008), individual retail investors
actively reallocate their money across different mutual funds. One can measure individual sen-
timent by looking at which funds have inflows and which have outflows. Brown, Goetzmann,
Hiraki, Shirishi, and Watanabe (2003) propose a market sentiment measure which is based on
how fund investors are moving into and out of, for example, “safe" government bond funds and
“risky" growth stock funds. They find evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that daily
mutual fund flows may be instruments for investor sentiment about the stock market. More-
over, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) examine the dumb money effect. They show that individual
investors send their money to mutual funds which own stocks that do poorly over the subse-
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quent few years (dumb money). They use mutual fund flows as a measure of individual investor
sentiment for different stocks. They find that when funds holding a particular stock experience
strong inflows, the subsequent return of that stock is lower. They also document that the dumb
money effect is related to the value effect: high sentiment stocks tend to be growth stocks. Ben-
Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl (2012) also measure investor sentiment as the net exchange between
bond funds and equity funds. Different to Frazzini and Lamont (2008), which focus on individ-
ual stocks, their focus is on the effect of mutual fund investments on the market as a whole.
Using the aggregate mutual fund flows data over January 1984 to December 2008, they find that
one standard deviation of net exchanges is related to 1.95% of the contemporaneous market re-
turns, while about 85% of the contemporaneous relation is reversed within four months, and the
remainder is reversed within ten months. At the portfolio level, they also find that the sentiment
effect is stronger in smaller stocks and in growth stocks.
Option Implied Volatility. The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is constructed on any trading
day using the implied volatilities of options on equities in the S&P 100 index (Bandopadhyaya
and Jones (2008)). It is commonly referred to as the fear index or the fear gauge. For example,
Whaley (2000) discusses the spikes in the VIX series since its 1986 inception, which include the
crash of October 1987 and the 1998 Long Term Capital Management crisis.
Trading Volume. Previous studies also use trading volume, or more generally liquidity, as
an investor sentiment measure. According to the model developed by Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003), over confidence and speculative bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and
high price volatility. Moreover, Baker and Stein (2004) show that irrational investors are more
likely to trade, and thus add liquidity, when they are optimistic and betting on rising stocks rather
than when they are pessimistic and betting on falling stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2007) argue
that the ratio of trading volume to the number of shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), is a simple proxy for this concept.
Closed-End Fund Discount. Closed-end funds are investment companies who issue a fixed
number of shares, which then trade on stock exchanges. The closed-end fund discount is the
difference between the net asset value of a fund’s actual security holdings and the fund’s market
price. If closed-end funds are disproportionately held by retail investors, the average discount
on closed-end equity funds may be a sentiment index, with the discount increasing when retail
investors are bearish (Baker and Wurgler (2007)). There is a series of papers which debate about
closed-end fund discounts as a measure of sentiment. For example, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler
(1991) find that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well. Neal
and Wheatley (1998) also find that the closed-end fund discounts predict the difference between
small and large firm returns using data from 1933 to 1993.
Sentiment Matrix. As presented above, a number of sentiment proxies have been used in pre-
vious studies. However, there are no definitive or uncontroversial measures. Baker and Wurgler
(2006) form a composite sentiment index, which is based on the common variation in six under-
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lying proxies of investor sentiment: the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), NYSE share turnover
(TURN), the number and average first-day returns on IPOs (NIPO and RIPO), the equity share
in new issues (S), and the dividend premium (PD−NDt−1 ). They measure investor sentiment as the
first principal component of the correlation matrix of the six variables (or their lags). More-
over, in order to remove the impact of macro-economic factors on investor sentiment, they also
provide an orthogonalized version of investor sentiment index. They regress the six variables
on five macro-economic variables: the growth in the industrial production index (Federal Re-
serve Statistical Release G.17), growth in consumer durables, nondurables, and services (all
from BEA National Income Accounts Table 2.10), and a dummy variable for NBER recessions.
They take the first principal component of the six residuals series from these regressions as the
“pure" sentiment measure, which is immune to macro-economic variations. Specifically, the
orthogonalized sentiment index is obtained with the following equation:
Sentimentt =−0.198CEFDt +0.225TURNt−1+0.234NIPOt
+0.263RIPOt−1+0.211St−0.243PD−NDt−1
(6)
They investigate how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. They find that
when beginning-of-period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high
for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying
stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand,
these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns. The BW’s composite sentiment
index has been widely used in the previous studies (see e.g Yu and Yuan (2011); Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2012); McLean and Zhao (2014)). Moreover, Huang et al. (2015) use the partial
least squares (PLS) method to develop a new sentiment index, based on an extension of the BW
approach, aiming to align the investor sentiment measure with the purpose of predicting future
stock returns. By eliminating a common noise component in sentiment proxies, they argue that
their new index has much greater predictive power than the existing sentiment indices.
Searching Volume. Da et al. (2014) use daily Internet search volume as a proxy of market-
level sentiment. They aggregate the Google searching volume of queries related to household
concerns (e.g., “recession, “unemployment," and “bankruptcy"), they construct a Financial and
Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index as a new measure of investor sentiment.
They find that the their FEARS index predicts aggregate market returns in a way that is consistent
with theories of investor sentiment. In particular, the FEARS index is correlated with low returns
today but predicts high returns tomorrow, and such effect is stronger among stocks that are
favored by sentiment investors and are difficult to arbitrage.
Most of the studies on investor sentiment focus on the contemporaneous impact or the pre-
dict power of investor sentiment on asset pricing. There are also studies which consider investor
sentiment as a state factor. Yu and Yuan (2011) investigate the market’s mean–variance tradeoff
across different sentiment states. The sentiment proxy they use is the sentiment index developed
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by Baker and Wurgler (2006). They find that the there is a positive relationship between stock
market’s expected excess return and the market’s conditional variance during periods of low sen-
timent. During periods of high sentiment, however, the relationship becomes insignificant. A
plausible explanation is that there are more sentiment traders in the market during the high sen-
timent periods. Sentiment traders tend to be inexperienced and naive investors, who are likely to
have a poor understanding of how to measure risk. Thus heavy presence of sentiment investors
during high sentiment periods should undermine an otherwise positive mean–variance tradeoff
in the stock market. They also document a negative correlation between returns and contempo-
raneous volatility innovations in the low-sentiment periods, which is consistent with the stronger
positive ex ante relation during such periods. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) examine how
market-wide investor sentiment (proxied by the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006))
affects the response of stock returns to firm-specific earnings news. Their findings show that
the stocks prices are more sensitive to good earnings news during high sentiment periods. Dur-
ing periods of low sentiment, however, stock prices are more sensitive to bad earnings news.
The impact of sentiment is especially pronounced for the earnings news of small stocks, young
stocks, high volatility stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, and stocks with extremely high and
low market-to-book ratios. They argue that misreaction to earnings news is one possible channel
through which sentiment causes mispricing of stocks. Antoniou et al. (2013) examine how in-
vestor sentiment states affect the profitability of momentum strategies. They sentiment measure
they use is the Consumer Confidence Index. They argue that news which contradicts investors’
sentiment are diffusing slowly. Thus, losers (winners) become underpriced under optimism
(pessimism). They show that momentum profits arise under optimism. An analysis of net order
flows from small and large trades indicates that small investors are slow to sell losers during
optimistic periods. Momentum-based hedge portfolios formed during optimistic periods expe-
rience long-run reversals. Li and Luo (2016) provide a sentiment-based explanations of the
positive cross-sectional relation between cash holdings and future stock returns using the sen-
timent index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). They find that the cash holding effect is significant
when sentiment is low, especially among stocks with high transaction costs, high short selling
costs, and large idiosyncratic volatility. When sentiment is high, however, the effect is insignif-
icant. A plausible explanation is that, due to the limits-to-arbitrage, high costs and risk prevent
rational investors from exploiting the cash holding effect during periods of high sentiment. Shen
et al. (2017) provide a sentiment-based explanation to the fact that firms with high exposure to
macro risk factors do not earn higher unconditional expected returns. Using the sentiment index
developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), they find that high-risk firms earn significantly higher
returns than low-risk firms following low-sentiment periods whereas the exact opposite occurs
following periods of high-sentiment. They argue that it is because sentiment-driven investors
undermine the traditional risk-return tradeoff during high-sentiment periods.
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On monetary policy and investor sentiment
Previous studies show that investor sentiment plays an important role in the financial market,
however, only a limited number of studies have linked investor sentiment to monetary policy.
Kurov (2010) investigate the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks on market-wide
investor sentiment proxied by the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) and the bull-
bear spread extracted from the Investor Intelligence survey. Using an event study methodology,
they show that conventional monetary policy affect investor sentiment in bear market periods,
but not in bull market periods. Specifically, they find that a 100 basis point cut in the fed funds
target rate in bear market leads to a seven standard deviations increase in investor sentiment,
as proxied by the BWI. They argue that investors are likely to pay more attention to Fed pol-
icy decisions in bear markets because of intense media coverage and due to the fact that the
Fed is often viewed as the provider of the market-wide “put.” The increased level of investor
attention is likely to contribute to the effect of monetary shocks on sentiment in bear markets.
Moreover, they also examine the effect of sensitivity of stock returns to sentiment changes on
the response of disaggregated stock returns to monetary news. They find that the stocks which
have a larger sentiment β (more sensitive to changes in investor sentiment), are more exposed to
target rate surprises in bear market periods. Lutz (2015) investigate the impact of conventional
and unconventional monetary policy on several sentiment indices. The sentiment measures they
used include the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), the Consumer Sentiment Index
compiled by the University of Michigan, the bull-bear spread extracted from the Investor Intel-
ligence survey, the mutual funds flow, the closed-end fund discount and the Gallup U.S. Daily
Economic Conditions Index. For conventional monetary policy, they employ a structural factor-
augmented vector autoregression framework. Their results show that expansionary conventional
monetary policy shocks increase investor sentiment. For unconventional monetary policy, they
use an event study methodology. They also find that unconventional monetary policy shocks
have an economically meaningful impact on investor sentiment.
Although few studies have empirically linked investor sentiment to monetary policy. In-
vestor sentiment is one of the key concerns of central bankers, especially at the unscheduled
meetings. For example, the former Fed chair Greenspan states in his book that “The deflation
of the tech-stock bubble had been the great financial drama of the preceding months. The NAS-
DAQ lost a stunning 50 percent of its value between March [2001] and year-end...while the total
losses were small in comparison with the paper wealth that the bull market had created, these
were significant declines, and the Wall Street outlook remained gloomy, putting a damper on
public confidence....the downturn was at the top of the agenda...Sentiment...usually does not
shift smoothly from optimism to neutrality to gloom; it’s like the bursting of a dam, in which
a flood backs up until cracks appear and the dam is breached. The resulting torrent carries
with it whatever shreds of confidence there were, and what remains is fear. We seemed to
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be confronting such a breach....On January 3, the first business day of the New Year, we con-
vened again via conference call and cut the fed funds rate by half percentage point."(Greenspan
(2007)). Moreover, according to Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), the large effect of monetary
shocks on expected excess returns may be related to the influence of monetary policy on the
riskiness of stocks or on investor risk aversion. They note, however, that their results are also
consistent with investor overreaction or excess sensitivity of stock prices to monetary shocks. In
other words, investor psychology may play a significant role in the response of equity investors
to monetary news.
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Chapter 1
Investor Sentiment Regimes and the
Market-Wide Stock Price Reaction to
Monetary Policy
1.1 Abstract
This chapter shows that the state of investor sentiment strongly affects the transmission of
conventional and non-convectional monetary policy to the stock market. During sentiment-
correction periods, the excess stock market return is 2% (1%) on the day of an unexpected 25
basis points cut in the FFR (interest rate path). Stock market also responds significantly to an-
nouncements of central bank liquidity swaps. Furthermore, the industry portfolios’ response is
consistent with the implications of the CAPM, which suggests that during such periods investors
process information more systematically. In contrast, during periods of optimism build-up, the
stock market response is statistically insignificant.
1.2 Introduction
“Animal spirits, sentiment, psychology, whatever you want to call it, was central to the economic
and financial story..." (B. Bernanke, 2015)
In classical finance theory investor sentiment does not play a role in the transmission of news
to the stock market. Behavioural finance literature, however, documents that investor sentiment
affects stock prices (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991); Kumar and Lee (2006)). In the presence
of limited arbitrage, the build-up of optimism when sentiment increases leads to an extended
period of market overvaluation (De Long et al. (1990); Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)). The
eventual correction of the mispricing is associated with lower future stock returns (Baker and
Wurgler (2006); Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012); Huang et al. (2015)). Despite the importance
35
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impacts of investor sentiment on stock prices, little has been done to examine its role in the
transmission of news to the stock market.
In this chapter, we focus on news related to the monetary policy stance, stemming from
the Federal Reserve’s actions. Market participants and the financial press commonly assign a
large weight to the FOMC decisions to explain stock price changes. Policymakers also closely
monitor the immediate stock market response to monetary policy news because the policy effect
on the economy is indirect and delayed. A substantial literature documents a significant stock
price response to monetary policy shifts (Thorbecke (1997); Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004);
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Maio (2014); Ozdagli (2017)). These studies, however, do not
consider the role of sentiment on asset prices and interpret their findings within the efficient
markets framework.1 Given the evidence of sentiment-driven mispricing, a question that natu-
rally arises is whether the stock market response to monetary policy news depends on the state
of investor sentiment.
The phases of sentiment build-up and subsequent corrections may run over periods of time,
which implies that mispricing evolves over time (Baker and Wurgler (2006); Yu and Yuan
(2011); Chung, Hung, and Yeh (2012)). In order to capture these phases, we classify senti-
ment states using two approaches. The first approach follows the existing literature and uses a
classification based on the level of sentiment (Baker and Wurgler (2006); Yu and Yuan (2011);
Antoniou et al. (2015)). This intends to capture the effect of monetary policy news following
periods of high versus low sentiment. The second approach is novel and focuses on changes in
sentiment, in order to identify periods of optimism build-up vs. periods of waning sentiment.
The effects of investors’ trading behavior during these periods of sentiment adjustments has
not been closely studied. The two approaches are inherently related given the mean-reverting
property of sentiment (Baker and Wurgler (2006); Yu and Yuan (2011); Chung, Hung, and Yeh
(2012)). The correction phase that is of particular interest for our analysis is associated with
periods when sentiment starts at a high level but then decreases. We employ three alternative
measures of sentiment: the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, the U.S. Con-
sumer Confidence Index and the Sentiment Index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). We
orthogonalize each sentiment measure to a set of macroeconomic variables in order to remove
the effects of business cycle variation. This is important in order to distinguish between be-
havioural and rational explanations, since the latter focus on the state of the economy linking
time-varying expected returns to macroeconomic variables.2
We use an event study methodology to estimate the stock market reaction to monetary policy
1The dividend discount model of stock valuation suggests that shifts in monetary policy can affect stock prices
through changes in the rates that market participants use to discount future cash flows, and through changes in the
expected cash flows (Patelis (1997)). Using a returns variance decomposition framework, Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005) demonstrate the importance of revisions in expected returns, that is, discount rate news, in explaining the
impact of monetary policy shocks on the stock market.
2See, among others, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Liu and Zhang
(2008), and Maio (2013).
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news conditional on sentiment states. Our sample covers the period from June 1989 to October
2014, hence including the pre-crisis period, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its aftermath.
We analyze both conventional and non-conventional monetary policy shocks. The former are
measured through unexpected changes in the FFR using the methodology of Kuttner (2001).
With the significant impact of the crisis, the Fed cut rates to reach the ZLB by the end of 2008
and turned to non-conventional monetary policy. Given the almost zero volatility of FFR shocks
at the ZLB, our analysis of conventional monetary policy focuses on the pre-ZLB era. In terms
of non-conventional policy, the Fed implements so-called “forward guidance”, with which to in-
fluence the path of future short-term rates through various communication channels. Moreover,
the Fed implemented major changes in the size and composition of its balance sheet through
LSAP and the provision of liquidity facilities. As a proxy for news related to forward guidance,
we calculate path surprises following the approach of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
Our analysis also covers the impacts of the LSAP and the liquidity facilities announcements.
We find that the state of investor sentiment strongly affects the transmission of monetary
policy shocks to the stock market. For conventional monetary policy prior to the ZLB, our
key findings are as follows. First, the impact of monetary policy shocks on the stock market
concentrates on the sentiment-correction phase that follows overvaluation episodes, particularly
when sentiment is high at the start of the year but then falls. During these periods, the excess
stock market return is about 2% on the day of an unexpected cut of 25 basis points in the FFR.
In contrast, during periods when sentiment starts at low level but then increases and optimism
grows, the stock market does not show a statistically significant price reaction to monetary policy
shocks. Importantly, these effects of sentiment are not driven by economic recessions. In fact, it
is only during the periods when sentiment starts high but outside of recessions the stock market
shows a statistically significant response to FFR shocks. We also consider the link with the
monetary policy cycle and find that the effect of sentiment on the transmission of monetary
news is stronger during easing cycles.
Second, the stock market impact of monetary policy shocks is characterized by sign asym-
metry. The market response following periods of high sentiment is significant for expansionary
FFR surprises, but not tightening surprises. Third, we consider the possibility of endogeneity
arising from reverse feedback, where the Fed is responding to market developments, and the
possibility of joint-response by the market and the Fed to economic news. Our evidence indi-
cates that accounting for endogeneity does not alter our key conclusions regarding the impact of
sentiment. Fourth, the effect of FFR surprises is predominantly contemporaneous and displays
only very short-run persistence. Fifth, the positive returns associated with expansionary policy
shocks are broad-based across U.S. industries and their pattern is consistent with the implica-
tions of the CAPM. The industry effects are also conditional on the state of investor sentiment.
Furthermore, we find that the state of sentiment matters for non-conventional policy during
the ZLB era. Compared with the pre-ZLB period, a key difference during the ZLB period is
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that sentiment is low, relative to its historical level. Thus, we can only consider states based
on the change in sentiment. The impact of path surprises is statistically significant only during
periods when sentiment decreases. Specifically, a daily excess stock market return is about 1%
in response to an unexpected decline of 25 basis points in the interest rate path. In contrast to
the findings from FFR shocks prior to the ZLB, the effect of path surprises is not only driven by
expansionary news. We show that amongst liquidity facilities and LSAP announcements, only
those related to the establishment of central bank liquidity swaps matter. Conditional on the
state of investor sentiment, the stock market reacted positively to these announcements. Finally,
we show that our results remain strong and consistent to a host of robustness checks.
A potential explanation for our results is related to changes in investor sentiment. The psy-
chology literature suggests that when individuals are in a positive emotional state, they engage
in more heuristic processing of information (Tiedens and Linton (2001); Mackie and Worth
(1989); Bless et al. (1990); Batra and Stayman (1990)). During periods when investors start
with a pessimistic state and then turn to become optimistic, their reliance on non-systematic
processing of information is likely to increase. At the end point of this process, investors are
in an exuberant sentiment state and are less rational overall, the stock market is overvalued
(Shiller (1990); De Bondt (1998)). Essentially, investors assign excessively optimistic valua-
tions, either by overestimating the size of future cash flows or by underestimating risk (Mian
and Sankaraguruswamy (2012); Kaplanski et al. (2015)). This setup is consistent with the ab-
sence of a significant response to monetary policy news when sentiment is rising and stocks are
overpriced. On the other hand, when fundamentals are revealed and sentiment starts to wane,
investors come to their senses and noise traders’ activity is lessened (Yuan (2015)).3 During
such phases, investors are more likely to process information systematically and become more
sensitive to news (Garcia (2013)), including those arising from the actions of the Fed. Our find-
ing that the CAPM fits well the announcement-day returns during these periods is in line with
this interpretation.
An alternative explanation is centered around investor attention. Attention is a scarce cog-
nitive resource (Kahneman (1973)) and investors have limited attention (Kahneman (1973); Da,
Engelberg, and Gao (2011)). Previous studies show that investor attention to market-wide de-
velopments is likely to be stronger during economic downturns (Peng and Xiong (2006)); Peng,
Xiong, and Bollerslev (2007)), which could imply a stronger response to monetary policy news.
As we demonstrate, however, sentiment correction periods occur not only in recessions but also
during expansions, a finding that reinforces our sentiment-based explanation.
Is the stock market reaction to monetary policy news consistent with rational asset pricing?
At first glance, the answer is negative since the evidence strongly supports the notion of senti-
ment dependence. While our analysis supports a behavioral interpretation, we should point out
3Several studies have analysed the behavioural biases of noise traders and their impact on asset pricing (Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003); Shleifer (2000); Shiller (2015); De Long et al. (1990); Miller (1977); Jones and Lamont
(2002), Lamont and Stein (2004), and Nagel (2005)).
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that a rational explanation could be in line with the stock market reaction to FFR surprises dur-
ing sentiment-correction phases. The positive response to expansionary news can be interpreted
within the dividend discount model or more advanced macroeconomic-based models that high-
light the importance of a risk factor related to the stance of monetary policy (Balvers and Huang
(2009); Lioui and Maio (2014)). However, these models cannot explain why only expansionary
news matter. Moreover, there is empirical evidence, which suggests that the Fed’s interven-
tions can also have a direct impact on sentiment (Lutz (2015)), especially during bear markets
(Kurov (2010)). Thus, it is more appropriate to view our results primarily from a behavioural
viewpoint.4
This chapter contributes to the nascent line of work that seeks to incorporate findings from
behavioural finance to examine the stock market reaction to news, as well as the established
literature that studies the effects of the Fed’s conventional and non-conventional policy actions
on financial markets. We develop a new measure of sentiment states, based upon changes in
sentiment and show that it reveals important information about the trading behaviour of investors
during periods of sentiment adjustment. Hence, we extend the previous literature on the asset
pricing implications of sentiment, which overlooks the dynamic behaviour of sentiment. Our
work is also related to the literature on state dependence in the relationship between stock market
and monetary policy. Several studies consider business cycle effects and show that the stock
market response is stronger during recessions ((Basistha and Kurov (2008); Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann (2000)). In contrast, our focus is on sentiment states, which have small or zero
correlation with the business cycle. Furthermore, sentiment corrections are not solely associated
with bear markets but also occur during bull markets. Hence, our analysis is distinct from
previous studies that condition the stock market response to policy surprises on bull-bear regimes
(Chen (2007); Jansen and Tsai (2010); Kurov (2010)).
This chapter also relates to a recent study by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), who ex-
amine whether stock price changes in response to firm-specific earnings surprises are affected
by lagged sentiment. They conclude that behavioral biases affect how information is impounded
into stock prices. Our work has a different angle by focusing on market-wide news that stem
from shifts in monetary policy, as opposed to firm-specific news. Another related recent study
is that of Garcia (2013), who also argues that investors’ sensitivity to news may be state de-
pendent. In Garcia’s (2013) analysis, however, this is related to the state of the business cycle,
with the sensitivity to news being stronger during economic downturns; whereas we focus on
sentiment downturns that, as we argue above, are distinct from recessions. Finally, this chapter
extends previous work by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Lucca and Moench (2015) and Savor
and Wilson (2014), among others, who find that the CAPM performs well on days associated
with monetary policy news. We show that the CAPM does a good job in explaining the observed
4The asymmetric response during correction phases is consistent with the investors’ belief that the Fed can
reverse declining stock prices via monetary easing (Kurov (2010); Cieslak et al. (2018)).
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cross-industry variation of FOMC announcement-day returns only during sentiment-correction
phases. Different from our event study analysis, Antoniou et al. (2015) use monthly data for
asset-pricing tests and show that the security market line is positively slopped only following
low sentiment periods.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.3 describes the data and variables that
we employ in the empirical analysis. Section 1.4 presents evidence related to the role of investor
sentiment in the transmission of monetary policy news to the stock market. Section 1.5 presents
the results from various robustness checks. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.3 Data and sample
1.3.1 Monetary policy news
Target rate surprises
Up to the recent financial crisis, the conduct of monetary policy in the U.S. was characterized by
targeting the FFR, which is the interest rate on overnight loans of reserves between banks, and
by increasing transparency (Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Bernanke and Mihov (1998); Romer
and Romer (2004)). Our full sample (June 1989 - October 2014) includes 227 FOMC meet-
ings, 23 of which were unscheduled.5In line with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we exclude the
unscheduled FOMC meeting that occurred in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attack (17 September 2001) from the sample. Finally, we remove the most prominent outlier,
as identified by the difference in the statistic of Welsch and Kuh (1977), that corresponds to the
unscheduled FOMC meeting on 22 January 2008.6
Using the methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001), we isolate the unexpected component
of changes in the target FFR (∆iut ) on day t in the month when the FOMC meeting takes place:
∆iut =
D
D− t ( f
0
m,t− f 0m,t−1) (1.1)
where f 0m,t is the current-month implied futures rate (100 minus the futures contract price), and
D is the number of days in the month.7
5The dates provided by Kuttner (2003) are used to identify FOMC meetings prior to February 1994, when there
were no press releases regarding FOMC decisions and market participants had to infer whether the FOMC had
taken a policy action from the signals provided by daily open market operations (Thornton (2014)). In Febru-
ary 1994 the Fed started to announce its decisions and publish accompanying statements, a development that en-
hanced transparency in monetary policy. The corresponding dates are obtained from the Federal Reserve website
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm.
6On that day, the market declined by almost 1%, in spite of a massive FFR cut of 75 basis points, almost all of
which was unexpected.
7Following Kuttner (2001), when the FOMC meeting falls on one of the last three days of the month, the
unscaled change in the one-month futures rate ( f 1m,t– f
1
m,t−1) is used to calculate the FFR surprise. Also, when the
FOMC meeting occurs on the first day of the month, f 1m−1,D, instead of f
0
m,t−1, is used to measure the surprise.
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[Insert Figure 1.1 around here]
This market-based proxy for monetary policy shocks has been extensively used in previous
studies that analyze the response of stock prices to monetary policy shifts (Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005); Kurov (2010); Kontonikas, MacDonald, and Saggu (2013)). The source of the futures
data is Bloomberg, while the FFR data is obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Database
(FRED) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Figure 1.1 plots actual and
unexpected changes in the target FFR on FOMC meeting dates. Typically, large expansionary
monetary policy shocks, as reflected in unexpected declines in the FFR, materialize during, or
near, periods of economic slowdown. Table 1.1 reports that the average FFR change is equal
to -0.04%, ranging from a minimum of -0.75% to a maximum of 0.75%. There are 82 FOMC
meetings that are associated with FFR changes, 51 of which are of expansionary nature (∆i< 0),
while 31 are contractionary (∆i > 0). On average, target rate surprises are expansionary with a
mean of -0.02%.
[Insert Table 1.1 around here]
During October 2008, in the aftermath of the Lehman Brother’s collapse, the Fed reduced
the target FFR from 2% to 1%. This was followed by another major cut in the FFR at the FOMC
meeting on 16 December 2008, from 1% to the range of 0%–0.25%. Since then and until the
end of the sample period, there are no further rate changes and the volatility of FFR shocks dies
out. Motivated by these developments, when we estimate the impact of FFR shocks on the stock
market, we focus on the period before the ZLB (June 1989 - December 2008).
Path surprises
In order to alleviate the constraint to monetary stimulus that the ZLB posed, the Fed provides
frequent assurances about its intention to keep the policy rate at near zero in the future, the
so-called forward guidance (Bernanke (2013); Doh and Connolly (2013)). Generally, forward
guidance implies that the central bank attempts to influence the path of future short-term rates
by communicating to the public and financial markets. Forward guidance has been intensively
used since 2009, but it has long been a part of the Fed’s toolkit, with elements of it traced to
FOMC statements of the Greenspan era (Contessi and Li (2013)). It has been closely associated
with a shift towards greater transparency in the conduct of monetary policy (Poole and Rasche
(2003)).8
8The outcome of a meeting was announced by the FOMC for the first time in February 1994. The FOMC
formally announced in February 1995 that all changes in the stance of monetary policy would be immediately
communicated to the public. Since January 2000, the FOMC issues a statement that reports the settings of the
target FFR and the balance of risks. At the beginning of forward guidance during the ZLB, the Fed adopted a
qualitative tone in its communication with post-FOMC meeting statements including phrases such as the FFR will
remain near zero for “an extended period" (FOMC statement of March 18, 2009). This then evolved to date-based
guidance, specifying future dates such as “at least through mid-2015" (September 13, 2012). Finally, a threshold-
based approach was adopted linking the first rate increase to developments in inflation and unemployment.
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Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) develop a methodology to identify two dimensions
of the Fed’s policy: changes in the current FFR target and changes in forward guidance. They
show that both target surprises and path surprises are useful to describe monetary policy shocks.
Path surprises should capture news conveyed to market participants by the FOMC’s statement
about the expected path of policy above and beyond what they learn for the FFR target level
(Wongswan (2009)).
Following Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), we calculate path surprises using prin-
cipal component analysis. The starting point is the definition of a matrix that contains five
columns and a number of rows equal to the number of relevant policy announcements. The first
two columns of the matrix correspond to the changes in the price of current-month and three-
month-ahead FFR futures contracts. The third to fifth columns are the changes in the prices of
the second, third, and fourth eurodollar futures contracts with maturity of up to four quarters. We
obtain two principal components, which are then transformed so that the first factor corresponds
to current target rate surprises, while the second factor (path factor) corresponds to moves in
interest rate expectations over the coming year that are not affected by changes in the current
target rate.9
Our analysis of the impact of path surprises focuses on the ZLB era, in line with Wright
(2012) and Swanson (2015), which necessarily narrows the sample to 47 observations for the
period January 2009 to October 2014. The average path surprise in Table 1.1 is equal to -0.01%,
with the variable ranging from -0.62% to 0.46%.
LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements
Responding to the crisis and the ZLB constraint, in addition to using more explicit forward
guidance, the Fed resolved to change the size and composition of its balance sheet by the pro-
vision of non-sterilized liquidity facilities and large scale purchases of longer-term assets from
the private sector, mainly mortgage backed securities (MBS) and Treasury bonds. The Fed’s
interventions aimed to improve financial markets conditions and to put downward pressures on
long-term borrowing costs. We consider several announcements of expansionary nature, captur-
ing the initiation or continuation of LSAPs and liquidity facilities programmes. The liquidity
facilities provided by the Fed include: dollar and foreign currency liquidity swaps between the
Fed and other central banks, the primary dealer credit facility, the asset-backed commercial
paper money market mutual fund liquidity facility, the primary and secondary credit, seasonal
credit, commercial paper funding facility, and the term auction facility (TAF).
Table 1.2 reports that the first such event in our sample occurs on 12 December 2007, and
is related to the initial announcement of the TAF and the authorization of swap lines with other
central banks in order to provide liquidity in U.S. dollars to markets overseas. In total, there are
46 unique liquidity facility announcements spanning the period from December 2007 to October
9For more details on the estimation procedure, see Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
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2013, more than half of which are associated with TAF and central bank liquidity swaps. The
Fed’s liquidity facilities were heavily used in autumn of 2008 in the aftermath of the collapse
of Lehman Brothers.10 There are also 22 LSAPs related events, with the first of these occurring
on 25 November 2008 and reflecting the initial announcement of the first round of quantitative
easing (QE1).11 This was followed by the first hint about purchases of Treasuries in a speech
by chairman Bernanke on 1 December 2008. It is important to note that both aforementioned
announcements, along with several other LSAPs and liquidity facility announcements, do not
overlap with the FOMC meetings.
[Insert Table 1.2 around here]
Unlike FFR changes, for which we can use market-based expectations to isolate their sur-
prise component, direct measures of expectations regarding the size of LSAPs and liquidity
facilities programmes are not available. Hence, we do not attempt to measure “balance sheet
shocks", in line with previous related studies (Gagnon et al. (2011); Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012);
Fiordelisi, Galloppo, and Ricci (2014); Ricci (2015)).12 Instead, we adopt an event study ap-
proach in which we evaluate the behaviour of stock returns in short windows surrounding the
LSAPs and liquidity facility announcements.
1.3.2 Investor sentiment states
We employ three proxies for investor sentiment: Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) Sentiment
Index (BWI), the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) and the U.S. Con-
sumer Confidence Index (CCI).13 The BWI is a commonly used measure of investor sentiment
(Yu and Yuan (2011); Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012); Shen, Yu, and Zhao (2017)). By tak-
ing the first principal component of five financial variables that can reflect sentiment, the BWI
filters out idiosyncratic noise in its constituents and captures common variation.14 We also
10The record growth in the monetary base around that period captures the impact of these liquidity facilities
(Kontonikas, Nolan, and Zekaite (2015)).
11On that day, the Fed announced its intention to purchase $100 billion in housing-related government sponsored
enterprises debt and up to $500 billion in agency mortgage backed securities.
12Two notable exceptions include Rosa (2012) and Swanson (2015). The former study measures the surprise
component of asset purchases by the Fed using a methodology based upon interpreting the wording of related
articles in the Financial Times. Swanson (2015), on the other hand, attempts to disentangle LSAPs from forward
guidance effects during the ZLB using an adaptation of the method of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
He finds that stock prices respond respond positively to shifts in LSAPs measured as the component of FOMC
announcements that is non-related to changes in forward guidance. Unlike our study, Swanson (2015) considers
only events related with FOMC meetings excluding important announcements made outside FOMC meetings such
as the first QE1 announcement (25 November 2008).
13We obtained CSI and CCI from the FRED and OECD databases, respectively. BWI data is available at Jeffrey
Wurgler’s website: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/.
14The BWI is formed as the first principal component of the closed-end fund discount, the number and the first-
day returns of IPOs, the equity share in total new issues and the dividend premium. NYSE turnover, that featured
in the set of variables used in the calculation of the sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006), is dropped in
the most recent update of their dataset. The updated BWI exhibits very similar behaviour over time with the earlier
edition.
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use two consumer confidence indexes, measured outside of the financial markets, as a proxy
for investor optimism (see, Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006); Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrah-
manyam (2013) and McLean and Zhao (2014)). The CSI is based on surveys conducted by
the University of Michigan in which 500 U.S. participants are asked questions about their out-
look on the economy. The CCI is another survey-based measure compiled by the Conference
Board. Compared to the CSI, it uses a larger pool of respondents (5,000) and somewhat different
questions.
A rational explanation for the sentiment-dependence in the relationship between stock re-
turns and monetary policy shocks puts emphasis on the state of the economy. In order to dis-
tinguish between behavioural and rational explanations, the effects of business cycle variation
should be removed from the sentiment indicators. Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalize each
of the constituent variables of their sentiment index with respect to a set of macroeconomic
conditions before conducting the principal component analysis.15 We obtain the orthogonalized
BWI from their data set, and also orthogonalize the CSI and CCI by regressing them on the same
set of macroeconomic variables that they used. The residuals from these regressions capture sen-
timent (optimism or pessimism) that is not justified by economic fundamentals (Lemmon and
Portniaguina (2006)). The orthogonalized sentiment indexes are standardized so that they have
zero mean and unit variance.
Figure 1.2 plots the orthogonalized sentiment indexes. They all rise during the 1990s but
start to decline from around 2000, following the culmination of the dot-com boom. Sentiment
declines during the recent global financial crisis, but somewhat recovers afterward. While the
CCI and CSI are highly correlated, the BWI exhibits different dynamics. For example, the
late 1990s dot-com boom episode features more prominently in the BWI, as compared to the
survey-based indicators.
[Insert Figure 1.2 around here]
In order to examine whether the relationship between stock returns and monetary policy
shifts is conditional on the state of investor sentiment, we construct a level-based dummy vari-
able based on the orthogonalized sentiment indexes. The dummy variable, SHt , is equal to 1 (0)
if the FOMC meeting occurs during those years that start with high (low) sentiment level. In
line with Baker and Wurgler (2006), we define a year as starting with high (low) sentiment if the
sentiment indicator at the December of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean
value. In our empirical analysis, this dummy reflects the effects of monetary policy news follow-
ing periods of high sentiment. Note that we use the terms “following periods of high sentiment"
and “high start of the year sentiment" interchangeably throughout the paper.
15This set of macroeconomic variables include the growth in industry production, the real growth in durable,
nondurable and services consumption, the growth in employment, and a dummy variable that indicates recessions
as classified by NBER business cycle dates. It is also used by other studies to remove business cycle information
from sentiment proxies (Yu and Yuan (2011); McLean and Zhao (2014); Huang et al. (2015))
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Importantly, investor sentiment exhibits a mean-reversion property. Following periods of
high sentiment, a correction phase ensues, during which sentiment tends to decline (Baker and
Wurgler (2006); Yu and Yuan (2011); Chung, Hung, and Yeh (2012)). On the other hand,
having reached a low point, sentiment tends to build-up. This motivates the construction of
a changes-based dummy variable, SDt , set to 1 (0) during periods of decreasing (increasing)
sentiment, that is, years when the sentiment indicator at the December of that year is lower
(higher) than at the December of the previous year. Given mean-reversion in sentiment, we
expect to obtain qualitatively similar results across the two dummy variables. Note that, as Baker
and Wurgler (2007) emphasize, changes in the level of their BWI should not be used to measure
changes in sentiment (e.g. month-to-month, BWIt−BWIt−1) due to lag structures, among other
considerations. Hence, we only use the CSI and CCI sentiment measures to generate dummies
based on December-to-December changes.16
[Insert Figure 1.3 around here]
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot the sentiment dummies based on levels and changes of the sentiment
indexes. The changes-based dummy identifies more states than the level based-dummy, while
they are both more active than the NBER recession indicator. Specifically, using the CSI, there
are 8 instances of the falling sentiment state and 3 instances of the high (start of the year) senti-
ment state. From 2009 onwards, there is no variation in the three level-based dummy variables.
They are always equal to 0, indicating low (start of the year) sentiment in the aftermath of the
recent financial crisis. The changes-based dummies display some variation during that period,
reflecting the fact that the recovery of sentiment has not been strongly sustained.
[Insert Figure 1.4 around here]
Table 1.3 reports the correlation coefficients between the sentiment dummies. Three stylized
facts emerge. First, correlations are stronger among the two survey-based measures of senti-
ment and smaller between them and the BWI proxy. For example, the CSI-CCI correlation
for the level-based dummy variable is 0.81, while the CSI-BWI correlation is 0.59. Second,
the correlation between level- and changes-based sentiment dummies is positive, in line with
the idea that sentiment is mean-reverting, and stronger in the case of the CCI (0.41). Third,
changes-based sentiment dummies and the NBER recession indicator are positively correlated.
This finding reflects periods when decreasing sentiment overlaps with recessionary episodes. As
presented in Figure 1.2 and 1.4, though, declines in sentiment occur not only during recessions
but also during expansions.
[Insert Table 1.3 around here]
16Baker and Wurgler (2007) explain how to estimate monthly changes in investor sentiment using their method-
ology. In robustness checks, we calculate changes-based sentiment dummies using the average monthly sentiment
changes during the year, as opposed to December-to-December changes. This enables us to incorporate the BWI in
the analysis, in a way consistent with the recommendation of Baker and Wurgler (2007). The results that we obtain
are in line with the baseline findings.
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1.3.3 Stock returns
We measure daily returns on the stock market, using both CRSP value-weighted and equally-
weighted returns. Returns are in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and are calculated in
the event space using data between the end of the FOMC announcement day and the end of the
previous trading day. We also use data on 49 industry-classified portfolios, obtained from the
database of K. French.
1.4 Econometric models and results
This section contains event study estimates of the stock market response to monetary policy
actions. Section 1.4.1 analyzes the impact of FFR shocks over the sample period June 1989 -
December 2008, i.e. before the ZLB. Section 1.4.2 examines the impact of path surprises at the
ZLB (January 2009 - October 2014), while Section 1.4.3 considers announcements of LSAPs
and liquidity facilities.
1.4.1 The impact of FFR shocks before the zero lower bound
We begin our empirical investigation by examining the response of stock market returns to tar-
get FFR surprises on FOMC announcement days conditional on the start-of-the-year level of
sentiment. To this end, we introduce an interaction term of the FFR surprise with the previously
defined level-based sentiment dummy, SHt , in the following regression model for excess stock
returns:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut + εt (1.2)
where Rt denotes the excess CRSP market return between the FOMC meeting day and the pre-
vious trading day.
[Insert Table 1.4 around here]
We use both value- and equally-weighted excess market returns for the estimation of Equa-
tion 1.2 with White (1980) standard errors. Table 1.4 Panel A reports estimates of Equation
1.2. Starting with value-weighted returns, the stock market reaction to unexpected FFR changes
when sentiment is high at the beginning of the year (SHt = 1), as captured by β2, is significant,
both economically and statistically. The negative sign of β2 indicates that following periods of
high sentiment the stock market responds positively (negatively) to monetary easing (tightening)
shocks. The results reveal an about 2% 1-day excess stock market return in response to an un-
expected cut of 25 basis points in the FFR. On the other hand, when sentiment is low at the start
of the year the market response to FFR surprises, as captured by β1, is statistically insignificant.
Hence, the impact of monetary policy news is stronger following periods of high sentiment.
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Using equally-weighted market returns, the magnitude of the effect of FFR shocks following
periods of high sentiment, declines by about a third as compared with the case of value-weighed
returns. Nevertheless, the effect remains sizeable and statistically significant. Thus, the market
response to target rate surprises is not exclusively driven by the reaction of large stocks. Finally,
using the full sample (June 1989 - October 2014) and a pre-crisis sample (June 1989 - August
2007), we obtain similar insights for value- and equally-weighted returns.17
Table 1.3 shows a positive correlation between level- and changes-based sentiment states,
in line with the idea that sentiment can exhibit mean-reversion. This prompts us to examine
whether changes in investor sentiment affect the relationship between FFR shocks and stock
market returns. Therefore, we replace the sentiment level-based dummy variable of Equation
1.2 with the changes-based dummy, SDt , and re-estimate Equation 1.3:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SDt )∆iut +β2SDt ∆iut + εt (1.3)
The results are presented in Table 1.4 Panel B. They reveal that the stock market responds
significantly to FFR shocks during periods of decreasing investor sentiment (SDt = 1), as captured
by β2. In contrast, the impact of monetary policy news on the stock market is insignificant when
sentiment is increasing.
The correlation between level- and changes-based sentiment states is modest, ranging from
0.17 to 0.41. This indicates that, on average, high levels of sentiment tend to be followed by
a period of correction, whereby sentiment decreases. However, there are also occasions where
sentiment is high at the start of the year and rises to an even higher level by its end. In order
to examine whether the monetary policy effect that we identified concentrates during periods
of correction, when optimism wanes, we use an alternative classification of sentiment states.
Specifically, we re-estimate Equation 1.3 using a sentiment state indicator, SHDt , that accounts
for the joint effect of the sentiment’s level and changes on the reaction of stock market returns to
FFR surprises. This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurs during
a year when sentiment starts at a high level but then declines, and 0 otherwise.18
Table 1.4 Panel C reports the results, and provides further evidence on the important role of
sentiment states in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to the stock market. In particular,
we find that the effect of policy shifts is statistically significant only during years when senti-
ment starts at high level but then subsequently declines. Estimates of the coefficient of interest
17These results are available upon request. We date the start of the financial crisis to September 2007. By the
end of the summer in 2007 major doubts about the stability of the financial system had emerged and the first major
central bank interventions in response to increasing interbank market pressures took place. In September 2007, the
Fed proceeded to the first major FFR cut (0.5%) since 2003, hence initiating a long cycle of monetary expansion.
The 2007-2009 dating scheme is consistent with previous analyses of the recent financial crisis (Brunnermeier
(2009); Kontonikas, MacDonald, and Saggu (2013)).
18 A year is defined as of high sentiment at the start but then decreasing sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the
December of the previous year exceeds the full sample mean value and the sentiment proxy at the December of that
year is lower than at the December of the previous year.
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(β2) are close in magnitude to those reported in Table 1.4 Panel A, where the sentiment dummy
is based on the level on sentiment solely. Finally, we also consider a 4-way decomposition in
which we use dummies to classify periods of “high & increasing", “high & decreasing", “low
& increasing", and “low & decreasing" sentiment. The findings (available upon request) are
consistent with those in Table 1.4, and show that the response of stock market returns to FFR
shocks is statistically significant only during periods of “high & decreasing" sentiment, that is,
when sentiment is hight at the start of the year but then falls. On the other hand, during periods
of “exuberance” (“depression”) when sentiment is already high (low) and keeps increasing (de-
creasing) the effect of monetary news is statistically insignificant. The same holds for periods
of optimism build-up when sentiment is low at the start of the year but then rises. Note that all
the subsequent analysis for the pre-ZLB period has been repeated using the “high & decreasing"
definition of the sentiment dummy and the results (available upon request) are indicating that
the monetary policy effects concentrate during the correction phase.
[Insert Figure 1.5 around here]
These findings are in line with the idea that the impact of monetary policy actions is mostly
potent when sentiment-driven overvaluation is followed by a correction. Figure 1.5 plots SHDt
along with a bear market indicator. While there is no commonly accepted definition for bull
vs. bear market states, the bear indicator that we use are consistent with the standard notion of
significant and sustained stock price declines. It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the
S&P 500 stock market index is lower than its full sample 2-year moving average, and 0 otherwise
(Kontonikas, MacDonald, and Saggu (2013)). Figure 1.5 shows that sentiment correction phases
(SHDt = 1) sometimes overlap with bear market episodes, for example the one associated with
the recent global financial crisis. However, sentiment correction may also occur during bull
markets. The correlation between sentiment correction phases and bear markets is small (0.2).
Therefore, our analysis is distinct from previous studies that condition the stock market response
to policy surprises on bear vs. bull states, and find a stronger response during bear states (Chen
(2007); Jansen and Tsai (2010); Kurov (2010)).19
Controlling for the business cycle and the monetary cycle
Previous studies show that the impact of monetary policy on the stock market is stronger during
recessions, thereby suggesting conditionality upon the state of business cycle (Basistha and
Kurov (2008); Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000)). To examine this possibility within our
framework, we interact our sentiment states with business cycle indicators. Specifically, we
estimate Equation 1.4, which conducts a 4-way decomposition of the monetary policy impact:
19Unreported findings (available upon request) show that the stock market response to FFR surprises during
sentiment correction phases is strongly significant during both bear and bull markets, and insignificant otherwise.
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Rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )(1−Rect)∆iut +β2(1−SHt )Rect∆iut
+β3SHt (1−Rect)∆iut +β4SHt Rect∆iut + εt
(1.4)
where Rect is a variable that captures the state of the economy, measured by the NBER business
cycle chronology (NBERt) and the real time probability of recession (Recprobt). NBERt is
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurs during a month that a U.S.
economy is in recession, as classified by the NBER business cycle dates. Recprobt is equal to
the real time recession probability at the month when the FOMC meeting takes place, obtained
from the dynamic-factor Markov-Switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008). There is a close
correspondence between the two business cycle indicators, with the correlation coefficient being
equal to 0.9.
The estimation results in Table 1.5 Panel A are novel and intriguing. They highlight, again,
the important role of sentiment for the transmission of monetary policy shocks to the stock mar-
ket. At the same time, they reveal that this finding is not driven by recessionary periods. In fact,
only outside recessions do stock market returns respond significantly to FFR shocks following
high sentiment periods, as captured by β3. The corresponding effect during recessions, as cap-
tured by β4, has a fairly large magnitude but is statistically insignificant. Using the recession
probability indicator in Panel B, we obtain similar results. It appears, then, that the results from
previous studies regarding the impact of recessions on the relationship between monetary policy
and the stock market are affected by the fact that they do not account for sentiment states.
[Insert Figure 1.6 around here]
Moreover, motivated by previous evidence which identifies comovement between the busi-
ness cycle and the monetary cycle (Chen, Kontonikas, and Montagnoli (2012)), we proceed by
interacting states defined by sentiment with those defined by the state of the monetary cycle. To
do so, we re-estimate Equation 1.4 replacing the Rect indicator with East . The latter is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurred during a monetary easing cycle and
0 otherwise. An easing cycle is defined as starting with a negative FFR target rate change and
ending with a positive FFR target rate change. This definition is consistent with Lucca and
Moench (2015). Figure 1.6 plots the dummy variable that reflects monetary cycles. We iden-
tify five easing cycles over the full sample period: the first three occurred in the 1990s, and the
other two in the 2000s. While recessionary periods always overlap with expansionary mone-
tary policy cycles, the latter have typically longer duration and precede, and/or continue after,
recessions. For example, the early 2000s expansionary cycle commenced in January 2001 and
ended in May 2004, thereby encompassing a shorter-lived recessionary episode, which lasted
from March to November of 2001. The correlation between the monetary cycle and the business
cycle indicators is positive but far from perfect (0.25).
[Insert Table 1.6 around here]
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The findings in Table 1.6 show that the impact of sentiment on the transmission of monetary
policy news to the stock market materialises during easing cycles, as captured by β4. Consider-
ing the evidence in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 together, it appears that following high sentiment periods,
FFR surprises affect the stock market when output is expanding and the monetary policy stance
is expansive.
Sign asymmetry and the role of unscheduled meetings
Equation 1.2 above assumes a symmetric stock market reaction to monetary policy surprises,
with no distinction between expansionary shocks and contractionary shocks. It is plausible,
though, that the stock market response depends on the type of news, as classified by the sign of
the monetary policy shock. Previous evidence by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) provides only
weak support for this type of asymmetry. Neuhierl and Weber (2017), on the other hand, provide
evidence in line with a more important role for expansionary surprises. However, both studies
do not account for sentiment states in their empirical framework. To do so, we estimate the
following regression model that allows for both sentiment dependence and sign asymmetry:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iunt +β2(1−SHt )∆iupt +β3SHt ∆iunt +β4SHt ∆iupt + εt (1.5)
where ∆iunt and ∆i
up
t denote negative and positive unexpected FFR target rate changes, respec-
tively. The negative FFR surprises variable is defined as follows: ∆iunt = ∆iut Dnt , where Dnt is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if ∆iut < 0, and 0 otherwise. In a similar fashion, the positive
FFR surprises variable is: ∆iupt = ∆iut D
p
t , where D
p
t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
∆iut > 0, and 0 otherwise.
[Insert Table 1.7 around here]
Table 1.7 reports estimates of Equation 1.5 and shows that the reaction of stock market
returns to FFR shocks following periods of high sentiment solely materializes in response to ex-
pansionary surprises. This effect is captured by β3, which is negative and significant at the 1%
level across all alternative specifications. On the other hand, the effect of tightening surprises is
always statistically insignificant, irrespectively of the state of investor sentiment. These effects
are not driven by small number of observations since 33 (21) out of the 88 (53) FOMC meetings
associated with unexpected FFR cuts (increases) occur following low sentiment periods (see Ta-
ble A.1 in the Appendix A). These findings highlight that the stock market response to monetary
policy news is highly asymmetric, driven by expansionary surprises, and at the same time, is
conditional on investor sentiment.
According to the “Fed put” story, policy is eased in times of trouble but not tightened accord-
ingly when financial conditions are good (Diamond and Rajan (2012); Cieslak et al. (2018)).
Unscheduled meetings, in particular, may be reactive or endogenous, with the Fed providing
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monetary stimulus in response to adverse economic and/or financial developments, such as the
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis (Ozdagli (2017); Neuhierl and Weber (2017)).
With the exception of two cases, unscheduled FOMC meetings are associated with expansion-
ary policy surprises (see Table A.2 in the Appendix A). Bernanke (2015) also highlights that a
rate move between regularly scheduled FOMC meetings is usually taken responding to an emer-
gency. Summarising internal debates in the Fed regarding unscheduled meetings, he points out
the issue of whether a surprise cut would “reassure or roil markets”. Related to this, expansion-
ary shocks in unscheduled meetings over the pre-ZLB period tend to boost the stock market,
with the average stock return being about 1%.
[Insert Table 1.8 around here]
To examine whether our results regarding the importance of expansionary surprises are
driven by the incorporation of unscheduled, and possibly endogenous, FOMC meetings in the
sample, we proceed to re-estimate Equation 1.5 removing all unscheduled meetings. The results
are reported in Table 1.8 and show that, overall, the effect of expansionary surprises is robust to
the exclusion of unscheduled meetings. The magnitude of β3 mildly declines but the effect re-
mains statistically significant in all cases. Hence, alleviating the possibility of reverse-feedback
type of endogeneity, does not alter our key conclusions regarding the impact of sentiment on the
transmission of policy shocks to the stock market.
Accounting for joint-response bias
Apart from the possibility of reverse-feedback, discussed above, event-study endogeneity may
also arise due to the simultaneous reaction of stocks and the market-based policy surprise proxy
to new information. For instance, news indicating a weaker economic outlook would tend to
reduce stock valuations and make an FFR cut more likely, implying a downward bias in the
size of the estimated policy impact (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). Thornton (2014) proposes
a procedure to address the joint-response bias which has some important advantages relative
to alternative methods. It is simple to implement, provides an indication of the magnitude of
the joint-response bias, and does not rely on either the use of intraday data or the identifica-
tion through heteroskedasticity of Rigobon and Sack (2004). The latter method makes strong
assumptions regarding the variance of shocks on FOMC meetings vs. other days.
Thornton’s (2014) method involves using the market-based monetary policy surprises on all
days as a latent variable. This variable accounts for the link between stock returns and market-
based policy surprises on days when there are no news from the Fed. In order to account for the
joint-response bias that arises due to the reaction of stock returns and the market-based proxy
to “ambient news”, rather than monetary policy actions, the following regression model can be
estimated using daily data:
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Rt = β0+β1FOMCt +β2∆iut +β3FOMCt∆i
u
t + εt (1.6)
where FOMCt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 on FOMC announcement days and 0
otherwise.
In Equation 1.6, the β2 coefficient reflects the joint-response bias, whereas β3 denotes the
marginal change in stock returns associated with unexpected policy events. Thornton (2014)
uses a similar model to evaluate the results from an event study considering changes in Treasury
yields around FOMC announcements. He shows that the joint-response bias in the Treasuries’
event study is large, since in contrast to β2 which is always significant, β3 is insignificant in many
cases. However, estimates of Equation 1.8 using stock market returns as the dependent variable,
provide little evidence to support the joint response bias. Specifically, β2 is significant only at
the 10% level, while β3 is significant at the 1% level and its magnitude is close to non-corrected
event study estimates (results are available upon request). We modify Thornton’s framework to
account for sentiment states by considering Equation 1.7:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )FOMCt +β2(1−SHt )∆iut +β3(1−SHt )FOMCt∆iut
+β4SHt FOMCt +β5S
H
t ∆i
u
t +β6S
H
t FOMCt∆i
u
t + εt
(1.7)
where SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) during a year that starts with high (low)
sentiment level.
[Insert Table 1.9 around here]
The results from Equation 1.7 are presented in Table 1.9. Following periods of high senti-
ment, estimates of the joint response bias and the marginal effect of unexpected policy actions,
as respectively captured by β5 and β6, are both highly significant. Their sum is somewhat
smaller relative to the baseline findings in Table 1.4 Panel A, which are not adjusted for the
joint-response bias. However, the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, adjusting
for joint-response bias makes little difference. For example, following high sentiment periods
defined using the CSI, the bias-corrected effect of policy surprises in Table 1.9 is -7.68, close
to the -7.15 non-corrected impact in Table 1.4 Panel A. On the other hand, following periods of
low sentiment, all related estimates are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Overall, these
results imply that the joint-response bias is relatively small and the event study estimates are
reliable.
Persistence of monetary policy effects
Our analysis has focused on the contemporaneous effect of FFR shocks on the stock market. It
interesting, though, to examine whether the significant contemporaneous impact that we identi-
fied persists over time. To this end, we compute 2- and 3-day stock market returns and estimate
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their corresponding response coefficients to FFR shocks. In particular, we first utilise the fol-
lowing regression model:
Rt,t+1 = β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut + εt (1.8)
where Rt,t+1 denotes the cumulative 2-day excess CRSP market return between the day follow-
ing the FOMC announcement and the day preceding it. To examine a longer window, we also
estimate the following model:
Rt,t+2 = β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut + εt (1.9)
where Rt,t+2 denotes the cumulative 3-day excess CRSP market return between the second day
following the FOMC announcement and the day preceding it.
[Insert Table 1.10 around here]
The results for 2- and 3-day cumulative returns are reported in Table 1.10 Panels A and
B, respectively. Overall, these results point to the following conclusions. Firstly, the response
of 2-day cumulative returns to monetary policy news is strongly significant, with a magnitude
somewhat higher than that of the contemporaneous response in Table 1.4. Secondly, when we
calculate returns over a 3-day window the magnitude and statistical significance of the returns
response is diminished. Hence, the impact of policy surprises is predominantly contemporane-
ous and displays some persistence only in the very short-run (see also Florackis, Kontonikas,
and Kostakis (2014)).
Evidence from industry portfolios
It is interesting to examine whether the impact of sentiment on the transmission of monetary
policy shocks, that we identified for a broad market index, also materialises at the industry level.
The reaction of industries to policy surprises may exhibit heterogeneity due to demand effects
or different sensitivities to monetary policy (Neuhierl and Weber (2017)). We obtain data on 49
industry portfolios from the K. French database and re-estimate Equation 1.2 using industry ex-
cess returns as the dependent variable. Figure 1.7 plots the industry-related findings (individual
regressions’ results are available upon request). They can be summarised as follows. First, the
reaction of industry-classified stock returns to monetary policy shocks is typically stronger when
sentiment is high at the start of the year. The effect of FFR shocks is statistically significant at
the 5% level in 25 industries using the BWI sentiment indicator, and in 24 industries using the
CSI. On the other hand, following periods of low sentiment the impact of monetary news tends
to be statistically insignificant. Second, there is heterogeneity in the response of different in-
dustries to FFR surprises. The most responsive industries include high-tech related (hardware,
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chips, software), financials, entertainment, retail and durables (cars), while utilities and the en-
ergy sector (oil, coal) are two of the least responsive industries. These findings are generally
consistent with the evidence in previous studies (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2004)).
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that the pattern of responses of industry portfolios to
monetary policy shocks is consistent with the implications of the CAPM. Lucca and Moench
(2015) also consider industry portfolios among their test assets over the period 1994-2010. They
show that average portfolio excess returns on FOMC announcement days are in line with a
comovement with the market portfolio, as implied by the CAPM (see also Savor and Wilson
(2014)). The aforementioned studies, however, do not account for the role of sentiment states.
To address this issue, we follow Lucca and Moench (2015) by adopting a two-step procedure. In
the first step, we estimate portfolio betas from a regression of the industry-classified portfolio’s
excess return on the excess return of the market portfolio at a daily frequency using all days in
the sample (including FOMC announcement days). We use two alternative samples: June 1989
- October 2014 (full sample) and June 1989 - December 2008 (pre-ZLB). We then estimate
for each FOMC meeting (scheduled and unscheduled) a cross-sectional regression of industry-
classified returns on the CAPM betas that we obtain from the first step, and calculate the average
intercept and slope and the associated Shanken-adjusted standard errors.20
[Insert Figure 1.8 around here]
Figure 1.8 scatter plots the actual average excess return earned on FOMC announcement
days (in percent) for the 49 industry-classified portfolios (horizontal axis) against the excess
return implied by the CAPM (vertical axis). The pattern is very similar to that in Lucca and
Moench (2015) who consider only scheduled meetings. In particular, it appears that the single
market factor model provides a good description of the cross-section of industry-classified re-
turns on FOMC announcement days. For the full sample, the average slope coefficient from the
cross-sectional regressions is estimated to be 0.43 (vs. 0.47 in Lucca and Moench (2015)) and
statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas at the pre-ZLB period it is mildly reduced to
0.38, but remains statistically significant. The intercept (alpha) is not statistically different from
zero in both samples.
[Insert Figure 1.9 around here]
To account for sentiment states we modify the second step of the estimation procedure.
Specifically, we consider FOMC meetings following periods of high and low sentiment sep-
arately, by splitting the full set of meetings in two related sub-sets and conducting the cross-
sectional analysis for each sub-set. The results, plotted in Figure 1.9, are striking. Following
20In line with our previous analysis, we exclude the unscheduled meetings of 17 September 2001 and 22 January
2008.
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high sentiment periods, the slope coefficient rises to about 0.6, while the intercept remains in-
significant, thereby indicating that exposure to aggregate market risk plays a key role in explain-
ing the cross-sectional variation of returns. On the other hand, following low sentiment periods,
the relationship between actual returns and returns implied by the CAPM is rather flat, not fol-
lowing the 45 degree line. These findings indicate that the CAPM does well in explaining the
observed cross-sectional variation of FOMC announcement-day returns only following periods
of high sentiment.
1.4.2 The impact of path surprises at the zero lower bound
In this section, we examine the impact of path surprises on stock returns during the ZLB era
between January 2009 and October 2014. The level-based sentiment dummy variable cannot be
used to identify sentiment states since, as shown in Figure 1.3, it is equal to zero throughout the
ZLB period. On the other hand, the changes-based sentiment dummy exhibits some variation,
as displayed in Figure 1.4. Since 2005, the CSI and CCI changes-based dummies overlap.
Therefore, we only use the CSI changes-based dummy to identify the impact of the state of
sentiment on the response of stock market returns to path surprises at the ZLB:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SDt )patht +β2SDt patht + εt (1.10)
The findings in Table 1.11 Panel A indicate that, consistent with the evidence from FFR
shocks that we document earlier, the stock market response to path surprises is conditional on
the state of investor sentiment. The effect is statistically significant during periods of decreasing
sentiment, with the negative sign of β2 indicating a positive (negative) response to expansionary
(tightening) path surprises. The 1-day excess return in response to an unexpected decline of
25 basis points in the interest rate path during periods of decreasing sentiment is about 1.13%.
On the other hand, the impact of path surprises is not significant during periods of increasing
sentiment. Our results are in agreement with Wright (2012) and Swanson (2015), who find
that expansionary monetary policy shocks boosted the stock market during the ZLB period.
Importantly, however, we show that this effect materialises only when sentiment is declining.
[Insert Table 1.11 around here]
Motivated by the evidence in Section 1.4.1. regarding sign asymmetry in the effect of FFR
shocks, we proceed by estimating Equation 1.11. This regression model allows for sentiment
dependence and sign asymmetry related to the impact of path surprises:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SDt )pathnt +β2(1−SDt )pathpt +β3SDt pathnt +β4SDt pathpt + εt (1.11)
CHAPTER 1. MARKET-WIDE STOCK PRICE REACTION 56
where pathnt and path
p
t denote negative and positive path surprises, respectively. Negative path
surprises are calculated as pathnt = pathtD
n
t , where D
n
t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
patht < 0, and 0 otherwise. Positive path surprises are calculated as path
p
t = pathtD
p
t , where
Dpt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if patht > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Table 1.11 Panel B reports estimates of Equation 1.9 and shows that the reaction of stock
market returns to path surprises during periods of decreasing sentiment is not only driven by
expansionary shocks. In fact, the effect of tightening path surprises, as depicted by β4, is almost
twice in magnitude compared to that of expansionary surprises, as captured by β3. On the other
hand, irrespectively of their sign, the effect of path surprises is always statistically insignificant
during increasing sentiment periods. These findings highlight an important difference between
the response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the ZLB and the reaction to path
surprises at the ZLB.
1.4.3 The impact of LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements
We examine the effects of the Fed’s interventions, through LSAPs and the provision of liquid-
ity facilities, between December 2007 and October 2013. We adopt an event study approach
in which we calculate and evaluate abnormal returns (ARs) in short windows surrounding non-
conventional policy announcements of expansionary nature; that is, announcements related to
the initiation or continuation of LSAPs and liquidity facilities programmes. We focus on the
following event windows: 5-days (-1,+3), i.e. one day before and three days following an an-
nouncement; 3-days (-1,+1); and one-day (0,0). By keeping the event window narrow, we are
able to better identify the announcement effect because this avoids contaminating the impact
of one particular announcement with that of previous and subsequent announcements (see also,
Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012)).
We further classify these events according to the state of investor sentiment at the time when
they occur, and then conduct event study analyses across each of the sentiment states. Since there
is little variation in the level-based sentiment dummy over the period of the non-conventional
policy announcements, we only use the CSI changes-based dummy to define sentiment states.21
For example, there are 13 events related to the announcements of central bank liquidity swaps, 9
of which occur during periods of decreasing sentiment, and the remaining 4 occur during periods
of increasing sentiment.22
We obtain ARs using the constant mean model (MacKinlay (1997)) and a 20-day estimation
period that ends prior to the event window. We calculate the Cumulative Average Abnormal
Returns (CAARs) and test whether a market reaction is significantly different from zero using
the Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) test statistic that addresses the event-induced in-
21As we have already pointed out, the values taken by the CSI and CCI changes-based dummies are the same
since 2005.
22The announcements related to TAF and liquidity facilities other than central bank liquidity swaps occurred
only during periods of decreasing sentiment.
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crease in return volatility (Ricci (2015)). To do so, we first obtain the cumulative standardized
abnormal returns (CSARs):
CSARi(t1, t2) =
t2
∑
t=t1
ARi,t
S(ARi)
(1.12)
where (t1, t2) is the event window and S(ARi) denotes the standard deviation of abnormal returns.
The standardized t test statistic is then calculated as follows:
t =
1
N ∑
N
i=1CSARi(t1, t2)√
1
N(N−1) [CSARi(t1, t2)− 1N ∑Ni=1CSARi(t1, t2)]2
(1.13)
where N is the number of observations in the sample.
Table 1.12 reports that the stock market benefits from the Fed’s establishment of the US dol-
lar and foreign-currency liquidity lines. This effect is conditional, though, on the state of investor
sentiment, manifesting itself only during periods of decreasing sentiment. The CAARs are pos-
itive and significant in two out of three event windows that we analyze. There is a tendency
for the CAARs to increase as the window expands.23 For example, the (0,0) CAAR associated
with the announcement of central bank liquidity swaps during periods of decreasing sentiment
is 1.51%, increasing to 3.11% when the window expands to (-1,+1) days. The market response
to other announcements (LSAPs, TAF and other liquidity facilities) is statistically insignificant.
Our evidence is consistent with the existing literature on the positive impact of expansionary
non-conventional monetary policy on the stock market (Rosa (2012); Wright (2012); Fiordelisi,
Galloppo, and Ricci (2014); Rogers, Scotti, and Wright (2014)), and highlights the important
role played by central bank liquidity swaps. Crucially, we show that it is important to account
for the sentiment environment at the time when these announcements take place.
[Insert Table 1.12 around here]
1.5 Robustness checks
We conduct a host of robustness checks and our findings remain unchanged. In line with our
main analysis, when we consider the impact of FFR shocks, we focus on the pre-ZLB period
and use the level-based sentiment states, while for path surprises we use the ZLB sample period
and changes-based states. The first two checks involve estimating the impact of FFR shocks and
include the removal of FOMC meetings that coincide with employment data releases, and using
an alternative sample starting point. In the third check, we use the index of Huang et al. (2015)
to identify sentiment states. The fourth check considers an estimation method that is robust to
the presence of outliers. The fifth and sixth checks concern the approach that we use to identify
23As Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) argue, a wider post-announcement window allows for the news to be absorbed over
a more extended period, which is sensible given the unprecedented nature of most of these initiatives.
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sentiment states. The seventh uses additional macro-related variables for the orthogonalization
of the sentiment indexes. Finally, we use a longer estimation window to investigate the impact
of LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements. The results are contained in the Appendix A.
1.5.1 Excluding employment data releases
In the early 1990s, the Fed’s decisions to cut rates may have reflected an endogenous reaction
to labour market conditions. Between June 1989 and September 1992 (the date of the last FFR
cut associated with employment news), nearly half of the FOMC meetings coincided with the
release of a worse-than-expected employment report (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). In order
to account for the possibility that unexpected FFR changes on FOMC meetings that coincide
with employment data releases may in fact reflect endogenous responses to the release of this
information, we remove 9 such FOMC meetings from the sample (see Table A.2 in Appendix
A). Table A.3 in the Appendix A shows that the effect of FFR surprises is conditional on the
state of investor sentiment, materializing only following periods of high sentiment.
1.5.2 Sample starting in February 1994
We consider an alternative starting point for the sample period in the estimation of the effect of
target rate surprises. Before 1994, there were no press releases regarding FOMC decisions and
market participants had to infer whether the FOMC had taken a policy action from the signals
provided by the size and type of open market operations in the days following each meeting. In a
development that enhanced transparency, on February 1994 the Fed commenced the practice of
issuing a statement on the day that the FOMC meeting is concluded to inform market participants
about an interest rate change. We then use February 1994 as the start point of our sample, that is,
the time when the Fed started to announce its policy actions, representing a shift that enhanced
transparency in monetary policy making. Table A.4 in the Appendix A reports the results. Our
findings are similar to those from using the sample that begins in June 1989. FFR shocks affect
market-wide stock returns only following periods of high sentiment. Consistent with previous
studies, the coefficient on high sentiment dummy increases in magnitude (i.e from -7.14 in Table
1.4 to -7.30 in Table A.4 for CSI).
1.5.3 Alternative sentiment measure
Huang et al. (2015) use the partial least squares (PLS) method to develop a new sentiment index,
based on an extension of the BWI approach, aiming to align the investor sentiment measure with
the purpose of predicting future stock returns. We construct level- and changes-based dummy
variables based on the PLS index of Huang et al. (2015) using the same approach as in section
1.3.2. We then repeat the analyses for the impact of FFR shocks and path surprises and present
the results in Table A.5 Panels A and B, respectively, in the Appendix A. Overall, the results are
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similar to those from using the other sentiment measures. The market response to FFR shocks
before the ZLB materializes only following periods of high sentiment. Moreover, the impact of
path surprises at the ZLB is statistically significant only during periods of decreasing sentiment.
1.5.4 Accounting for outliers
We employ the MM weighted least squares regression, using the procedure of Yohai (1987),
which is robust to the presence of outliers. Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix A report the
results for the market-wide response to FFR shocks and path surprises, respectively. In line with
the findings from OLS estimation, stock market returns react to FFR shocks (path surprises)
only following periods of high sentiment (during periods of decreasing sentiment).
1.5.5 Monthly classification of sentiment states
In the baseline analysis using both level- and changes-based dummies, sentiment states are de-
fined for the whole year, i.e. there is no intra-year variation. This approach is in line with Baker
and Wurgler (2006) and Yu and Yuan (2011). Here, we conduct a robustness check by allow-
ing for monthly variation in the sentiment states. Specifically, we construct a new level-based
dummy, SHMt , that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a month that starts
with high (low) sentiment level. A month is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if
the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean
value. Furthermore, we construct a new changes-based dummy, SDMt , that is equal to 1 (0) if the
FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment month. A month is defined
as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end of that month is lower
(higher) than at the end of the previous month. The results for FFR shocks and path surprises ob-
tained using monthly classification of sentiment states are presented in Table A.8 and A9 in the
Appendix A, respectively. Overall, they are similar to the results obtained using annual classifi-
cation of sentiment states. However, we got weaker results (in both magnitude and significance)
with the monthly change-based dummy. A plausible explanation is that, change-based dummy
at the monthly frequency cannot correctly capture the sentiment correction periods, when the
monetary policy mainly matters.
1.5.6 Alternative changes-based annual classification
For our benchmark analysis, we define periods of decreasing (increasing) sentiment as those
years when the value of the sentiment measure in December is lower (higher) than that in the
December of the previous year. We use an alternative yearly classification scheme in which a
year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if, throughout it, the average monthly
change of the orthogonalized sentiment proxy is negative (positive). For the CSI and CCI mea-
sures, we first orthogonalize the monthly changes of the original indexes to the six macroeco-
CHAPTER 1. MARKET-WIDE STOCK PRICE REACTION 60
nomic variables used by Baker and Wurgler (2006), and then calculate the average value of the
monthly residuals throughout each year. In the case of the BWI, we start by orthogonalizing the
monthly changes of each of its five constituents, and then obtain the first principal component
of the residuals, and finally calculate the average value of the principal component throughout
each year. Table A.10 in the Appendix A presents the findings for the impact of path surprises on
the stock market. Results from the alternative changes-based dummy are overall in line with the
findings from using December-to-December changes. Stock market returns respond to monetary
policy shocks during periods of decreasing sentiment only.
1.5.7 Additional variables for orthogonalization
In order to ensure that the residuals from the orthogonalizing regressions capture sentiment that
is unrelated to economic fundamentals, rather than the effect of omitted variables, we use an
extended set of macro-related factors for the orthogonalization. This helps us to further assess
the potential of a risk-based explanation for our findings. To this end, we follow Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2012) and expand the set of macro-related variables used by Baker and Wurgler
(2006) by including the the default premium (BAA minus AAA corporate bond yield spread), the
term premium (10-year minus 1-year Treasury bond yield spread), the real interest rate (1-month
Treasury bill rate minus the monthly Consumer Price Index inflation rate), the inflation rate, and
the consumption-wealth ratio (cay) defined in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).24 Table A.11 and
A12 in the Appendix A report the results for the stock market response to FFR shocks and path
surprises, respectively. The results are quantitatively similar to those we reported earlier, and
indicate that our findings are robust to the use of a more extensive set of macro-variables for the
orthogonalization of sentiment.
1.5.8 Longer estimation window for CAARs
We repeat the analyses for the effect of LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements using a 90-
day estimation window, instead of the 20-day window used earlier. Table A.13 in the Appendix
A reports the response of stock market returns to the unconventional monetary policy announce-
ments. Overall, the results are similar to those from using the 20-day estimation window, albeit
with slightly lower CAARs.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter shows that sentiment states strongly affect the transmission of monetary policy
news to the stock market. We employ measures of monetary policy that capture conventional
and non-conventional dimensions of the Fed’s behaviour, along with several proxies for investor
24cay is obtained from Sydney Ludvigson’s website, http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/ludvigsons/.
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sentiment. Our main finding is that the impact of monetary policy news is potent during the
sentiment correction phase that follows overvaluation episodes. This particularly occurs, when
sentiment is high at the start of the year but then declines. On the other hand, during periods
of optimism build-up, the impact of monetary policy news is statistically insignificant. Specifi-
cally, during the correction phases, the excess stock market return is about 2% (1%) on the day
of an unexpected cut of 25 basis points conventional (unconvnetional) monetary policy shocks.
For conventional monetary policy, we also find that the impact of monetary policy shocks on
market-wide stock returns is characterized by sign asymmetry. Expansionary FFR surprises sig-
nificantly affect the market-wide stock returns following periods of high sentiment, however, the
tightening shocks do not have a significant impact on stock returns regardless of the sentiment
states. Our results still hold after we accounting for endogeneity problems. We also examine
the persistence of the monetary policy impacts. We find that monetary policy surprise is pre-
dominantly contemporaneous and displays only very short-run persistence. We also show that
the positive returns associated with expansionary policy shocks are broad-based across U.S. in-
dustries and their pattern is consistent with the implications of the CAPM. The industry effects
are also conditional on the state of investor sentiment. Moreover, we show that the sentiment
effects that we document in the relationship between monetary policy shocks and stock returns
are not related to business cycle variation. For the unconventional monetary policy during the
ZLB era, we find that the state of sentiment matters as well. The impact of path surprises is
statistically significant only during periods when sentiment decreases. However, in contrast to
the findings from FFR shocks prior to the ZLB, the effect of path surprises is not only driven by
expansionary news. We show that amongst liquidity facilities and LSAP announcements, only
those related to the establishment of central bank liquidity swaps matter. Conditional on the
state of investor sentiment, the stock market reacted positively to these announcements. Finally,
we show that our results remain strong and consistent to a host of robustness checks.
We provide a possible explanation which is related to investors’ emotional state. When op-
timism builds-up, investors tend to behave in a manner consistent with noise trading, by relying
heavily on heuristic processing of information and pushing the stock market above levels jus-
tified by fundamentals. In contrast, during correction phases they engage in more systematic
processing of information and their sensitivity to news increases. An alternative explanation is
centered around investor attention. Investors may pay more attention to the monetary policy
news due to lose in stocks during the correction phases, which results in a significant response
to expansionary monetary policy shocks. Overall, our results are consistent with a behavioural
explanation.
This chapter brings together two strands of the existing literature by seeking to incorporate
lessons from behavioural finance to research about the impact of monetary policy on financial
markets. It contributes to the studies which seek to incorporate behavioural finance to stock
market responses to news, as well as the established literature that studies the effects of the Fed’s
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conventional and non-conventional policy actions on financial markets. Our work is also related
to the literature on state dependence in the relationship between stock market and monetary
policy. Several studies consider business cycle effects and show that the stock market response
is stronger during recessions. In contrast, our focus is on sentiment states, which have small
or zero correlation with the business cycle. Furthermore, sentiment corrections are not solely
associated with bear markets but also occur during bull markets. Hence, our analysis is distinct
from previous studies that condition the stock market response to policy surprises on bull-bear
regimes. The results in this chapter suggest several avenues for future work. For example,
one could adopt a returns decomposition approach to shed light into whether the stock market
response during a sentiment correction phase is related to adjustments in expected cash flows
and/or expected returns. Moreover, policy-makers when calibrating the impact of monetary
surprises should be aware of the asymmetries that we document.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for FFR changes, unexpected changes and path surprises
∆it and ∆iut denote FFR target rate changes and unexpected changes, respectively, on FOMC announcement days over the full sample period
(June 1989 - October 2014). patht denotes path surprises on FOMC meeting days over the zero lower bound period (January 2009 - October
2014).
Obs Min Max Mean St.Dev.
Panel A: All meetings
∆it 227 -0.75 0.75 -0.04 0.21
∆iut 227 -0.42 0.17 -0.02 0.08
patht 47 -0.62 0.46 -0.01 0.15
Panel B: Contractionary
∆it > 0 31 0.25 0.75 0.30 0.12
∆iut > 0 53 0.003 0.17 0.05 0.04
patht > 0 17 0.003 0.46 0.10 0.14
Panel C: Expansionary
∆it < 0 51 -0.75 -0.25 -0.34 0.14
∆iut < 0 88 -0.42 -0.004 -0.09 0.09
patht < 0 30 -0.62 -0.002 -0.08 0.12
Panel D: No change
∆it=0 145 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆iut = 0 86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
patht = 0 0
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Table 1.2: LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements
This table considers announcements of expansionary nature by the Fed that reflect the initiation or continuation of Large Scale As-
set Purchases (LSAPs) and liquidity facilities programmes. The liquidity facilities provided by the Fed incorporated, among other pro-
grammes, central bank liquidity swaps and the term auction facility (TAF). The source of the data is the Federal Reserve website
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/).
Announcement Obs Date of first announcement Date of last announcement
Liquidity facilities 46 12/12/2007 31/10/2013
Central bank liquidity swaps 13 12/12/2007 31/10/2013
Term auction facility 13 12/12/2007 28/08/2009
Other liquidity facilities 21 03/11/2008 04/12/2009
LSAPs 22 25/11/2008 30/10/2013
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Table 1.3: Correlation matrix of sentiment states
This table presents correlation coefficients of the sentiment-based states, along with the business cycle and monetary cycle indicators. SH,it
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year
is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full
sample mean value. i = CSI, CCI and BWI; where CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S.
Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. SD,it is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0)
if the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the
sentiment proxy at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. i = CSI and CCI. NBERt is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurred during a U.S. recession as classified by NBER business cycle dates and 0 otherwise.
The sample period is June 1989 - October 2014. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
SH,CSIt S
D,CSI
t S
H,CCI
t S
D,CCI
t S
H,BWI
t NBERt
SH,CSIt 1.00
SD,CSIt 0.17∗∗ 1.00
SH,CCIt 0.81∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 1.00
SD,CCIt 0.17∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 1.00
SH,BWIt 0.59∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.05 1.00
NBERt -0.07 0.37∗∗∗ 0.02 0.37∗∗∗ 0.05 1.00
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1 77
Ta
bl
e
1.
4:
R
es
po
ns
e
of
st
oc
k
m
ar
ke
tr
et
ur
ns
to
FF
R
sh
oc
ks
be
fo
re
th
e
ze
ro
lo
w
er
bo
un
d
-c
on
di
tio
na
lu
po
n
th
e
st
at
e
of
in
ve
st
or
se
nt
im
en
t
Pa
ne
lA
of
th
is
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
O
L
S
es
tim
at
es
w
ith
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
ity
-c
on
si
st
en
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
,o
ve
r
FO
M
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
td
ay
s,
of
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
m
od
el
:
R t
=β
0+
β 1
(1
−
SH t
)∆
iu t
+β
2S
H t
∆i
u t
+ε
t,
w
he
re
R t
an
d
∆i
u t
de
no
te
C
R
SP
m
ar
ke
tr
et
ur
ns
(v
al
ue
-w
ei
gh
ed
an
d
eq
ua
lly
-w
ei
gh
te
d,
al
te
rn
at
iv
el
y)
in
ex
ce
ss
of
th
e
1-
m
on
th
Tr
ea
su
ry
bi
ll
ra
te
an
d
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
FF
R
ch
an
ge
s,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
SH t
is
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1
(0
)
if
th
e
FO
M
C
m
ee
tin
g
oc
cu
rr
ed
du
ri
ng
a
ye
ar
th
at
st
ar
ts
w
ith
hi
gh
(l
ow
)
se
nt
im
en
tl
ev
el
.
A
ye
ar
is
de
fin
ed
as
st
ar
tin
g
w
ith
hi
gh
(l
ow
)
se
nt
im
en
ti
f
th
e
se
nt
im
en
tp
ro
xy
at
th
e
en
d
(D
ec
em
be
r)
of
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
is
ab
ov
e
(b
el
ow
)
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
m
ea
n
va
lu
e.
Pa
ne
lB
of
th
is
ta
bl
e
re
pl
ac
es
SH t
in
th
e
ab
ov
e
eq
ua
tio
n
w
ith
SD t
,a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1
(0
)
if
th
e
FO
M
C
m
ee
tin
g
oc
cu
rr
ed
du
ri
ng
a
de
cr
ea
si
ng
(i
nc
re
as
in
g)
se
nt
im
en
t
ye
ar
.
A
ye
ar
is
de
fin
ed
as
of
de
cr
ea
si
ng
(i
nc
re
as
in
g)
se
nt
im
en
ti
f
th
e
se
nt
im
en
tp
ro
xy
at
th
e
en
d
(D
ec
em
be
r)
of
th
at
ye
ar
is
lo
w
er
(h
ig
he
r)
th
an
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
.
Pa
ne
lC
of
th
is
ta
bl
e
re
pl
ac
es
SH t
in
th
e
ab
ov
e
eq
ua
tio
n
w
ith
SH
D
t
,a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
is
eq
ua
lt
o
1
if
th
e
FO
M
C
m
ee
tin
g
oc
cu
rr
ed
du
ri
ng
a
ye
ar
w
he
n
se
nt
im
en
ts
ta
rt
s
at
hi
gh
le
ve
lb
ut
th
en
de
cl
in
es
,a
nd
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
A
ye
ar
is
de
fin
ed
as
of
hi
gh
at
th
e
st
ar
t
bu
tt
he
n
de
cr
ea
si
ng
se
nt
im
en
ti
ft
he
se
nt
im
en
tp
ro
xy
at
th
e
en
d
(D
ec
em
be
r)
of
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
ex
ce
ed
s
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
m
ea
n
va
lu
e
an
d
th
e
se
nt
im
en
tp
ro
xy
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
at
ye
ar
is
lo
w
er
th
an
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
ye
ar
.C
SI
,C
C
Ia
nd
B
W
Id
en
ot
e
th
e
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ic
hi
ga
n’
s
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
ti
nd
ex
,t
he
U
.S
.C
on
su
m
er
C
on
fid
en
ce
in
de
x
an
d
B
ak
er
an
d
W
ur
gl
er
’s
(2
00
6,
20
07
)s
en
tim
en
ti
nd
ex
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
in
cl
ud
es
FO
M
C
m
ee
tin
gs
ov
er
Ju
ne
19
89
-
D
ec
em
be
r
20
08
,w
ith
th
e
ex
ce
pt
io
n
of
th
e
17
Se
pt
em
be
r
20
01
m
ee
tin
g
an
d
th
e
22
Ja
nu
ar
y
20
08
m
ee
tin
g.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*,
**
,*
**
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
V
al
ue
w
ei
gh
te
d
re
tu
rn
s
E
qu
al
ly
w
ei
gh
te
d
re
tu
rn
s
O
bs
β 0
β 1
β 2
A
d
j.R
2
β 0
β 1
β 2
A
d
j.R
2
Pa
ne
lA
:S
H t
C
SI
18
0
0.
21
∗∗
-0
.3
8
−7
.1
5∗
∗∗
0.
14
0.
16
∗∗
-0
.6
3
−4
.6
2∗
∗
0.
10
(0
.1
0)
(0
.8
6)
(2
.4
5)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.6
2)
(2
.2
6)
C
C
I
18
0
0.
20
∗∗
-0
.5
2
−7
.3
4∗
∗∗
0.
14
0.
15
∗∗
-0
.5
6
−4
.9
2∗
∗
0.
11
(0
.1
0)
(0
.8
3)
(2
.5
3)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.6
0)
(2
.3
0)
B
W
I
18
0
0.
23
∗∗
-0
.3
7
−6
.8
0∗
∗∗
0.
14
0.
18
∗∗
∗
0.
44
−5
.4
6∗
∗∗
0.
15
(0
.0
9)
(0
.9
7)
(2
.5
7)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.7
9)
(1
.9
2)
Pa
ne
lB
:S
D t
C
SI
18
0
0.
20
∗∗
-0
.6
8
−4
.9
8∗
∗
0.
09
0.
15
∗∗
-0
.8
1
−3
.3
5∗
0.
07
(0
.1
0)
(1
.0
7)
(2
.4
1)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.8
1)
(1
.9
4)
C
C
I
18
0
0.
20
∗∗
-0
.7
7
−4
.9
5∗
∗∗
0.
09
0.
15
∗∗
-0
.8
6
−3
.3
3∗
0.
07
(0
.1
0)
(1
.0
9)
(2
.4
1)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.8
2)
(1
.9
5)
Pa
ne
lC
:S
H
D
t
C
SI
18
0
0.
21
∗∗
-0
.2
1
−8
.2
4∗
∗∗
0.
17
0.
16
∗∗
-0
.3
7
−5
.4
9∗
∗
0.
12
(0
.0
9)
(0
.8
4)
(2
.4
2)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.6
1)
(2
.3
0)
C
C
I
18
0
0.
21
∗∗
-0
.2
5
−8
.2
0∗
∗∗
0.
17
0.
16
∗∗
-0
.4
0
−5
.6
7∗
∗
0.
12
(0
.0
9)
(0
.8
4)
(2
.4
3)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.6
1)
(2
.3
1)
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1 78
Table 1.5: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - controlling for the business cycle
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )(1− Rect)∆iut +β2(1− SHt )Rect∆iut +β3SHt (1− Rect)∆iut +β4SHt Rect∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value-weighted
market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low)
sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI
denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007)
sentiment index, respectively. Rect is a variable that captures the state of the economy, measured by the NBER business cycle chronology and
the real time probability of recession. Specifically, NBERt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurred during a U.S.
recession as classified by NBER business cycle dates and 0 otherwise. Recprobt is equal to the real time recession probability when the FOMC
meeting takes place, obtained from the dynamic-factor Markov-Switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008). The sample period includes
FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 Ad j.R2
Panel A: NBER recession
CSI 180 0.21∗∗ -0.84 0.66 −8.31∗∗∗ -5.15 0.14
(0.10) (1.09) (0.67) (2.32) (4.64)
CCI 180 0.20∗∗ -1.01 0.61 −8.70∗∗∗ -5.18 0.14
(0.10) (1.04) (0.67) (2.39) (4.64)
BWI 180 0.23∗∗ -0.89 0.75 −7.73∗∗∗ -5.10 0.13
(0.09) (1.17) (0.65) (2.82) (4.63)
Panel B: Recession probability
CSI 180 0.21∗∗ -0.86 1.78 −7.62∗∗∗ -6.01 0.14
(0.10) (1.10) (1.23) (2.42) (7.56)
CCI 180 0.20∗∗ -1.03 1.82 −8.03∗∗∗ -5.79 0.14
(0.10) (1.06) (1.24) (2.59) (7.54)
BWI 180 0.23∗∗ -0.90 1.86 −6.91∗∗ -6.47 0.12
(0.09) (1.19) (1.23) (2.93) (7.71)
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Table 1.6: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - controlling for the monetary cycle
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )(1−East)∆iut +β2(1− SHt )East∆iut +β3SHt (1−East)∆iut +β4SHt East∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value-weighted
market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low)
sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI
denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007)
sentiment index, respectively. East is a dummy variable that captures the state of the monetary cycle, being equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting
occurred during a monetary easing cycle and 0 otherwise. A monetary easing cycle is defined as starting with a negative FFR target rate change
and ending with a positive FFR target rate change. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the
exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 Ad j.R2
CSI 180 0.21∗∗ -1.60 -0.11 0.21 −7.71∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.10) (2.46) (0.90) (4.11) (2.45)
CCI 180 0.19∗ -1.64 -0.31 0.48 −7.96∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.10) (2.44) (0.85) (4.22) (2.53)
BWI 180 0.20∗∗ 11.36∗ -0.68 -1.96 −8.44∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.10) (6.75) (0.90) (2.18) (2.68)
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Table 1.7: Response of stock market returns to negative and positive FFR shocks before the
zero lower bound, following periods of high vs. low sentiment
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )∆iunt + β2(1− SHt )∆iupt +β3SHt ∆iunt +β4SHt ∆iupt +εt , where Rt , ∆iunt and ∆iupt denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in
excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate, negative unexpected FFR changes and positive unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Negative FFR
surprises are calculated as ∆iunt = ∆iut Dnt , where Dnt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if ∆iut < 0, and 0 otherwise. Positive FFR surprises
are calculated as ∆iupt = ∆iut D
p
t , where D
p
t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if ∆iut > 0, and 0 otherwise. SHt is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high
(low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and
BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006,
2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of
the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 Ad j.R2
CSI 180 0.01 -1.21 -0.68 −10.11∗∗∗ 6.81 0.22
(0.10) (0.84) (4.56) (1.51) (6.41)
CCI 180 0.02 -1.28 0.36 −10.06∗∗∗ 9.41 0.22
(0.10) (0.84) (3.78) (1.51) (7.15)
BWI 180 0.03 -1.70 6.32 −9.50∗∗∗ 2.38 0.19
(0.10) (0.97) (6.29) (1.85) (5.49)
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Table 1.8: Response of stock market returns to negative and positive FFR shocks before the
zero lower bound, following periods of high vs. low sentiment - excluding unscheduled FOMC
meetings
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )∆iunt +β2(1− SHt )∆iupt +β3SHt ∆iunt +β4SHt ∆iupt +εt , where Rt , ∆iunt and ∆iupt denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in
excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate, negative unexpected FFR changes and positive unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Negative FFR
surprises are calculated as ∆iunt = ∆iut Dnt , where Dnt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if ∆iut < 0, and 0 otherwise. Positive FFR surprises are
calculated as ∆iupt = ∆iut D
p
t , where D
p
t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if ∆iut > 0, and 0 otherwise. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low)
sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI
denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007)
sentiment index, respectively. The sample period includes scheduled FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 Ad j.R2
CSI 157 0.08 -0.59 0.94 −7.93∗∗ 6.49 0.05
(0.11) (1.26) (4.50) (3.24) (6.69)
CCI 157 0.09 -0.78 0.37 −7.82∗∗ 9.32 0.06
(0.10) (1.30) (3.73) (3.25) (7.36)
BWI 157 0.12 -0.93 6.26 −6.08∗ 2.29 0.02
(0.11) (1.53) (6.35) (3.19) (5.69)
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Table 1.9: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - corrected for joint-response bias
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over June 1989 - December 2008 (daily data), of the
following model: Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )FOMCt +β2(1− SHt )∆iut +β3(1− SHt )FOMCt∆iut +β4SHt FOMCt +β5SHt ∆iut +β6SHt FOMCt∆iut +εt , where Rt
and ∆iut denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively.
FOMCt is dummy variable that is equal to 1 on FOMC announcement days and 0 otherwise. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0)
during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end
(December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer
Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6
CSI 4927 0.01 -0.08 −0.60∗ -0.33 0.33∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗ −7.68∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.16) (0.36) (1.31) (0.11) (0.55) (2.41)
CCI 4927 0.01 0.10 −0.60∗ 0.10 0.30∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ −7.95∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.12) (0.34) (1.13) (0.14) (0.57) (2.56)
BWI 4927 0.01 0.16 -0.48 0.18 0.30∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ −7.90∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.11) (0.32) (1.14) (0.14) (0.61) (2.49)
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Table 1.10: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - 2-day and 3-day cumulative returns
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of the following model: Rt,t+1=β0+β1(1 −
SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt,t+1 and ∆iut denote CRSP value weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate accu-
mulated over two days (FOMC announcement day and the following day) and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting
with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI,
CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. Panel B replaces 2-day cumulative returns with 3-day (FOMC announcement day and the following
2 days) cumulative returns, that is, Rt,t+2. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception
of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
Panel A: 2-day returns
CSI 180 0.29∗∗ -1.93 −7.79∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.13) (1.47) (2.92)
CCI 180 0.28∗∗ -1.84 −8.22∗∗∗ 0.09
(0.13) (1.42) (2.93)
BWI 180 0.31∗∗ -2.00 −7.42∗∗ 0.08
(0.12) (1.52) (2.99)
Panel B: 3-day returns
CSI 180 0.38∗∗∗ -1.85 -5.45 0.03
(0.14) (1.74) (3.39)
CCI 180 0.38∗∗ -1.92 -5.57 0.03
(0.14) (1.68) (3.54)
BWI 180 0.39∗∗∗ -2.28 -4.85 0.02
(0.14) (1.85) (3.37)
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Table 1.11: Response of stock market returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound, during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment
Panel A of this table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following
model: Rt =β0+β1(1− SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month
Treasury bill rate and path surprises, respectively. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a
decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December)
of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. CSI denotes the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index. The
zero lower bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings that were not accompanied by a FOMC statement
or other information were excluded. Panel B of this table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC
meeting days, of the following model: Rt =β0+β1(1−SDt )pathnt + β2(1−SDt )pathpt +β3SDt pathnt +β4SDt pathpt +εt , where pathnt and pathpt denote
negative and positive path surprises, respectively. Negative path surprises are calculated as pathnt = patht D
n
t , where D
n
t is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if patht < 0, and 0 otherwise. Positive path surprises are calculated as path
p
t = patht D
p
t , where D
p
t is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if patht > 0, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 Ad j.R2
Panel A
CSI 47 0.25∗ 0.45 −4.51∗∗∗ 0.11
(0.15) (0.64) (1.74)
Panel B
CSI 47 0.35 2.71 0.04 −3.86∗∗ −7.10∗∗ 0.22
(0.24) (4.78) (0.98) (1.65) (3.50)
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Table 1.12: Response of stock market returns to LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements,
during periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment
This table presents the CRSP value-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs (%)) using alternative event windows across periods
of decreasing sentiment (Panel A) and increasing sentiment (Panel B). Returns are in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Abnormal returns
are calculated using the constant mean model and a 20-day estimation period that ends prior to the event window. We consider announcements by
the Fed over the period December 2007 - October 2014 that reflect the initiation/continuation or slowdown/stop of Large Scale Asset Purchases
(LSAPs) and liquidity facilities programmes. There are 46 announcements related to liquidity facilities (LIQall ), including 13 announcements
about central bank liquidity swaps (CB swaps), 13 announcements about the term auction facility (TAF) and 21 announcements about other
liquidity facilities (Other). 22 LSAPs-related announcements are also considered. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if
the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous
year. The statistical significance of CAARs is evaluated using the Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) test statistic that accounts for
event-induced increase in returns volatility. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Event window CB swaps TAF Other LIQall LSAPs LIQall+LSAPs
Panel A: Decreasing sentiment
(-1, 3) 3.17 -1.92 -0.74 -0.14 1.49 -0.05
(-1, 1) 3.11∗∗ -0.74 0.10 0.55 1.87 0.47
(0, 0) 1.51∗∗∗ -0.42 -0.06 0.16 0.08 0.12
Panel B: Increasing sentiment
(-1, 3) 0.77 0.77 -0.64 -0.36
(-1, 1) 0.22 0.22 -0.42 0.30
(0, 0) 0.96 0.96 -0.04 0.16
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Figure 1.1: Actual and unexpected FFR changes
This figure plots actual and unexpected FFR changes on FOMC announcement days over the period June 1989 - October 2014. Shaded areas
denote U.S recessions as classified by NBER business cycle dates.
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Figure 1.2: Sentiment indices
This figure plots sentiment indices using monthly data over the period December 1988 - October 2014. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index,
respectively. Shaded areas denote the U.S recessions as classified by NBER business cycle dates.
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Figure 1.3: Sentiment level-based states
This figure plots level-based sentiment states, as captured by SH,it , over the period December 1988 - October 2014. This dummy variable is
equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high
(low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. i = CSI, CCI
and BWI; where CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and
Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. Shaded areas denote the U.S recessions as classified by NBER business cycle
dates.
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 1 89
Figure 1.4: Sentiment changes-based states
This figure plots changes-based sentiment states, as captured by SD,it , over the period January 1989 - October 2014. The dummy variable is
equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing)
sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. i = CSI and CCI; where
CSI and CCI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and the U.S. Consumer Confidence index, respectively. Shaded
areas denote the U.S recessions as classified by NBER business cycle dates.
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Figure 1.5: Sentiment states and bear markets
This figure plots level and changes-based interacted sentiment states (solid line), as captured by SHDt , along with a bear market indicator (dotted
line). The sentiment dummy variable is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year when sentiment starts at high level but then
declines, and 0 otherwise. A year is defined as of high at the start but then decreasing sentiment if the CSI at the end (December) of the previous
year exceeds the full sample mean value and the CSI at the end of that year is lower than at the end of the previous year. CSI denotes the
University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index. The bear market indicator is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the S&P 500 stock
market index is lower than its full sample 2-year moving average, and 0 otherwise. Shaded areas denote the U.S recessions as classified by
NBER business cycle dates.
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Figure 1.6: Monetary cycles
This figure plots monetary cycles, as captured by East , over the period December 1988 - October 2014. This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the
FOMC meeting occurred during a monetary easing cycle and 0 otherwise. A monetary easing cycle is defined as starting with a negative FFR
target rate change and ending with a positive FFR target rate change. Shaded areas denote the U.S recessions as classified by NBER business
cycle dates.
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Figure 1.7: Response of industry portfolio returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound
This figure plots OLS estimates of the impact of unexpected FFR changes on industry portfolio returns, over FOMC announcement days,
following periods of low (high) sentiment in Panel A (B), as captured by β1 (β2), in the following model: Rit =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt ,
where Rit and ∆iut denote industry portfolio returns and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. The portfolio returns are in excess of the 1-
month Treasury bill rate. We use data on 49 industry-classified portfolios, obtained from the database of K. French. SHt is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with
high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI and
BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The
sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22
January 2008 meeting. The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals associated with the estimated industry responses.
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Figure 1.8: CAPM for industry portfolios on FOMC announcement days
This figure shows the fit of the CAPM for 49 industry-classified portfolios, obtained from the database of K. French, on FOMC announcement
days. For each portfolio, the horizontal axis shows the average excess return earned on FOMC announcement days (in percent) whereas the
vertical axis shows the excess return implied by the CAPM. The CAPM betas are estimated from a regression of the industry-classified portfolio’s
excess return on the excess return of the market portfolio at a daily frequency (using all days in the Fsample). The full sample period is June
1989 - October 2014, while the pre-ZLB period is June 1989 - December 2008. The results from the second-stage cross-sectional regressions
are as follows: RFOMC = -0.11(0.10) + 0.43(0.14)βˆ for the full sample, and RFOMC = -0.07(0.12) + 0.38(0.17)βˆ for the pre-ZLB period, where
the standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for the estimation error in betas following Shanken (1992). The dashed line shows the scatter
plot regression line and the solid black line shows the 45-degree line.
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Figure 1.9: CAPM for industry portfolios on FOMC announcement days before the zero lower
bound, following periods of high vs. low sentiment
This figure shows the fit of the CAPM for 49 industry-classified portfolios, obtained from the database of K. French, on FOMC announcement
days following periods of high vs. low sentiment. For each portfolio, the horizontal axis shows the average excess return earned on FOMC
announcement days (in percent) whereas the vertical axis shows the excess return implied by the CAPM. The CAPM betas are estimated
from a regression of the industry-classified portfolio’s excess return on the excess return of the market portfolio at a daily frequency (using
all days in the sample). The sample period is June 1989 - December 2008. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the
sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI and BWI denote the University of
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The results from the second-stage
cross-sectional regressions are as follows: RFOMC = -0.17(0.16) + 0.62(0.22)βˆ following periods of high sentiment, and RFOMC = 0.23(0.11) -
0.30(0.12)βˆ following periods of low sentiment, as defined by the CSI; RFOMC = -0.11(0.20) + 0.58(0.28)βˆ following periods of high sentiment,
and RFOMC = -0.02(0.10) + 0.13(0.13)βˆ following periods of low sentiment, as defined by the BWI; where the standard errors (in parentheses)
are adjusted for the estimation error in betas following Shanken (1992). The dashed line shows the scatter plot regression line and the solid
black line shows the 45-degree line.
Chapter 2
Investor Sentiment States and the
Cross-Sectional Stock Price Reaction to
Monetary Policy
2.1 Abstract
This chapter analyzes the effect of investor sentiment states on the response of cross-sectional
stock returns to monetary policy news using an event study approach over the Jun-89 to Oct-14
sample period. We demonstrate that monetary policy news affect stock portfolio returns only
following periods of high sentiment or during periods of decreasing sentiment, especially for
the deciles which are more sensitive to investor sentiment. Specially, FFR surprises have larger
impacts on the stocks with high accruals, young stocks, stocks with high asset growth rate, stocks
with low book-to-market ratio, high cash holding stocks, stocks with low gross profitability, high
investment stocks, past loser stocks, stocks with high net operating assets, stocks with low asset
tangibility, less profitable stocks, stocks with high return volatility, and large stocks at the pre-
ZLB period. Unconventional monetary policy shocks also have larger impact on the stocks that
are more exposed to investor sentiment.
2.2 Introduction
Traditional finance theory suggests that there are two main transmission channels through which
monetary policy affects stock returns: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending chan-
nel. According to the balance sheet channel, monetary policy shocks can affect a firm’s net
cash flow by influencing consumer spending and the firm’s floating-rate interest payments, and
then, the firm’s stock price. The bank lending channel has a more immediate effect. Mon-
etary policy shocks will change the total supply of intermediated credit. Therefore, the level
of funds that a firm can borrow from credit markets or financial intermediaries would be af-
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fected. Thus companies with different characteristics will respond differently to monetary pol-
icy shocks. A large number of previous studies investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks
on cross-sectional stock returns (see Thorbecke (1997); Jensen and Mercer (2002); Kontonikas
and Kostakis (2013)). However, all these studies focus on the transmission channels suggested
by the classic finance theory.
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, we demonstrated that investor sentiment plays an important role
in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to stock market returns. Specifically, monetary
policy shocks affect market-wide stock return only following periods of high sentiment or dur-
ing periods of decreasing sentiment, when stock market mispring is being corrected, as investors
are more sensitive to monetary news during such periods. In fact, sentiment-driven misprices
can affect not only the stock market as a whole, but also individual stocks. Having already doc-
umented the response of market-wide stock return to monetary policy shocks across sentiment
states, we extend the analysis towards the response of cross-sectional stock returns.
In this chapter, we have a closer look at the influence of investor sentiment on the impact
of monetary policy shocks on the cross-sectional stock returns over the period June 1989 to
October 2014. The impacts of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy are inves-
tigated. We investigate the responses of 15 stock portfolio returns using the same event study
methodology that we employed in Chapter 1. We first examine the sentiment sensitivity of dif-
ferent portfolio deciles. As discussed in previous studies, stocks with high sentiment sensitivity
are more overvalued when sentiment is high, and the subsequent returns will be lower (Baker
and Wurgler (2006); Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006); Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)). We
find that the young stocks, stocks with low asset tangibility, growth stocks, large stocks, low
profit stocks, stocks with high return volatility, past loser stocks, stocks with high accruals,
stocks with high asset growth rate, distressed stocks, stocks with low gross profitability, high
investment stocks, stocks with high net operating assets and stocks hold more cash have lower
average returns following periods of high sentiment. Thus, those stocks are more exposed to
investor sentiment. Our findings about sentiment sensitivity of the portfolios sorted by size and
book-to-market ratio are different to the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006). A possible expla-
nation is that sentiment sensitivity of the portfolios may change. In fact, our results show that,
the long leg and short leg of portfolios sorted by total accruals, asset growth, book-to-market
ratio, investment to asset, net operating assets, and size reverse at the ZLB period.
Second, consistent with our findings in Chapter 1, we demonstrate that stock portfolio re-
turns are affected by monetary policy shocks only following periods of high sentiment or during
periods of decreasing sentiment. Importantly, our findings show that short leg stocks are gener-
ally more exposed to monetary policy shocks. In other words, stocks which are more sensitive
to investor sentiment are also more sensitive to monetary policy shocks. These findings can be
interpreted as evidence in favour of a separate sentiment channel of the transmission of monetary
policy.
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This chapter contributes to the studies which investigate the role of investor sentiment in
asset pricing. Our results are in line with previous studies, which find that the cross-section of
future stock returns is conditional upon the begin-of-period proxies for sentiment. However, by
focusing on the ZLB period, we extend previous literature by showing that the cross-sectional
sentiment sensitivity may change over time. This chapter also relates to the studies which ex-
amine the relationship between monetary policy and stock returns. We extend the literature by
examining the cross-sectional response of 15 portfolios.1 Moreover, our findings are also related
to the literature on state dependence in the relationship between stock returns and monetary pol-
icy. Our evidence for sentiment-dependence will be crucial to distinguish between behavioural
and economic fundamentals-based explanations for the cross-sectional patterns. Specifically,
previous papers that document a strong impact of monetary policy shifts on stocks of small size
and high book-to-market ratio interpret their findings in the context of the credit channel of
the policy transmission mechanism (Thorbecke (1997); Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000);
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004); Basistha and Kurov (2008); Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013);
Maio (2014)). According to the credit channel, small firms are more financially constrained,
relative to large firms, since they are less well-collateralized and do not have the same ability to
raise external finance (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)).2
Therefore, small stocks are expected to be more strongly affected by a monetary policy shock, in
comparison to large stocks. Further, high book-to-market ratio firms are likely to be distressed
and, consequently, more sensitive to changes in monetary conditions than growth firms (Kon-
tonikas and Kostakis (2013); Maio (2014)).3 The credit channel theory, however, neither posits
a role for investor sentiment, nor does it anticipate that the response of size- and book-to-market
ratio-sorted portfolios may vary across sentiment states. Moreover, it does not predict a strong
reaction by growth and loser stocks to monetary policy news.4 In fact, when one considers the
impact of investor sentiment, our results show that it is the large, and low book-to-market ratio
firms are more affected by monetary policy shocks, following periods of high sentiment. Thus,
finding that sentiment-sensitive stocks are mostly impacted, can be interpreted as evidence in
favour of a separate sentiment channel.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 develops our hypothesis. Section
1Previous studies, however, mainly focus on the portfolios sorted by size, value and momentum.
2Small companies have limited ability to issue commercial papers and face higher agency costs of debt. More-
over, small companies have restricted access to intermediated credit, and hence on the advent of an overall reduced
supply of bank loans, these companies are typically the first to have their credit lines reduced or cut. Whited and
Wu (2006) and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), among others, find that size loads negatively to a composite indicator
of financial constraints.
3Several studies have shown that the value premium is associated with relative distress. Specifically, high book-
to-market (value) firms tend to have persistently lower earnings and are considered to be more financially distressed,
relative to low book-to-market (growth) firms (Fama and French (1993); Fama and French (1995); Fama and French
(1998)).
4Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013) point out that stock portfolios formed on the basis of past performance and
without reference to corporate characteristics, such as momentum-sorted portfolios, cannot be used to shed light on
the credit channel.
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2.3 describes the data and variables employed in the empirical analysis. In Section 2.4, we
present evidence on the role of investor sentiment in the impact of monetary policy shocks on
different stock portfolios. Section 2.5 describes the results from various robustness checks.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.3 Data and sample
In this section we present and discuss the measures of monetary policy, investor sentiment and
stock portfolios that we employ in the subsequent empirical analysis. The full sample period
is June 1989 - October 2014, hence including the pre-crisis period, the financial crisis and its
aftermath. Our dataset includes a set of event-dates with 204 scheduled FOMC meetings and 23
unscheduled FOMC meetings.
2.3.1 Monetary policy news
We consider both conventional and unconventional monetary policy news. We measure conven-
tional monetary policy shocks as unexpected component of changes in the target FFR using the
methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001). The unconventional monetary policy we considered
is the Fed’s forward guidance through FOMC statements at the ZLB. We measure the changes in
forward guidance as path surprises using the methodology introduced by Gürkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson (2005). We refer the reader to Section 1.3.1 for a more detailed discussion concerning
the measurement of these monetary policy shocks, and for an analysis of the related descriptive
statistics.
2.3.2 Investor sentiment states
In order to examine whether the relationship between cross-sectional stock returns and monetary
policy shifts is conditional on the state of investor sentiment, we construct a level-based dummy
variable, SHt , and a changes-based dummy variable, S
D
t , based on the orthogonalized sentiment
indexes. We employ two proxies for investor sentiment: Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007)
Sentiment Index (BWI) and the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI). We
refer the reader to Section 1.3.2 for a more detailed discussion concerning the measurement of
these variables, and for an analysis of the related descriptive statistics.
2.3.3 Stock portfolios
In order to examine the role that investor sentiment plays in the transmission of monetary pol-
icy news on cross-sectional stock returns, we consider daily returns on 15 portfolio sorts which
are commonly used by previous literature: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age),
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book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset (CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to as-
sets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return
volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity (Size). We obtain return data on BM/ME, Mom
and Size from the database of K. French, and we construct the other 12 portfolios using the
firm-level data from the merged CRSP-Compustat database.
Following Novy-Marx (2013), the sample includes all common stock (share codes 10 and
11), financial firms (those with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) are excluded. We consider
value-weighted-return of different portfolios. There portfolios are constructed using a decile
sort on a signal using NYSE breakpoints. We use both annual files and quarterly files on merged
CRSP-Compustat database. In order to avoid lookahead bias, for the portfolios using the annual
files, accounting data for fiscal-year end of year t is matched with stock returns data from July
of year t+1 until June of year t+2. These portfolios are sorted into 10 groups and rebalanced
annually at the end of June. For the ones that use the quarterly files, the accounting data for a
given quarter are matched to the end of the second month after which they were reported. These
portfolios are sorted into 10 groups and rebalanced monthly.
We calculate Acc following the method introduced by Sloan (1996). We measure AG as the
growth rate of total assets. Age is defined as the number of years since the firm’s first appearance
on CRSP, measured to the end of our sample. BM is book equity divided by market equity. CA
is cash and marketable securities over total assets. GP is gross profits over total assets. Inv is
the annual change in gross total property, plant, and equipment, plus the annual change in total
inventories, divided by one-year lagged total assets. Mom is measured as stocks’ cumulated
past performance in the previous year by skipping the most recent month. NOA is defined as the
difference on the balance sheet between all operating assets and all operating liabilities scaled
by total assets. Oscore is calculated as the probability of bankruptcy in a static model using
accounting variables. PPE/A is measured by property, plant and equipment over total assets.
RoA is income before extraordinary items over total assets. RoB is income before extraordinary
items over book value of equity. Sigma is measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock
returns over the past 12 months. Size is the market value of equity. Detailed discussions about
the construction of portfolios are reported in the Appendix B,
2.4 Econometric models and results
2.4.1 Investor sentiment and the long-short strategy
We begin our empirical investigation by examining the sentiment-sensitivity of different stock
portfolios at the pre-ZLB period (June 1989 - December 2008). We separate our sample into two
states according to the sentiment level at the end (December) of the previous year. Specifically,
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a year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end of
the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. According to Stambaugh, Yu,
and Yuan (2012), short selling is the major obstacle to eliminating sentiment-driven mispricing.
Overpricing should then be more prevalent than underpricing, and overpricing should be more
prevalent when market-wide sentiment is high. Thus, we define the deciles with lower returns
following periods of high sentiment as exhibiting higher sentiment-sensitivity because they are
more overvalued. Another reason that we focus on the periods following high sentiment is that
our findings in Chapter 1 show conventional monetary policy shocks affect market-wide stock
returns only following periods of high sentiment
[Insert Table 2.1 around here]
Table 2.1 reports the presents the monthly average portfolio returns across sentiment states
classified by CSI for the pre-ZLB periods. The first rows of Table 2.1 show that the effect of
total accruals conditional on sentiment. Following periods of high sentiment, firms with high
accruals earn lower returns on average than firms with low accruals.5 Thus, stocks of firms with
high accruals should have higher sentiment-sensitivity.
The next rows of Table 2.1 show that the cross-sectional effect of firm ages is conditional
upon the state of investor sentiment. Specifically, youngest stocks earn 0.45% less than the
top-decile Age firms following periods of high sentiment, which indicates that they are more
exposed to sentiment. This is consistent with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006).
The next rows of Table 2.1 show that the average monthly returns following high sentiment
periods is decreasing, though not monotonically, with asset growth decile. This indicates that
companies that grow their total asset more are more sensitive to investor sentiment.
The next rows of Table 2.1 present the average monthly returns of stock portfolios sorted by
the book-to-market ratio. The conditional cross-sectional effect is striking. The average returns
increase monotonically from the growth (bottom-decile) stocks to the value (top-decile) stocks
following periods of high sentiment. This is different to Baker and Wurgler (2006), who find a
“U-shape" among the average monthly returns of stock portfolios sorted by the book-to-market
ratio.
The next rows look at the cash. Although the returns for the top-decile is only 0.02% lower
than the bottom-decile following periods of high sentiment, the conditional difference in returns
on top-decile is−0.41% per month, which is much larger than that of the bottom-decile (%0.06).
The results indicate that firms with larger cash to asset ratio are more exposed to investor senti-
ment.
The next rows examine gross profitability. Following periods of high sentiment, the average
returns for the bottom-decile (top-decile) stocks is 0.91% (0.96%). The conditional differences
5Sloan (1996) find similar pattern, without considering the state of investor sentiment.
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are the same for the two deciles. So the bottom-decile is slightly more sensitive to investor
sentiment, as compared to the top-decile.
The remain results presented in the next rows show that, firms with higher past investment,
lower past performance, higher net operating assets, higher O-score, less tangible assets, less
profitability (measured by return-on-asset and return-on-book value of equity), and higher return
volatility have lower average returns following periods of high sentiment, and thus, are more
exposed to investor sentiment.
Importantly, the results in the final rows of Table 2.1 show that, following periods of high
sentiment, large firms have lower average returns (0.69%) as compared to small firms (0.98%).
This is in contrast to the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2006). Moreover, we got similar results
with sentiment states classified by the BWI (see Table 2.2).
We then construct a long-short strategy, using the extreme deciles, 1 and 10 only. For each
portfolio, we define the decile which is more exposed to investor sentiment as the short leg, and
the other decile will be the long leg. According to the results reported in Table 2.3, for the pre-
ZLB period, stocks with high accruals, young stocks, stocks with high asset growth rate, stocks
with low book-to-market ratio, high cash holding stocks, stocks with low gross profitability, high
investment stocks, past loser stocks, stocks with high net operating assets, distressed stocks,
stocks with low asset tangibility, less profitable stocks, stocks with high return volatility, and
large stocks are defined as the short leg.
We next examine the sentiment-sensitivity of stock portfolio deciles at the ZLB period.
Because investor sentiment was always low after the ZLB was reached, following Baker and
Wurgler (2006), we classify the deciles with higher average returns as with higher sentiment-
sensitivity. Similarly, the deciles which are more exposed to investor sentiment are defined the
short leg. The results reported in Table 2.4 show that, the sentiment sensitivity changes at the
ZLB period for the portfolios sorted by total accruals, asset growth, book-to-market ratio, in-
vestment to asset, net operating assets, and size. For instance, large stocks are more exposed to
investor sentiment at the pre-ZLB period, however, it is the small stocks that are more sensitive
to investor sentiment at the ZLB period. Thus, large stocks is defined as the short leg (long leg)
at the pre-ZLB (ZLB) period.
2.4.2 The impact of target rate surprises
We proceed by investigating the role that sentiment plays in the transmission of the conventional
monetary policy shocks to cross-sectional stock returns. Specifically, we examine how FFR
shocks affect the short leg/long leg of each portfolio across different sentiment states:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut + εt (2.1)
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where Rt is the short leg/long leg return of each portfolio, and SHt is equal to one when sentiment
is high at the end of the previous year. Thus, the β2 coefficient measures the stock response to
unexpected FFR changes following periods of high sentiment and the β1 coefficient measures
the stock response to unexpected FFR changes following periods of low sentiment.
[Insert Table 2.5 around here]
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 reports the estimates of Equation 2.3 with sentiment measured by
CSI and BWI, respectively. In line with the findings for market-wide stock returns in Chapter 1,
the results in Table 2.5 show that the impact of FFR surprises on portfolio returns is statistically
significant only when sentiment is high at the start of the year. These findings are robust to the
use of BWI. In the cross-section, we find that the short leg deciles, which are more sensitive
to investor sentiment, are generally more sensitive to FFR surprises following periods of high
sentiment. For instance, for portfolios sorted by firm ages, the results in Table 2.5 show that
the reaction of the short leg stocks to FFR surprises, conditional on the begin-of-the-year sen-
timent being high, is almost four times larger than the response of the long leg stocks (-11.22
vs. -3.09). The only exception is the O-score sorted portfolio. The impact of FFR shocks is
larger on the long leg stocks, which are the stocks with low O-score. This may result from the
multidimensional nature of the growth and distress variables mentioned by Baker and Wurgler
(2006), as firms with low O-score may include high-flying growth firms, and growth stocks are
more affected by FFR surprises following periods of high sentiment.
[Insert Table 2.6 around here]
On the aspect of the long-short spread, we find that the return differentials respond to un-
expected FFR changes only when sentiment is high at the start of the year. The reaction of the
long-short return differentials are statistically significant for the portfolios sorted by firm age,
asset growth rate, book-to-market ratio, investor to asset ratio, momentum, asset tangibility, re-
turn volatility and firm size. As presented in Table 2.5, the long-short differentials decline in
response to expansionary FFR surprises, driven by the stronger reaction of the short leg portfo-
lios. For example, for the portfolios sorted by past performance, an unexpected cut of 25 basis
points in the FFR is associated with about 2.5% higher return for the past-loser stocks (short leg)
and 1.25% for the past-winner stocks. For the analyses based on BWI, we got similar results.
To sum up, in line with the presence of a sentiment mechanism, we find that the response
of stock portfolios to monetary policy shocks is conditional on the state of investor sentiment.
Conventional monetary policy shocks affect portfolio returns only following periods of high
sentiment. We also find that the short leg stocks, which are more sensitive to sentiment, are also
more exposed to FFR surprises.
Our evidence is in line with the event study results of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) in
the case of book-to-market portfolios, and Cenesizoglu (2011) for both size and book-to-market
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portfolios.6 Also, our findings agree with the VAR evidence of Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013)
in identifying past-loser stocks as more exposed to FFR shocks, relative to past-winner stocks.7
Nevertheless none of these studies accounts for the role of investor sentiment and thereby aver-
age conditional patterns.
2.4.3 The impact of path surprises at the zero lower bound
We then examine the cross-sectional effect of unconventional monetary policy. We start by
examining the impact of path surprises on stock returns during the ZLB era (January 2009 -
October 2014). The level-based sentiment dummy variable cannot be used to identify sentiment
states since it is always low throughout the ZLB period. Therefore, we employ the CSI changes-
based dummy with the fowling regression8:
Rt = β0+β1(1−SDt )patht +β2SDt patht + εt (2.2)
The results in Table 2.7 show that, consistent with the market-wide evidence in the Chapter
1, the effect of path surprise on stock portfolios materialize only during periods when sentiment
is decreasing, supporting our argument of a sentiment channel. Consistent with the findings in
Table 2.5, the short leg deciles are generally more sensitive to path surprises, relative to the long
leg deciles. The portfolios sorted by cash to asset ratio and investment are the two of which
the long leg deciles are more affected by path surprises, however, their long-short spread are
insignificant.
[Insert Table 2.7 around here]
Thus, with the exception of portfolios sorted by cash to asset ratio and investment, the stocks
that we expect to react more strongly to policy shocks, on the basis of high sentiment-sensitivity,
do so. For some portfolios there is a pronounced dispersion in the monetary policy impact in
the cross-section. For instance, during periods of decreasing sentiment, the momentum-sorted
portfolio, the β2 coefficient of the past-winner stocks (-2.75) is almost seven times smaller than
that of the past-loser stock (-19.59), and not statistically different from zero. For other portfolios
which has been employed in previous monetary literature (the size and book-to-market sorted
portfolios), the reactions of both small and large stocks to path surprises are statistically sig-
nificant, but small stocks react stronger than large stocks. Hence, the small-minus-large return
differential increases in response to an unexpected decline in the path of interest rates. Expan-
sionary path surprises also increase the value-minus-growth return differential, via the signifi-
cant response of the high book-to-market stocks. These findings are consistent with previous
6It should be noted, though, that the results of Cenesizoglu (2011) are sensitive to the treatment of outliers.
7The responses of other portfolios have not been examined by previous studies.
8We consider only CSI changes-based dummy, see Chapter 1 for detailed explanations.
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studies which examine the impact of unconventional monetary policy on stock returns. For ex-
ample, Wright (2012) find that unexpected easing of monetary policy at the ZLB increases the
return of the HML factor. However, they argue that it may reflect the high sensitivity of value
stocks to the credit channel of the transmission mechanism. By showing that the cross-sectional
repones are conditional on the state of investor sentiment, we shed light on the existence of a
separate sentiment channel in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to stock returns.
Another interesting finding is that, the impact of monetary policy changes along with the
changes in sentiment sensitivity. For example, the stocks with high asset growth rate are more
exposed to investor sentiment at the pre-ZLB period. During the ZLB period, however, the
stocks with low asset growth rate are more sensitive to investor sentiment. Our results show
that, conventional monetary policy has larger impact on stocks with high asset growth rate at the
pre-ZLB period, and unconventional monetary policy has larger impact on stocks with low asset
growth rate at the ZLB period.
2.5 Robustness checks
We examine the robustness of our findings in a number of ways and find that the results re-
ported in Section 3.5 are overall not sensitive to these changes. First, we employ an alternative
sentiment index. Second we employ an alternative dummy variable to define sentiment states
based upon a monthly classification scheme. The results are contained in the Appendix B. The
reaction of stocks to monetary policy shocks is conditional upon the state of investor sentiment.
2.5.1 Alternative sentiment measure
As documented by Baker and Wurgler (2006) there is no perfect measure of investor sentiment.
Different indices may capture different dimensions of investor sentiment. We employ a survey-
based sentiment measure (CSI) and a sentiment index based on financial variables (BWI) in the
previous section. In this section, we consider an alternative sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer
Confidence Index (CCI) compiled by the Conference Board, to reassure the reader that the our
results are robust across sentiment indicators.9
We examine the sentiment-sensitivity of different portfolio deciles for the pre-ZLB period,
and present the results in Tables B.1 of the Appendix B. For the ZLB period, CCI is always
at low level, so the sentiment sensitivity of different portfolio deciles are the same as the ones
presented in Table 2.4. The results in Table B.1 show that the long-short strategy using CCI is
not different to the ones reported in Table 2.3. We next investigate the impact of FFR shocks
(for the pre-ZLB period) and path surprises (for the ZLB period) on portfolio returns across
sentiment states classified by the CCI. The results are reported in Table B.3 and B.4 of the
9Please see Chapter 1 for detailed discussions on this sentiment measure.
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Appendix B, respectively. Consistent with the baseline results, Table B.3 show that FFR shocks
affect portfolio returns only following periods of high sentiment. Moreover, the short leg stocks,
which are more sensitive to investor sentiment, are generally more exposed to monetary policy,
excluding the portfolio sorted by O-score, which have been observed and explained in previous
section.10 Table B.4 also shows that the short leg stocks are generally more affected by path
surprises shocks. In fact, because CSI and CCI show similar pattern in annual changes at the
ZLB period, the results reported in Table B.4 are the same as the ones presented in Table 2.7.
2.5.2 Monthly classification of sentiment states
Similar to our analyses in Chapter 1, we employ level-based and changes-based sentiment
dummy which are based upon an annual classification scheme in the baseline regressions. In
order to ensure that our findings are robust to the frequency of the classification scheme, we use
alternative sentiment state variables that are based upon a monthly classification of the state of
investor sentiment, as in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012). Specifically, for the analysis of the
impact of target rate surprises we define a dummy variable SHMt that is equal to 1 if the FOMC
meeting occurs during a month that starts with high sentiment level and 0 otherwise. A month is
defined as starting with high sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month
exceeds the full sample mean value. Table B.4 and B.5 in the Appendix B show the results using
CSI and BWI, respectively. The monthly classification results are consistent with the baseline
findings from annual classification of the sentiment states. In an unreported table, we also exam-
ine the impact of monthly change-based sentiment states on the transmission of path surprises
to stock portfolio returns. However, although our results show a larger repones on the short-leg,
most of the coefficients are insignificant. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, a plausible explanation
is that, change-based dummy at the monthly frequency cannot correctly capture the sentiment
correction periods, when the monetary policy mainly matters.
2.6 Conclusions
In Chapter 1, we show that there is a sentiment channel in the transmission of monetary policy to
stock market. The impact of monetary policy shifts on the stock market is concentrated during
the periods when the sentiment-driven mispricing is subsequently corrected, that is, following
periods of high sentiment or during periods of decreasing sentiment. In this Chapter we investi-
gate the impact of monetary policy shocks on stock portfolio returns across different sentiment
states. We consider 15 portfolios which have been widely used in previous studies. We focus
on the 1st and the 10th decile of each portfolio, and employ a long-short strategy, according to
which the short-leg is the decile which is more exposed to investor sentiment. Following Baker
10For other portfolios, there are positive long-short differentials, however, not all of them are statistically signif-
icant.
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and Wurgler (2006), we define a decile as more exposed to investor sentiment if the average
returns of that decile is higher (lower) following periods of high (low) sentiment. Our findings
show that, similar to the results on market-wide stock returns in Chapter 1, at the stock level,
monetary policy shocks affect portfolio returns significantly only during the sentiment correc-
tion phases. Moreover, in the cross-section, we show that the short-leg deciles, which are hard
to value and difficult to arbitrage, tend to react more strongly to both conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policy shifts. Specifically, we find that conventional monetary policy have
larger impacts on the stocks with high accruals, young stocks, stocks with high asset growth rate,
stocks with low book-to-market ratio, high cash holding stocks, stocks with low gross profitabil-
ity, high investment stocks, past loser stocks, stocks with high net operating assets, stocks with
low asset tangibility, less profitable stocks, stocks with high return volatility, and large stocks at
the pre-ZLB period. For the unconventional monetary, we also find that the response is more
pronounced among the short-leg deciles, which are more exposed to investor sentiment.
The findings in this chapter enhance our argument in Chapter 1, that monetary policy shocks
affect stock returns only following periods of high sentiment or during periods of decreasing sen-
timent. This chapter contributes to the literature which examines the impact of monetary policy
shocks on the cross-sectional stock returns. Our findings cannot be explained by the traditional
transmission channels of monetary policy. By showing the sentiment-based state dependence of
monetary policy shocks on stock returns and the fact that stocks which are sentiment-sensitive
are more exposed to monetary policy shocks, we argue that investor sentiment will affect the
transmission of monetary policy to stock returns. However, it is still not clear how investor sen-
timent affect investors’ decision-making and why the stocks which are more exposed to investor
sentiment are also more exposed to monetary policy. This could be a avenue for future studies.
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Table 2.1: Portfolio average returns conditional upon the investor sentiment states based on the
CSI before the zero lower bound
This table presents the average portfolio returns over months in which CSI is high at the start of the year, months in
which it is low, and the difference between these two averages. Portfolios formed on the following characteristics
are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score
of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore), asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB),
return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity (Size). A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment
if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value.
CSI denotes the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index. The sample period is June 1989 - December
2008.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High 0.63 0.32 0.91 0.86 0.70 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.44 0.30
Acc Low 0.80 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.95 1.01 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.02
High-Low -0.17 -0.48 0.06 -0.03 -0.25 -0.26 -0.21 -0.31 -0.61 -0.73
High 0.35 0.26 0.89 0.86 0.48 0.97 0.68 0.68 0.85 0.80
Age Low 0.59 1.22 0.87 1.30 0.39 0.52 0.60 0.76 0.85 0.73
High-Low -0.24 -0.96 0.02 -0.44 0.10 0.45 0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.07
High 0.95 0.59 0.91 0.74 0.71 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.33
AG Low 0.28 0.80 0.62 0.68 0.50 0.50 0.95 0.80 1.03 1.11
High-Low 0.67 -0.21 0.29 0.06 0.22 0.41 -0.08 0.10 -0.13 -0.77
High 0.23 0.62 0.88 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.14 1.25 1.40
BE/ME Low 0.45 0.72 0.89 1.05 1.10 0.85 1.02 1.15 1.31 1.66
High-Low -0.22 -0.10 -0.02 -0.22 -0.09 0.15 0.19 -0.01 -0.06 -0.26
High 0.80 0.40 0.64 1.05 0.67 0.60 0.68 0.81 0.82 0.78
CA Low 0.74 0.49 0.62 0.53 0.67 0.69 0.70 1.14 1.14 1.20
High-Low 0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.52 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.33 -0.33 -0.41
High 0.91 0.22 0.56 0.69 0.78 0.86 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.96
GP Low 0.37 0.44 0.29 0.58 0.43 0.59 0.67 0.99 1.14 1.51
High-Low 0.55 -0.22 0.27 0.11 0.34 0.26 0.09 -0.29 -0.47 -0.55
High 0.82 0.68 0.77 0.94 0.98 0.85 0.70 0.70 0.45 0.44
Inv Low 0.55 0.35 1.18 0.69 0.77 0.95 0.81 0.57 0.82 1.46
High-Low 0.27 0.33 -0.41 0.24 0.22 -0.10 -0.11 0.13 -0.37 -1.02
High -0.34 0.26 0.41 0.71 0.57 0.64 0.80 1.06 0.83 1.29
Mom Low -0.34 0.71 0.70 0.54 0.59 0.82 0.74 0.84 0.73 1.36
High-Low 0.00 -0.45 -0.30 0.18 -0.02 -0.18 0.06 0.23 0.10 -0.07
High 1.04 0.79 0.97 1.10 1.12 1.14 0.99 0.84 0.93 0.79
NOA Low 1.39 2.00 1.74 1.39 0.83 0.06 0.26 0.58 -1.14 1.83
High-Low -0.35 -1.20 -0.77 -0.29 0.29 1.08 0.73 0.26 2.07 -1.04
High 0.78 0.33 0.81 0.72 0.89 0.71 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.32
Oscore Low 1.11 0.83 0.47 0.70 0.61 0.74 0.60 0.39 0.28 0.00
High-Low -0.33 -0.49 0.34 0.02 0.28 -0.02 0.07 0.29 0.47 0.32
High 0.71 0.24 0.80 0.76 0.58 0.91 0.68 0.57 0.85 1.13
PPE/A Low 0.82 1.31 1.26 1.03 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.50 0.50 0.35
High-Low -0.11 -1.06 -0.46 -0.27 -0.21 0.16 -0.06 0.07 0.35 0.78
High 0.77 0.73 1.05 1.38 1.15 0.79 0.93 0.82 0.69 1.21
RoA Low 0.13 0.78 1.06 0.01 -0.01 0.26 0.38 1.27 1.21 1.04
High-Low 0.64 -0.05 -0.02 1.37 1.16 0.53 0.55 -0.45 -0.52 0.16
High 0.37 -0.14 0.55 0.52 0.83 0.56 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.82
RoB Low -0.18 0.17 0.38 0.62 0.56 0.57 0.63 0.76 0.83 1.36
High-Low 0.55 -0.31 0.17 -0.10 0.27 -0.01 0.19 0.11 0.04 -0.54
High 0.95 0.78 0.50 0.79 0.67 0.66 0.82 0.73 0.80 0.65
Sigma Low 1.12 1.09 0.51 0.85 0.68 0.58 0.68 0.53 0.67 0.02
High-Low -0.17 -0.31 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.63
High 0.98 0.95 0.89 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.90 0.83 0.84 0.69
Size Low 0.60 0.56 0.80 0.74 1.00 1.03 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.75
High-Low 0.38 0.39 0.09 0.07 -0.19 -0.25 0.14 0.02 0.02 -0.06
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Table 2.2: Portfolio average returns conditional upon investor sentiment states based on the
BWI before the zero lower bound
This table presents the average portfolio returns over months in which CSI is high at the start of the year, months in
which it is low, and the difference between these two averages. Portfolios formed on the following characteristics
are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score
of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore), asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB),
return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity (Size). A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if
the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. BWI
denotes Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index. The sample period is June 1989 - December 2008.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High 0.56 0.43 0.87 0.82 0.64 0.86 0.85 0.58 0.26 0.06
Acc Low 0.75 1.03 0.86 0.73 0.74 0.66 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.84
High-Low -0.19 -0.60 0.01 0.09 -0.10 0.21 -0.10 -0.31 -0.62 -0.78
High -0.12 0.31 0.67 0.72 0.39 1.10 0.67 0.67 0.96 0.85
Age Low 0.95 1.45 1.15 1.19 0.90 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.74 0.72
High-Low -1.07 -1.14 -0.48 -0.47 -0.51 0.44 0.02 -0.07 0.23 0.12
High 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.87 0.85 0.76 0.85 0.81 0.63 0.13
AG Low 0.63 0.73 0.74 0.58 0.56 0.90 0.93 1.00 1.22 0.86
High-Low 0.36 0.26 0.22 0.29 0.29 -0.14 -0.08 -0.19 -0.59 -0.72
High -0.23 0.25 0.63 0.82 0.91 0.95 1.10 1.17 1.29 1.38
BE/ME Low 0.81 1.05 1.14 0.94 1.13 0.99 1.24 1.11 1.23 1.53
High-Low -1.04 -0.80 -0.51 -0.11 -0.22 -0.04 -0.14 0.06 0.07 -0.15
High 0.84 0.27 0.76 0.80 0.70 0.52 0.78 1.03 0.86 0.73
CA Low 0.73 0.42 0.51 1.10 0.92 0.72 0.59 0.91 0.91 1.33
High-Low 0.11 -0.16 0.25 -0.30 -0.22 -0.19 0.19 0.11 -0.05 -0.61
High 0.69 0.69 0.43 0.70 0.54 0.60 0.84 0.69 0.49 0.93
GP Low 0.92 0.22 0.58 0.63 0.75 1.02 0.65 0.70 1.04 1.22
High-Low -0.22 0.47 -0.16 0.06 -0.21 -0.42 0.19 -0.01 -0.55 -0.30
High 0.70 0.74 1.16 0.92 0.98 0.80 0.82 0.68 0.13 0.08
Inv Low 0.83 0.70 0.53 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.63 0.65 0.95 1.25
High-Low -0.14 0.04 0.63 0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.19 0.03 -0.82 -1.17
High -0.53 0.28 0.45 0.70 0.60 0.71 0.89 1.09 0.83 1.16
Mom Low -0.15 0.43 0.49 0.65 0.54 0.65 0.68 0.94 0.80 1.46
High-Low -0.38 -0.15 -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.03 -0.30
High 0.84 1.67 0.90 0.95 1.34 1.51 0.48 1.07 0.64 0.25
NOA Low 1.40 0.77 1.37 1.37 0.99 0.30 1.22 0.25 0.37 1.79
High-Low -0.57 0.90 -0.47 -0.41 0.35 1.21 -0.74 0.83 0.27 -1.54
High 0.72 0.60 0.69 0.57 1.06 0.83 0.62 0.48 0.62 -0.11
Oscore Low 0.98 0.84 0.80 0.87 0.78 0.61 0.70 0.81 0.67 0.63
High-Low -0.25 -0.24 -0.11 -0.30 0.29 0.22 -0.08 -0.34 -0.05 -0.75
High 0.53 0.68 0.78 0.71 0.58 0.79 0.68 0.36 0.92 1.06
PPE/A Low 0.94 1.01 1.01 0.93 0.85 0.97 0.70 0.57 0.64 0.89
High-Low -0.41 -0.33 -0.22 -0.21 -0.27 -0.18 -0.02 -0.21 0.28 0.17
High 0.89 0.63 0.50 1.07 0.53 0.90 0.74 0.56 0.93 1.14
RoA Low -0.15 1.00 1.63 1.13 1.27 0.46 0.90 1.16 0.66 1.20
High-Low 1.03 -0.37 -1.13 -0.06 -0.73 0.45 -0.15 -0.60 0.26 -0.06
High -0.07 0.13 0.39 0.47 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.83 0.83 0.92
RoB Low 0.60 0.44 0.65 0.61 0.84 0.50 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.94
High-Low -0.67 -0.31 -0.27 -0.13 -0.24 0.12 -0.27 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02
High 1.12 1.09 0.51 0.85 0.68 0.58 0.68 0.53 0.67 0.02
Sigma Low 0.68 0.74 0.57 0.66 0.80 0.77 0.87 0.86 1.00 1.37
High-Low 0.43 0.35 -0.06 0.18 -0.12 -0.20 -0.20 -0.32 -0.34 -1.35
High 0.82 0.77 0.68 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.82 0.67
Size Low 1.00 0.98 1.07 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.05 0.99 0.86 0.73
High-Low -0.18 -0.22 -0.38 -0.42 -0.40 -0.35 -0.34 -0.32 -0.04 -0.06
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Table 2.3: The long-short strategy before the zero lower bound
This table presents the long-short strategy for 15 portfolios. Portfolios formed on the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc),
asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset (CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv),
momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore), asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on
book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity (Size). Deciles which are more sensitive to investor sentiment
are defined as the short leg. A decile is defined as with higher sentiment sensitivity if it has lower average monthly returns during years start
with high sentiment. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year
is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and
Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period is June 1989 - December 2008.
CSI BWI
Long leg Short Leg Long leg Short leg
Acc Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
Age Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
AG Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
BE/ME Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
CA Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
GP Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
Inv Decile 1 Decil 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
Mom Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
NOA Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
Oscore Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
PPE/A Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
RoA Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
RoB Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1
Sigma Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
Size Decile 1 Decile 10 Decile 1 Decile 10
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Table 2.5: Response of portfolio returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound, following
periods of high vs. low sentiment - CSI based analyses
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote portfolio returns and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Portfolios formed
on the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to
asset (CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Os-
core), asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of
equity (Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the
FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if
the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value according to the University of
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of
the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test
for equality of coefficients (F-statistic) are reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 0.57 −10.48∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.06 −10.85∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.50 0.38 [0.95]
(1.11) (3.61) (1.34) (2.97) (0.81) (1.16)
Age -0.20 −3.09∗ [0.14] -0.51 −11.20∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.31 8.11∗ [0.07]
(0.94) (1.79) (1.14) (3.80) (0.89) (4.34)
AG 0.23 -2.47 [0.19] -0.24 −11.87∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.47 9.40∗∗ [0.03]
(1.03) (1.87) (1.28) (3.69) (0.61) (4.16)
BE/ME 0.03 −3.32∗ [0.15] -0.56 −10.37∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.60 7.05∗∗∗ [0.01]
(1.43) (1.92) (1.09) (2.85) (0.86) (2.36)
CA -1.07 −3.31∗ [0.24] 0.16 −11.55∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.22 8.23∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.02) (1.74) (1.33) (3.34) (1.00) (2.28)
GP -0.35 −5.63∗∗∗ [0.01] -0.33 −6.89∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.03 1.26 [0.33]
(1.08) (1.81) (1.12) (1.77) (0.55) (1.21)
Inv -0.78 -2.50 [0.33] -0.37 −10.55∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.41 8.05∗∗ [0.02]
(0.87) (1.58) (1.21) (3.39) (0.63) (3.46)
Mom -0.23 −5.13∗∗ [0.08] -0.66 −15.25∗∗ [0.02] 0.43 10.12∗∗ [0.06]
(1.40) (2.53) (1.30) (6.09) (1.05) (5.01)
NOA 0.35 −8.44∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.52 −9.55∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.88 1.08 [0.92]
(1.23) (2.59) (1.19) (3.53) (0.60) (2.00)
Oscore -0.24 −8.36∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.41 −4.44∗ [0.11] 0.17 −3.92∗∗ [0.02]
(1.04) (2.12) (1.13) (2.38) (0.84) (1.53)
PPE/A -0.39 -1.60 [0.53] -0.21 −13.74∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.18 12.14∗∗ [0.02]
(0.81) (1.84) (1.32) (4.43) (1.00) (5.00)
RoA -0.54 −7.04∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.18 −11.72∗∗ [0.02] -0.36 4.68 [0.24]
(1.19) (1.93) (1.23) (4.80) (0.64) (4.28)
RoB -0.65 −3.76∗ [0.16] -0.44 −11.81∗∗ [0.02] -0.22 8.05 [0.14]
(1.14) (2.00) (1.44) (4.82) (0.77) (5.65)
Sigma -0.83 -0.60 [0.91] 0.53 −15.89∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.36 15.28∗∗ [0.01]
(0.78) (1.85) (1.48) (5.58) (1.35) (6.63)
Size -0.70 -1.73 [0.58] -0.51 −8.01∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.19 6.27∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.72) (1.73) (1.03) (2.32) (0.93) (1.71)
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Table 2.6: Response of portfolio returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound, following
periods of high vs. low sentiment - BWI based analyses
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote portfolio returns and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Portfolios formed on
the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity
(Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC
meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment
proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value according to the Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007)
sentiment index. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001
meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients
(F-statistic) are reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 1.74∗ −11.03∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.01 −10.21∗∗∗ [0.00] 1.74∗∗ -0.82 [0.04]
(1.01) (3.29) (1.29) (3.04) (0.75) (1.07)
Age -0.84 -2.31 [0.45] -0.17 −10.96∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.66 8.65∗∗ [0.02]
(1.23) (1.58) (1.18) (3.68) (0.96) (3.94)
AG 0.70 -2.78 [0.09] -0.27 −11.22∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.97 8.44∗∗ [0.08]
(1.10) (1.78) (1.35) (3.69) (0.68) (4.16)
BE/ME 0.01 -3.12 [0.18] -0.97 −9.46∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.98 6.34∗∗∗ [0.04]
(1.44) (1.89) (1.20) (2.94) (0.98) (2.42)
CA -1.31 −2.96∗ [0.39] 0.65 −11.41∗∗∗ [0.00] −1.93∗∗ 8.45∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.04) (1.72) (1.30) (3.24) (0.99) (2.04)
GP -0.76 −4.95∗∗∗ [0.04] -0.10 −6.77∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.66 1.81∗ [0.04]
(1.22) (1.78) (1.12) (1.77) (0.63) (1.02)
Inv -0.67 -2.51 [0.30] -0.31 −10.07∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.36 7.56∗∗ [0.02]
(0.91) (1.53) (1.26) (3.37) (0.67) (3.40)
Mom 0.34 −5.43∗∗ [0.03] 0.18 −15.30∗∗ [0.00] 0.16 9.87∗∗ [0.04]
(1.34) (2.44) (1.37) (5.72) (1.25) (4.76)
NOA 0.88 −8.52∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.80 −8.81∗∗ [0.03] 1.69∗∗ 0.28 [0.48]
(1.21) (2.49) (1.28) (3.51) (0.75) (1.84)
Oscore -0.61 −7.57∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.99 −5.59∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.60 -1.99 [0.84]
(1.30) (2.16) (1.11) (2.10) (1.46) (1.36)
PPE/A -0.68 -1.25 [0.76] -0.06 −13.18∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.62 11.92∗∗ [0.01]
(0.96) (1.67) (1.38) (4.35) (1.05) (4.77)
RoA -0.69 −6.55∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.62 −11.89∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.31 5.34 [0.09]
(1.27) (1.95) (1.20) (4.52) (0.83) (3.94)
RoB -1.17 -3.09 [0.38] 0.33 −11.95∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.50 8.05∗ [0.05]
(1.30) (1.87) (1.41) (4.56) (1.00) (5.17)
Sigma -1.21 -0.24 [0.61] 1.91 −16.37∗∗∗ [0.00] −3.13∗∗ 16.13∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.90) (1.70) (1.45) (5.14) (1.55) (5.95)
Size 0.63 −2.97∗∗ [0.04] -1.08 −7.06∗∗∗ [0.02] 1.71 4.09∗∗∗ [0.32]
(1.02) (1.37) (1.28) (2.36) (1.81) (1.56)
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Table 2.7: Response of portfolio returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote portfolio returns and path surprises, respectively. Portfolios formed on
the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity
(Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC
meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment
proxy at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year according to the University of Michigan’s
Consumer Sentiment index. The zero lower bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings that were not
accompanied by a FOMC statement or other information were excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald
test for equality of coefficients (F-statistic) are reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 0.41 −4.25∗∗ [0.04] 0.30 −4.16∗∗ [0.06] 0.11 -0.09 [0.80]
(0.66) (2.09) (1.04) (2.09) (0.54) (0.45)
Age 0.42 −2.43∗ [0.08] -0.53 −3.70∗ [0.19] 0.94 1.27∗ [0.81]
(0.53) (1.42) (1.28) (1.98) (0.94) (0.74)
AG -0.69 -2.98 [0.30] 0.96 −4.04∗∗ [0.02] −1.65∗∗ 1.06∗∗ [0.00]
(0.96) (1.91) (0.78) (1.94) (0.72) (0.49)
BE/ME -0.43 −3.02∗∗∗ [0.22] 0.50 −9.02∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.94 6.00∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.82) (1.86) (1.17) (2.52) (1.16) (1.53)
CA -0.37 −3.63∗∗ [0.08] 0.48 −3.61∗∗ [0.05] -0.86 -0.02 [0.25]
(0.84) (1.58) (0.63) (1.75) (0.53) (0.53)
GP 0.33 −3.10∗∗ [0.04] 0.00 −5.33∗∗∗ [0.02] 0.33 2.23∗∗∗ [0.01]
(0.60) (1.45) (0.90) (1.85) (0.48) (0.62)
Inv 0.93 −4.75∗∗ [0.02] 0.93 −4.44∗∗ [0.01] −1.29∗∗∗ -0.31 [0.22]
(0.87) (2.40) (0.94) (1.78) (0.47) (0.61)
Mom 0.29 -2.75 [0.35] 0.02 −19.59∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.26 16.84∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.81) (2.66) (0.97) (4.76) (1.22) (6.04)
NOA 0.34 −3.16∗ [0.06] 0.48 −4.42∗∗ [0.01] -0.14 1.27∗∗∗ [0.05]
(0.83) (1.59) (0.66) (1.76) (0.62) (0.34)
Oscore 0.18 −2.83∗ [0.00] 0.85 −6.13∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.67 3.31∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.64) (1.67) (1.17) (1.85) (0.67) (1.18)
PPE/A -0.20 −3.04∗ [0.14] 0.11 −3.66∗∗ [0.06] -0.31 0.62 [0.24]
(1.03) (1.59) (1.05) (1.65) (0.44) (0.52)
RoA 0.29 -2.33 [0.15] 0.51 −5.58∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.22 3.24∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.82) (1.56) (0.93) (1.91) (0.55) (0.78)
RoB 0.36 -2.71 [0.13] 0.37 −5.78∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.01 3.07∗∗ [0.05]
(0.77) (1.79) (0.81) (1.77) (0.66) (1.19)
Sigma 0.05 -2.36 [0.15] 0.93 −4.56∗ [0.07] -0.87 2.20∗ [0.19]
(0.54) (1.44) (1.61) (2.41) (1.71) (1.28)
Size 0.26 −3.84∗∗ [0.02] 1.11 −5.93∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.85 2.09∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.62) (1.54) (0.84) (1.68) (0.54) (0.41)
Chapter 3
Investor Sentiment States and the
Pre-FOMC Announcement Drift
3.1 Abstract
This chapter documents a strong effect of investor sentiment states on stock returns one day
before the announcement by the scheduled FOMC meetings. We find that the returns on the
S&P500 index increase significantly over the pre-FOMC window only during periods of high
sentiment. We also find that there is no stock price drift ahead of other macro-economic an-
nouncements. Our findings on the pre-FOMC announcement order imbalance show that there
are more buyer-initiated trade than seller-initiated trade on the S&P500 constituents during pe-
riods of high sentiment. These findings provide a behavioural explanation to the pre-FOMC
announcement puzzle.
3.2 Introduction
As we mentioned in previous chapters, the post-FOMC announcement response of stock re-
turns have been examined by a large number of previous studies in the past decades (Thor-
becke (1997); Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Maio (2014);
Ozdagli (2017)). Recently, Lucca and Moench (2015) document large average excess returns
on U.S.equities in anticipation of monetary policy decisions made at scheduled meetings of the
FOMC in the past few decades. This phenomenon, which they refer to as the pre-FOMC an-
nouncement drift, is difficult to explain with standard asset pricing theory. Bernile, Hu, and
Tang (2016) and Kurov et al. (2017) argue that the pre-FOMC drift is a result of information
leakage in the embargo period (a 30-minute window) before an FOMC announcement. Lucca
and Moench (2015) argue that an information leakage explanation is implausible for a longer
pre-FOMC window, and hence the pre-FOMC announcement drift is a puzzle.
In this chapter, we examine the impact of investor sentiment on the pre-FOMC announce-
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ment stock price drift over the period from February 1994 to October 2015. Our study is mo-
tivated by the conjecture that there are more noise traders in the stock market when investor
sentiment is high (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012)). Many papers have shown strong evi-
dence that investor sentiment affects stock prices (Baker and Wurgler (2006); Lamont and Stein
(2006)) and investors’ estimation for risk (Yu and Yuan (2011)). A large body of psychology
literature also shows that high sentiment leads people to make optimistic judgments, whereas
low sentiment leads people to make pessimistic ones (Bower (1981); Arkes, Herren, and Isen
(1988)). Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), we define a high (low) sentiment month when
the sentiment measure at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean
value. We employ two alternative measures of sentiment: the University of Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index and the Sentiment Index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006).
We show that, the state of investor sentiment strongly affects stock returns over the pre-
FOMC window, which we define as one day before the scheduled FOMC announcement day,
the last trading day before investors can observe signals about policy decisions. By setting our
pre-FOMC window as one day before scheduled FOMC announcement, we reveal a signifi-
cant pre-FOMC effect even outside the embargo period that is connected to information leak-
age documented in prior studies. We find that the positive drift of the S&P500 index over the
pre-FOMC window concentrates only on the sentiment-exuberance state. Specifically, in high
sentiment months, the S&P500 index increases about 23 basis points in the pre-FOMC window.
In contrast, in low sentiment months, FOMC meetings do not feature statistically significant
pre-announcement returns.
Further, we find that the pre-FOMC drift does not contain information about the subsequent
outcome of the FOMC announcement. The positive and significant pre-FOMC drift during high
sentiment months occurs, regardless of whether the subsequent FOMC announcement delivers
an unexpected cut or rise in the FFR. We also find a pre-FOMC effect in the short-term fixed
income securities. Specifically, the yield on the 3-month U.S. Tresury bills increases about 1.5
basis point on the pre-FOMC window, during periods of high sentiment. In contrast, there is no
pre-FOMC effect on long-term treasury bonds.
Moreover, other macroeconomic releases do not feature statistically significant preannounce-
ment returns, even after we consider the state of investor sentiment. Using the Google Search
Volume Index (SVI) as a proxy for investor attention, we show that, compared with other
macroeconomic announcements, FOMC announcement grabs more attention among investors.
Finally, we find that, the pre-FOMC drift is not related to the business cycle. It is also unrelated
to the yet-to-be-realized policy decision, as measured by the unexpected change in the FFR,
as defined in Kuttner (2001), or the market participants’ expectation about the future path of
monetary policy, as measured using the approach of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
What might explain our findings? First, it is difficult to explain the pre-FOMC drift with
standard asset pricing theory. Rational explanations focus on the state of the economy and link
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time-varying expected returns to macroeconomic variables (See, among others, Perez-Quiros
and Timmermann (2000), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Liu and Zhang (2008), and Maio
(2013)). In order to remove the effects of business cycle variation, we orthogonalize each sen-
timent measure to a set of macroeconomic variables. This allows us to distinguish between
behavioural and rational explanations. Moreover, our evidence also shows that, economy states,
as captured by the NBER recession dummy, does not result in the positive and significant pre-
FOMC stock returns during periods of high sentiment.
Second, our findings cannot be explained by the information leakage story documented in
Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016) and Kurov et al. (2017). By setting our pre-FOMC window as
one day before the scheduled FOMC announcement days, we avoid the embargo period when
information leakage is most likely to happen. Furthermore, we also show that stock returns do
not move in the same direction as suggested by the FFR shocks on announcement days.
Third, our findings cannot be explained by the argument related to volatility or liquidity,
which is used by Lucca and Moench (2015). According to Campbell and Hentschel (1992), the
“volatility feedback" effect implies that if volatility is priced, an anticipated decline in volatility
would decrease the required rate of return, which in turn necessitates an immediate stock price
and leads to lower future returns. On the other hand, Amihud (2002) documents a negative re-
lationship between contemporaneous unexpected illiquidity and excess returns on U.S. equities.
However, our evidence shows that, during high sentiment months (when we find positive and
significant pre-FOMC returns), the pre-FOMC returns remain unchanged, after controlling for
the level and innovation components in volatility and liquidity.
One possible explanation is related to investors’ emotional state. Psychology literature sug-
gests that individuals engage in more heuristic processing of information when they are in a
positive emotional state. During periods when investors are in a pessimistic state, their reliance
on non-systematic processing of information is likely to increase (Tiedens and Linton (2001);
Mackie and Worth (1989); Bless et al. (1990); Batra and Stayman (1990)). Financial literature
also documents that, there are more noise traders when sentiment is high (Stambaugh, Yu, and
Yuan (2012)). 1 Essentially, excessively optimistic valuations are assigned, either by overesti-
mating the size of future cash flows or by underestimating risk (Mian and Sankaraguruswamy
(2012); Kaplanski et al. (2015)). During such phases, investors are more likely to positively
speculate about the information contents of the forthcoming FOMC announcements. This re-
sults into the pre-FOMC positive stock price. This interpretation is consistent with our evidence
of positive (negative) order imbalance over the pre-FOMC window during high (low) sentiment
months. At the same time, higher risk appetite of investors during such periods is evidenced
by a decline in the price (increase in the yield) of the 3-month T-bill. In other words, investors
allocate capital from low risk assets into risky assets over the pre-FOMC window, during high
sentiment periods.
1Yu and Yuan (2011) also argue that investors are less rational overall during periods of high sentiment
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This chapter contributes to the developing standard of literature that how stock price changes
in anticipation of macro-economy and/or monetary policy announcement (Lucca and Moench
(2015); Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016); Kurov et al. (2017)). We extend the literature by incorpo-
rating insights from behavioural finance. This chapter is the first to show that the positive drift
of the S&P500 index occurs only during periods of high sentiment. Our findings of the senti-
ment conditionality of pre-FOMC drift, together with the inability of the rational based stories
to explain the drift, points to a behavioural explanation. Our findings also relates to the studies
on pre-announcement drifts of individual stock returns before earnings announcements (see, for
example Lamont and Frazzini (2007)). Most of these studies point to the behavioral “attention-
grabbing" effect as a potential explanation. Our results offers a new angle by considering the
state of investor sentiment.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the effect of monetary policy shifts on stock
prices (Thorbecke (1997); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Chen (2007); Wright (2012); Swanson
(2015)). These studies mainly focus on the price effect on FOMC announcement days.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.3 describes the data and variables that
we employ in the empirical analysis. Section 3.4 shows evidence related to the role of investor
sentiment in the pre-FOMC announcement drift. Section 3.5 discusses possible explanations.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.3 Data and sample
Our analysis focuses on stock returns before scheduled FOMC meetings across different senti-
ment states over the period from February 1994 to October 2015, hence including the pre-crisis
period, the financial crisis and its aftermath.2 We define the pre-FOMC window as one day
before a scheduled FOMC announcement day. There are 175 scheduled FOMC announcements
in our sample period. In order to ensure that our results are not affected by outliers, we exclude
the top and bottom 1% of pre-FOMC returns, which finally reduces the number of pre-FOMC
events to 171.
3.3.1 Investor sentiment measure
We employ two proxies for investor sentiment: Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) Sentiment
Index (BWI) and the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI).3 The BWI is a
2Before 1994, the market participants generally became aware of policy actions on the day after the FOMC’s
decision, when it was implemented by the Open Market Desk (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). On February 1994,
the Fed started to announce target FFR changes, which eliminates virtually all of the timing ambiguity associated
with rate changes(Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). Lucca and Moench (2015) also find that the pre-FOMC drift is
more pronounced at the post-1994 period.
3We obtained CSI from the FRED databases. BWI data is available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website:
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/.
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commonly used measure of investor sentiment (Yu and Yuan (2011); Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan
(2012); Shen, Yu, and Zhao (2017)). By taking the first principal component of five financial
variables that can reflect sentiment, the BWI filters out idiosyncratic noise in its constituents and
captures common variation.4 We also use one consumer confidence index, measured outside of
the financial markets, as a proxy for investor optimism (see, Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006);
Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013) and McLean and Zhao (2014)). The CSI is based
on surveys conducted by the University of Michigan in which 500 U.S. participants are asked
questions about their outlook on the economy.
To remove the effect of business cycle variation, Baker and Wurgler (2006) orthogonalize
each of the constituent variables of their sentiment index with respect to a set of macroeconomic
conditions before conducting the principal component analysis.5 We obtain the orthogonalized
BWI from their data set, and also regress the CSI on the same set of macroeconomic variables.
The residuals from this regression capture sentiment (optimism or pessimism) that is not as-
sociated by economic fundamentals (Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)). The orthogonalized
sentiment indexes are standardized so that they have zero mean and unit variance.
[Insert Figure 3.1 around here]
Figure 3.1 plots the orthogonalized sentiment indexes. They all rise during the 1990s but
start to decline from around 2000, following the culmination of the dot-com boom. Sentiment
declines during the recent global financial crisis, but somewhat recovers afterward. The two
indexes exhibit different dynamics. For example, the late 1990s dot-com boom episode features
more prominently in the BWI, as compared with the CSI.
In order to examine whether the pre-FOMC drift is conditional on the state of investor sen-
timent, we construct a level-based dummy variable based on the orthogonalized sentiment in-
dexes. The dummy variable, SHt , is equal to 1 (0) for the days that are in a month starting with
a high (low) sentiment level. We define a month as starting with high (low) sentiment if the
sentiment indicator in the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value, follow-
ing Baker and Wurgler (2006). In our empirical analysis, the loading on this dummy variable
reflects the pre-FOMC drift on S&P500 returns during periods of high sentiment.
[Insert Table 3.1 around here]
4The BWI is formed as the first principal component of the closed-end fund discount, the number and the first-
day returns of IPOs, the equity share in total new issues and the dividend premium. NYSE turnover, that featured
in the set of variables used in the calculation of the sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006), is dropped in
the most recent update of their dataset. The updated BWI exhibits very similar behaviour over time with the earlier
edition.
5This set of macroeconomic variables include the growth in industrial production, the real growth in durable,
nondurable and services consumption, the growth in employment, and a dummy variable that indicates recessions
as classified by NBER business cycle dates. It is also used by other studies to remove business cycle information
from sentiment proxies (Yu and Yuan (2011); McLean and Zhao (2014); Huang et al. (2015)).
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As reported in Table 3.1, the correlation coefficients between the sentiment dummies is 0.34.
This indicates that, the two sentiment indicators capture different dimensions of investor senti-
ment.
3.3.2 Stock returns
We measure daily stock market returns using the log returns of the S&P500 index. Returns are in
excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate.6 We obtain S&P500 index data from CRSP database.
3.3.3 Trading activity measure
Following Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016), we measure investors’ trading activity by the aggregate
order imbalance, defined as (B-S)/(B+S), where B (S) is the aggregate buyer-initiated (seller-
initiated) dollar trading volume (see also Barber and Odean (2007); Kaniel et al. (2008); Kel-
ley and Tetlock (2013)). Aggregate dollar trading volume is constructed using the tick-by-tick
transaction data on S&P500 constituents. List of S&P500 constituents is obtained from CRSP
database. We obtain buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trading volume, as identified using the
Lee and Ready’s (1991) algorithm, from the Intraday Indicators by WRDS database. Following
Lee and Ready (1991), a trade is defined as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) if the trade price is
above (below) the midpoint of the recent (the previous second) bid–ask quote. If the transac-
tion price is equal to the midpoint, we define a trade as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated ) if the
trade price is above (below) the last executed trading price. The order imbalance data covers the
period over February 1994 to December 2013 only, due to availability.
3.4 Econometric models and results
This section contains the empirical findings of this chapter. Section 3.4.1 documents excess
returns on the S&P500 index ahead of FOMC announcements. Section 3.4.2 examines the pre-
FOMC drift in yields of fixed income instruments, and Section 3.4.3 analyzes S&P500 returns
ahead of other major macroeconomic data releases.
3.4.1 Investor sentiment and pre-FOMC stock returns
Table 3.2 shows that the average market-wide stock return over the pre-FOMC window is higher
in high sentiment months than in low sentiment months. In contrast, the mean of stock returns
on the days outside of the pre-FOMC window is higher in low sentiment months than in high
sentiment months. The results suggest that the pre-FOMC effect is conditional upon the state of
investor sentiment.
6Following Lucca and Moench (2015), we use the one-month Treasury bill at the beginning of each month.
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[Insert Table 3.2 around here]
We formally assess, across different sentiment states, the magnitude of excess stock mar-
ket returns one day ahead of the scheduled FOMC announcements. Specifically, we examine
whether the pre-FOMC effect is conditional upon the state of investor sentiment. To this end,
we introduce an interaction term of the pre-FOMC dummy with the previously defined level-
based sentiment dummy, SHt , in the following regression model for excess stock returns:
rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )FOMCpret +β2SHt FOMCpret + εt (3.1)
where rt denotes the daily market excess return and FOMC
pre
t is a dummy variable that equals
1 on the pre-FOMC window and zero otherwise. β1 captures the mean excess return on pre-
FOMC window during periods of low sentiment, and β2 represents the mean excess return on
pre-FOMC window during periods of high sentiment.
[Insert Table 3.3 around here]
We estimate Equation 3.1 with Newey and West (1987) standard errors and report the results
in Panel A of Table 3.3. It shows that, first, there is no significant pre-FOMC announcement drift
during periods of low sentiment. The coefficient for mean excess return on pre-FOMC window
during periods of low sentiment, as captured by β1, is statistically insignificant using either of
the two sentiment indicators. Second, the mean excess return on the pre-FOMC window during
periods of high sentiment, as captured by β2, is positive and statistically significant. Specifically,
the results with sentiment states defined by CSI show that, on average, the return on the day right
before the FOMC meeting during periods of high sentiment is 22 basis points. The findings are
robust across the two sentiment indicators.
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the estimates of the following equation:
rt = β0+β1FOMC
pre
t + εt (3.2)
where the constant β0 measures the unconditional mean excess return earned on all time periods
outside of the pre-FOMC window. The coefficient β1 is the mean excess return differential on
pre-FOMC window versus on other days. The results show that β1 is positive, but statistically
insignificant, which indicates that there is no significant stock price changes at our pre-FOMC
window, if the state of investor sentiment is not considered. These findings reveal the important
role that investor sentiment plays in the pre-FOMC drift. The price drift will stay unobserved, if
we do not consider the state of investor sentiment.
Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016) and Kurov et al. (2017) find evidence of information leak-
age during the embargo period before FOMC announcements. We set our pre-FOMC window
as one day before scheduled FOMC announcements so as to avoid the embargo period. This
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setting allows us to examine the pre-FOMC announcement effect in an environment whereby
information leakage induces trading is unlikely.
We further empirically examine whether the pre-FOMC drift we document contains infor-
mation about the next-day FOMC announcement by allowing for the interaction between the
state of sentiment with FFR surprises. To this end, we introduce a new dummy variable, Surt ,
which is equal to 1 (-1) on the pre-FOMC window if the FOMC announcement on the next day
conveys negative (positive) FFR surprises and zero otherwise following Bernile, Hu, and Tang
(2016). FFR surprises are calculated following Kuttner (2001).
We estimate a regression model below using daily returns that include the pre-FOMC day
and all days outside the pre-FOMC window:
rt = β0+β1(1−SHt )FOMCpret +β2SHt FOMCpret
+β3(1−SHt )Surt +β4SHt Surt + εt
(3.3)
Table 3.4 shows that both β3 and β4 are statistically insignificant. The results indicate that
the FFR surprise on the FOMC announcement day is not associated with the stock return one
day before the announcement, during both high and low sentiment periods. This finding implies
that the pre-FOMC drift does not contain information about the FFR surprise on the next day.
[Insert Table 3.4 around here]
3.4.2 Effects on the yields of Treasury securities
Lucca and Moench (2015) find no evidence of pre-FOMC drift on the yields of fixed income
instruments. In this section, we examine whether the yields of Treasury securities change on
the pre-FOMC window, when the state of investor sentiment is considered. We replace the
dependent variable in Equation 3.1 with the rates on the 3-month Treasury bills and 2-, 5-, and
10-year notes. Table 3.5 reports the results. We find strong evidence of pre-FOMC increase in
the yield of the 3-month treasury bill, during periods of high sentiment. This suggests that, when
sentiment is high, investors move capital out of short-term treasury bills in anticipation of the
scheduled FOMC announcements. On the other hand, during periods of low sentiment, there
is weak evidence of pre-FOMC decrease in the yield of long term treasuries when we identify
sentiment states by using CSI.
[Insert Table 3.5 around here]
3.4.3 Alternative macro-announcements
Savor and Wilson (2014) find that asset prices behave very differently on days when important
macroeconomic news is scheduled for announcement. However, Lucca and Moench (2015)
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show that there is no significant pre-announcement drift for macroeconomic news other than
the FOMC announcements. We then proceed to examine the S&P500 index return before the
releases of U.S employment situation (EMPS), producer price index (PPI) report and industrial
production (IP) report, conditional upon the state of investor sentiment. Both EMPS and PPI
report are published monthly by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. IP report is released monthly
by the Federal Reserve Board.
We exclude from our sample the announcements which were re-scheduled.7 We replace the
FOMCpret with EMPS
pre
t , PPI
pre
t and IP
pre
t and re-estimate Equation 3.1, where the dummy
variable EMPSpret (PPI
pre
t , IP
pre
t ) equals 1 on the day before a scheduled announcement day
of the EMPS (PPI, IP) report and 0 otherwise. The results in Table 3.6 show that none of
these three macroeconomic announcements features statistically significant pre-announcement
returns, even after considering the state of investor sentiment.8
[Insert Table 3.6 around here]
Why does the pre-announcement drift feature only for the FOMC announcement? We con-
sider one possible explanation relates to investors’ attention level. Following Da, Engelberg,
and Gao (2011), we use monthly Google SVI as a proxy for investor attention. We obtain the
monthly SVI via the product Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trends). The SVI for a
search term is the number of searches for that term divided by its all time average. We can also
compare the SVI for different terms. Figure 3.2 plots the SVI for the term “FOMC", “employ-
ment situation", “producer price index" and “industrial production". It shows that, generally, the
search volume for “FOMC" is higher than the search volume for the other three terms. Thus,
a simple reason that we observe pre-FOMC drift only is that, other macroeconomic announce-
ments do not grab too much investor attention, when compared to the FOMC announcement.9
[Insert Figure 3.2 around here]
3.5 Further search for possible explanations
Our results so far show that there is an increase in the S&P500 index on the pre-FOMC window
during periods of high sentiment. In this section, we regress the S&P500 excess returns on
the pre-FOMC window during periods of high sentiment on a number of variables that could
potentially explain the drift. Following Lucca and Moench (2015), the variables we consider
include a recession dummy as classified by the NBER business cycle dates, a measure of FFR
7For example, we exclude the scheduled release of EMPS at Feb 19 2004, which was eventually delayed to Mar
18 2004.
8We also examine the pre-announcement effect without considering sentiment state, all the results are insignifi-
cant too, tables are available upon request.
9We present SVI after 2004 only, due to availability.
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shocks proposed by Kuttner (2001), investors’ expectations about the future path of monetary
policy as measured by the first two principal components (level and slope) from the cross-section
of Treasury yields (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)), the level and innovation component
of trading volume and implied stock market volatility (VIX). All explanatory variables, except
for the NBER dummy are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. The coefficient
of each variable captures the effects that variable has on pre-FOMC returns, and the intercept
captures the impact of high investor sentiment states on the pre-FOMC returns, when other
variables are controlled. Thus we expect a decrease in intercept after controlling for the variables
that lead to the pre-FOMC drift.
[Insert Table 3.7 around here]
The first and 7th column of Table 3.7 shows a regression of pre-FOMC returns on the NBER
recession dummy during periods of high sentiment, as classified by CSI and BWI, respectively.
NBER is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurred during a U.S.
recession as classified by NBER business cycle dates and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the
dummy is insignificant for high sentiment periods classified by CSI. Importantly, the intercept
remains to be 0.20 with a standard error of 0.1. Compare to our baseline results in Panel A
of Table 3.3, the pre-FOMC returns during periods of high sentiment decreases a bit, but it’s
still statistically significant. We obtain similar results using BWI. Those results indicate that
economic cycles do not affect the pre-FOMC returns during periods of high sentiment.
In Section 3.4.1 we show that the pre-FOMC returns are not related to a dummy that cap-
tures the direction of the FFR shocks. We then proceed by examining the relationship between
the stock returns on the pre-FOMC window and the FFR shocks on the announcement day.
The results in the second column of Table 3.7 show that the pre-FOMC returns are not signif-
icantly related to the yet-to-be-realized FFR shocks when CSI is high. Moreover, the intercept
remains at 0.23 and significant, after adding the FFR shocks as a control variable. We also ob-
tain similarly results using BWI. These findings indicate that, the positive pre-FOMC returns
during periods of high sentiment we addressed cannot be explained by the information leakage
argument.
We also examine whether the pre-FOMC equity returns are related to the investors’ expecta-
tions about the future path of monetary policy. Following Lucca and Moench (2015), we employ
the first two principal components (level and slope) from the cross-section of daily zero-coupon
Treasury bond yields for maturities from one through five years. Both level and slope are lagged
two days before scheduled announcement days (that is, one day before our pre-FOMC window).
The coefficients for both level and slope are negative as reported in column 3 of Table 3.7. The
negative sign of the coefficients indicates that the pre-FOMC drift is stronger when investors
expect a monetary easing. However, both of them are statistically insignificant. Additionally,
controlling for investors’ expectations about the future path of monetary policy does not reduce
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the magnitude or significance of the intercept. The results are robust across the two sentiment
measures.
Amihud (2002) documents a negative relationship between contemporaneous unexpected
illiquidity and excess returns on U.S. equities. We then investigate whether market liquidity,
as proxied by trading volume, affects the pre-FOMC returns during periods of high sentiment.
We regress the S&P500 excess returns on the pre-FOMC window on the level and innovation
component of trading volume. The level of trading volume is lagged two days before scheduled
announcement days. Specifically, following Lucca and Moench (2015), we calculate the level
of trading volume as the daily trading volume divided by its prior 21-day mean. The innovation
component is the residual from an AR(1) regression of the daily trading volume level on a
constant and its level at the previous day. The results in column 4 show that both the lagged
level and contemporaneous innovation component of trading volume do not significantly affect
the pre-FOMC returns when CSI is high. They do not change the magnitude and significance of
the intercept either. The intercept is still 23 basis points, which is inline with our baseline results
in Panel A of Table 3.3. We obtain similar results using BWI, as reported in column 10. Thus,
liquidity cannot explain the positive pre-FOMC returns during periods of high sentiment.
Previous studies find that the stock market tends to be relatively quiet – conditional volatil-
ity is abnormally low – on days preceding regularly scheduled policy announcements (Bomfim
(2003)). Lucca and Moench (2015) also find that the market volatility tend to be low on the pre-
FOMC window. They argue that, the “volatility feedback" effect could explain the pre-FOMC
drift to some extent. According to Campbell and Hentschel (1992), the “volatility feedback"
effect implies that an unexpected decline in volatility leads to a downward revision in future
expected volatility, and thus to lower risk and higher contemporaneous returns. We then investi-
gate whether the pre-FOMC returns are related to equity market uncertainty as measured by the
VIX. We employ both the level and innovation component of VIX.10The level of VIX is lagged
two days before scheduled announcement days. The results in column 5 of Table 3.7 show that,
the lagged value of VIX is positive and significantly related to the pre-FOMC returns, and the in-
novation component is negative and significantly related to the pre-FOMC returns. These results
are inline with findings of Lucca and Moench (2015), which indicate that the market volatility
affect stock returns on the pre-FOMC window. However, the intercept continue to be 23 basis
point and significant, which implies that there is a sentiment impact on the pre-FOMC returns,
even after controlling for the impact of market volatility. The results are robust across the two
sentiment measures.
Finally, we employ a regression which includes a constant and all the variables above. The
results in column 6 (12) of Table 3.7 show that, when other variables are controlled, there is
still a negative relationship between the stock returns and the innovation component of VIX on
10We obtain VIX index form the FRED database: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/. The innovation component is the
residual from an AR(1) regression of the daily VIX value on a constant and its value at the previous day.
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the pre-FOMC window. Importantly, the intercept remains to be 23 basis points and significant.
Thus, these variables cannot fully explain the positive pre-FOMC drift during periods of high
sentiment.
The results above show that changes in volatility is a factor that may affect stock returns on
the pre-FOMC window during periods of high sentiment. Moreover, Chordia et al. (2002) find
that trading activity affects stock returns at daily level. Using aggregate order imbalance as a
proxy of trading activity, they document that positive order imbalance is associated with con-
temporaneous positive market-wide stock returns, while negative order imbalance is associated
with negative ones. We then proceed by examining the liquidity, volatility and trading volume
on the pre-FOMC window, across different sentiment states.
[Insert Table 3.8 around here]
We replace the dependent variable in Equation 3.1 with ∆Trv, ∆V IX and OIB, respectively.
Where ∆Trv is the daily changes in the level of trading volume. ∆V IX is the daily changes in
the VIX, and OIB is the daily order imbalance. The results in Panel A of Table 3.8 show that,
during periods of high sentiment there is a significant decrease in trading volume on the pre-
FOMC window. However, the results in Panel B show that VIX does not change significantly
on the pre-FOMC window, during both high and low sentiment periods. The results in Panel
C of Table 3.8 show that, there is a positive (negative) and significant order imbalance on the
pre-FOMC window during periods of high (low) sentiment. Specifically, for high sentiment
state classified by the CSI, investors’ net buying is 2% higher than net selling on the pre-FOMC
window, which suggests that investors’ appetite for acquiring stocks becomes stronger during
such periods.
The results on order imbalance, together with our findings that investors allocate assets from
low risk short-term T-bills to stocks on the pre-FOMC window during periods of high sentiment,
proposed a behavioral explanation to our baseline results of positive pre-FOMC stock returns
during periods of high sentiment. Psychology studies show that, when individuals are in a
positive emotional state, they engage in more heuristic processing of information (Tiedens and
Linton (2001); Mackie and Worth (1989); Bless et al. (1990)). High sentiment also drives people
to make optimistic judgments and choices (Bower (1981); Arkes, Herren, and Isen (1988)).
Also, as pointed out by previous literature, investors pay more attention to their portfolios around
(before or after) attention-grabbing events (see Lamont and Frazzini (2007); Barber and Odean
(2007); Yuan (2015)). We thus consider the following explanation for the pre-FOMC puzzle:
On the pre-FOMC window when sentiment is high, investors hold an optimistic view on the
yet-to-be-realized policy decisions. Such optimistic view leads them to switch from low risk
assets to stocks. It also results in more buyer-initiated trade on the pre-FOMC window, and in
turn, positively affects stock price.
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3.6 Additional tests with the cross-sectional stock returns
We also examine the pre-FOMC announcement drift among stock portfolio returns, conditional
upon the state of investor sentiment. We replace rt in Equation 3.1 with returns of 15 portfo-
lios.11 Table C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix C report the results using CSI and BWI, respectively.
The results are generally in line with the ones using market-wide stock returns. There is an
increase in portfolio returns on the pre-FOMC window only during periods of high sentiment.
Specifically, when sentiment is high, the pre-FOMC drift is concentrated in the oldest firms,
firms with most net issuance, firms with most tangible assets, firms with highest RoB (RoA) and
largest firms. For portfolios sorted by past performance (LR, Mom, SR), the results tend to be
a U-shape. That is, when sentiment is high, only the deciles in the middle (deciles 4, 5, 6) have
positive and significant pre-FOMC returns. Generally, this evidence show that the pre-FOMC
drift is more pronounced in liquid stocks.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we provide a behavioural explanation of the pre-FOMC puzzle documented by
Lucca and Moench (2015). We find that the pre-FOMC announcement drift in stock returns
is conditional upon the state of investor sentiment. We find that the pre-FOMC announcement
stock price drift materializes only during periods of high sentiment. Specifically, we find that
the S&P500 index increases by 22 basis points on the day before a scheduled FOMC announce-
ment during periods of high sentiment. In contrast, in low sentiment months, FOMC meetings
do not feature statistically significant pre-announcement returns. We investigate several possi-
ble explanations for our findings and the evidence points toward a behavioral channel, which
relates to the investors’ optimism and their trading activity. We show that, during periods of
high sentiment, investors reduce investment in risk-free assets (short-term T-bills) and increase
exposures to risky assets (stocks) on the pre-FOMC window, as evidenced by more net-buying
activities on the pre-FOMC window, leading to the positive pre-FOMC announcement stock re-
turns. Moreover, we find no evidence of pre-announcement drift ahead of other macro-economic
announcements, even after we consider the state of investor sentiment. One possible explana-
tion is that investors do not pay too much attention to other macro-economic announcements, as
compared to the FOMC announcements. Use Google searching volume as a proxy of investor
attention, we find evidence that support our view. We also examine other explanations of the
pre-FOMC drift, which have been employed by previous studies. However, our evidence show
11Similar to our analyses in Chapter 2, we consider the following portfolios: Accruals (Acc), asset growth
(AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset (CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to
assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore), asset tangibility
(PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value
of equity (Size).
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that none of them could explain the stock price drift on our pre-FOMC window. Specifically,
we show that the pre-FOMC drift does not contain information about the subsequent outcome of
the FOMC announcement. The positive and significant pre-FOMC drift during high sentiment
months occurs, regardless of whether the subsequent FOMC announcement delivers an unex-
pected cut or rise in the FFR. Thus, the drift we document is not a result of information leakage.
We also show that our findings cannot be explained by the “volatility feedback" effect.
This chapter contributes to the recent studies on the pre-FOMC announcement drift. It is the
first to show the state dependence of the pre-FOMC announcement drift. Previous studies either
call the pre-FOMC as a puzzle or employ a leakage-based explanation. We bring together two
strands of the literature on behavioural finance and the pre-FOMC stock price drift, and provide
a behavioral explanation to the pre-FOMC puzzle. We argue that the pre-FOMC drift is a result
of sentiment-driven speculation among investors at the pre-FOMC window. Our findings also
relates to the studies on pre-announcement drifts of individual stock returns before earnings
announcements. Most of these studies point to the behavioral “attention-grabbing" effect as
a potential explanation. Our results offers a new angle by considering the state of investor
sentiment.
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Table 3.1: Correlation matrix of sentiment states
This table presents correlation coefficients of the dummy variables that classify sentiment states. SH,it is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
(0) if a day belongs to a month with high (low) sentiment. A high (low) sentiment month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the end of
the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value. i = CSI or BWI, where CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s
Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period is February 1994 - October
2015. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
SH,CSIt S
H,BWI
t
SH,CSIt 1.00
SH,BWIt 0.34∗∗∗ 1.00
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of daily log excess return on the S&P500 index on the pre-FOMC window and for all other days. The
pre-FOMC window is one day before scheduled FOMC announcements. The sample period is February 1994 to October 2015. Panels A, B
and C include the full sample, high sentiment and low sentiment period, respectively. Sentiment states are classified in monthly frequency. A
high (low) sentiment month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean
value. CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index,
respectively.
Pre-FOMC window Other days
Obs Mean Min Max St.Dev. Obs Mean Min Max St.Dev.
Panel A: Full sample
171 0.12 -2.91 3.16 0.94 5302 0.01 -9.47 10.95 1.19
Panel B: High sentiment
CSI 98 0.23 -2.91 2.37 0.93 2971 0.00 -7.13 5.57 1.09
BWI 71 0.25 -2.91 2.37 0.90 2211 -0.01 -7.13 5.57 1.14
Panel C: Low sentiment
CSI 73 -0.04 -2.83 3.16 0.93 2331 0.03 -9.47 10.95 1.29
BWI 100 0.02 -2.83 3.16 0.95 3091 0.03 -9.47 10.95 1.22
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Table 3.3: S&P500 index returns one-day ahead of scheduled FOMC announcements during
periods of high vs. low sentiment
Panel A of this table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of the following model:
rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )FOMCpret +β2SHt FOMCpret +εt , where rt denotes daily log return of the S&P500 index in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill
rate. FOMCpret is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 on the pre-FOMC window and 0 otherwise. The pre-FOMC window is one day before a
scheduled FOMC announcement. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if a day belongs to a high (low) sentiment month. A high (low)
sentiment month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI
and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively.
Panel B of this table presents the estimates of the following model: rt =β0+β1FOMC
pre
t +εt . The sample period is February 1994 - October 2015.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs No. of FOMC β0 β1 β2
Panel A: With sentiment
CSI 5473 171 0.02 -0.05 0.22∗∗
(0.01) (0.11) (0.10)
BWI 5473 171 0.01 0.01 0.24∗∗
(0.01) (0.10) (0.11)
Panel B: Without sentiment
5473 171 0.01 0.10
(0.01) (0.07)
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Table 3.4: S&P500 index returns one-day ahead of scheduled FOMC announcements during
periods of high vs. low sentiment - controlling for FFR surprises
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of the following model using daily
returns that include the pre-FOMC day and all days outside the pre-FOMC window: rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )FOMCpret +β2SHt FOMCpret +β3(1−
SHt )Surt +β4SHt Surt +εt , where rt denotes daily log return of the S&P500 index in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate. FOMC
pre
t is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 on the pre-FOMC window and 0 otherwise. The pre-FOMC window is one day before scheduled FOMC
announcement. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if a day belongs to a month with high (low) sentiment. A high (low) sentiment
month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI and BWI
denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. Surt is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 (-1) on the pre-FOMC window, if the following FOMC announcement conveys a negative (positive) Federal
fund rate (FFR) surprise and 0 otherwise. The sample period is February 1994 - October 2015. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs No. of FOMC β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
CSI 5473 171 0.01 -0.02 0.21∗∗ -0.21 0.08
(0.01) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12)
BWI 5473 171 0.01 0.00 0.26∗∗ 0.11 -0.15
(0.01) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
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Table 3.5: Yield changes in Treasury securities one-day ahead of scheduled FOMC
announcements during periods of high vs. low sentiment
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of the following model: Yt =β0+β1(1−
SHt )FOMC
pre
t +β2SHt FOMC
pre
t +εt , where Yt denotes the yield changes in 3-month Treasury bills and 2-, 5-, and 10-year notes in Panels A, B, C
and D, respectively. FOMCpret is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 on the pre-FOMC window and 0 otherwise. The pre-FOMC window is one
day before a scheduled FOMC announcement. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if a day belongs to a high (low) sentiment month.
A high (low) sentiment month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean
value. CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index,
respectively. The sample period is February 1994 - October 2015. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs No. of FOMC β0 β1 β2
Panel A: 3-month
CSI 5473 171 -0.001 0.006 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
BWI 5473 171 -0.001 0.008∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.001) (0.005) (0.007)
Panel B: 2-year
CSI 5473 171 -0.001 -0.003 0.004
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
BWI 5473 171 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Panel C: 5-year
CSI 5473 171 0.000 −0.011∗ -0.002
(0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
BWI 5473 171 0.000 -0.007 -0.004
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel C: 10-year
CSI 5473 171 0.000 −0.011∗ -0.003
(0.000) (0.006) (0.004)
BWI 5473 171 0.000 -0.007 -0.006
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
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Table 3.6: S&P500 index returns one-day ahead of other macro-announcements during periods
of high vs. low sentiment
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of the following model: rt =β0+β1(1−
SHt )ANN
pre
it +β2S
H
t ANN
pre
t +εt , where rt denotes daily log return of the S&P500 index in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate. ANN
pre
t
denotes EMPSpret , PPI
pre
t and IP
pre
t in Panels A, B and C respectively. EMPS
pre
t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 on the day right before
a scheduled announcement day of the U.S employment situation report and 0 otherwise. PPIpret is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 on the
day preceeding a scheduled announcement day of the U.S producer price index report and 0 otherwise. IPpret is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 on the day preceeding a scheduled announcement day of the U.S industrial production report and 0 otherwise. SHt is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 (0) if a day belongs to a high (low) sentiment month. A high (low) sentiment month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the
end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment
index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period is February 1994 - October 2015. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs No. of FOMC β0 β1 β2
Panel A: EMPS
CSI 5473 171 0.02 -0.17 0.08
(0.02) (0.13) (0.08)
BWI 5473 171 0.02 -0.09 0.04
(0.02) (0.10) (0.10)
Panel B: PPI
CSI 5473 171 0.02 -0.05 -0.12
(0.02) (0.10) (0.09)
BWI 5473 171 0.02 -0.04 -0.16
(0.02) (0.09) (0.10)
Panel C: IP
CSI 5473 171 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.01) (0.15) (0.09)
BWI 5473 171 0.01 -0.03 0.12
(0.01) (0.11) (0.10)
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3 156
Ta
bl
e
3.
7:
M
od
el
lin
g
th
e
pr
e-
FO
M
C
st
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
du
ri
ng
pe
ri
od
s
of
hi
gh
se
nt
im
en
t
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lts
of
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
pr
e-
FO
M
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
tr
et
ur
ns
on
va
ri
ou
s
ex
pl
an
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
th
e
pr
e-
FO
M
C
w
in
do
w
,d
ur
in
g
pe
ri
od
s
of
hi
gh
se
nt
im
en
to
nl
y.
T
he
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
is
lo
g
re
tu
rn
of
th
e
S&
P5
00
in
de
x
in
ex
ce
ss
of
th
e
1-
m
on
th
Tr
ea
su
ry
bi
ll
ra
te
on
th
e
da
y
be
fo
re
a
sc
he
du
le
d
FO
M
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t.
N
B
E
R
is
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
th
at
is
eq
ua
l
to
1
if
th
e
FO
M
C
m
ee
tin
g
oc
cu
rr
ed
du
ri
ng
a
U
.S
.
re
ce
ss
io
n
as
cl
as
si
fie
d
by
N
B
E
R
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
da
te
s
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
FF
R
sh
oc
k
is
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
FF
R
ch
an
ge
s
on
th
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
td
ay
fo
llo
w
in
g
th
e
pr
e-
FO
M
C
w
in
do
w
.
L
ev
el
an
d
Sl
op
e
ar
e
th
e
fir
st
tw
o
pr
in
ci
pa
l
co
m
po
ne
nt
s
fr
om
th
e
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
n
of
da
ily
ze
ro
-c
ou
po
n
bo
nd
yi
el
ds
fo
r
m
at
ur
iti
es
fr
om
on
e
th
ro
ug
h
fiv
e
ye
ar
s
as
in
?.
B
ot
h
le
ve
la
nd
sl
op
e
ar
e
la
gg
ed
tw
o
da
ys
be
fo
re
sc
he
du
le
d
an
no
un
ce
m
en
td
ay
s.
Tr
a
Vo
l(
la
g)
de
no
te
s
on
e-
da
y-
la
gg
ed
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
le
ve
lo
n
th
e
S&
P5
00
st
oc
k
m
ar
ke
ti
nd
ex
,a
nd
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
le
ve
li
s
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
da
ily
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
di
vi
de
d
by
its
pr
io
r2
1-
da
y
m
ea
n.
Tr
a
Vo
l(
In
no
v.
)
is
th
e
re
si
du
al
fr
om
an
A
R
(1
)
re
gr
es
si
on
of
th
e
tr
ad
in
g
vo
lu
m
e
le
ve
lo
n
a
co
ns
ta
nt
an
d
its
pr
ev
io
us
da
y
le
ve
l.
V
IX
(l
ag
)
de
no
te
s
th
e
on
e-
da
y-
la
gg
ed
le
ve
lo
f
th
e
V
IX
in
de
x.
V
IX
(i
nn
ov
.)
de
no
te
s
th
e
re
si
du
al
fr
om
an
A
R
(1
)
re
gr
es
si
on
of
th
e
V
IX
in
de
x
on
a
co
ns
ta
nt
an
d
its
le
ve
li
n
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
da
y.
V
IX
is
th
e
le
ve
lo
ft
he
V
IX
in
de
x
at
th
e
m
ar
ke
tc
lo
se
tw
o
da
ys
be
fo
re
th
e
sc
he
du
le
d
m
ee
tin
g.
C
SI
an
d
B
W
Id
en
ot
e
th
e
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
of
M
ic
hi
ga
n’
s
C
on
su
m
er
Se
nt
im
en
ti
nd
ex
an
d
B
ak
er
an
d
W
ur
gl
er
’s
(2
00
6,
20
07
)
se
nt
im
en
ti
nd
ex
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
A
ll
ex
pl
an
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s,
ex
ce
pt
fo
r
th
e
N
B
E
R
du
m
m
y,
ar
e
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
to
ha
ve
ze
ro
m
ea
n
an
d
un
it
va
ri
an
ce
.
T
he
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
is
Fe
br
ua
ry
19
94
-O
ct
ob
er
20
15
.R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
*,
**
,*
**
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
,5
%
an
d
1%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
C
SI
B
W
I
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
N
B
E
R
0.
43
0.
27
0.
44
∗
0.
31
(0
.2
8)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.2
6)
(0
.2
5)
FF
R
sh
oc
k
-0
.0
1
0.
02
0.
08
0.
07
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
7)
L
ev
el
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
7
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
7)
Sl
op
e
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
(0
.1
3)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.0
8)
Tr
a
Vo
l(
la
g)
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.1
2)
(0
.0
8)
Tr
a
Vo
l(
In
no
v.
)
-0
.0
3
-0
.1
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.1
3
(0
.1
6)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.2
0)
(0
.0
9)
V
IX
(l
ag
)
0.
17
∗∗
0.
13
0.
18
∗∗
0.
13
∗
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
7)
V
IX
(I
nn
ov
.)
−0
.6
7∗
∗∗
−0
.6
9∗
∗∗
−0
.6
6∗
∗∗
−0
.6
8∗
∗∗
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
1)
C
on
st
.
0.
20
∗∗
0.
23
∗∗
0.
23
∗∗
0.
23
∗∗
0.
23
∗∗
∗
0.
21
∗∗
∗
0.
20
∗∗
0.
25
∗∗
0.
25
∗∗
0.
25
∗∗
0.
25
∗∗
∗
0.
22
∗∗
∗
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
8)
O
bs
98
98
98
98
98
98
71
71
71
71
71
71
N
o.
of
FO
M
C
98
98
98
98
98
98
71
71
71
71
71
71
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 3 157
Table 3.8: Volatility and order imbalance one-day ahead of scheduled FOMC announcements
during periods of high vs. low sentiment
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of the following model: Yt =β0+β1(1−
SHt )FOMC
pre
t +β2SHt FOMC
pre
t +εt , where Yt denotes the daily changes in the trading volume level, daily changes in VIX and the daily order
imbalance in Panel A, B and C respectively. FOMCpret is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 on the pre-FOMC window and 0 otherwise. The
pre-FOMC window is one day before scheduled FOMC announcement. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if a day belongs to a
high (low) sentiment month. A high (low) sentiment month is the month when the sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above
(below) the full sample mean value. CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period is February 1994 - October 2015 for Panel A and Panel B, and January 2000 -
October 2015 for Panel C. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Obs No. of FOMC β0 β1 β2
Panel A: ∆Trv
CSI 5473 171 1.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
BWI 5473 171 1.01∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Panel B: ∆V IX
CSI 5473 171 -0.004 0.24 0.08
(0.02) (0.16) (0.11)
BWI 5473 171 -0.004 0.19 0.09
(0.02) (0.14) (0.13)
Panel C: Order imbalance
CSI 5011 156 0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.005)
BWI 5011 156 0.05∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.005) (0.005)
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Figure 3.1: Sentiment indices
This figure plots sentiment indices using monthly data over the period January 1994 - September 2015. CSI and BWI denote the University of
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Google Searching Volume Index
This figure plots the monthly Google Searching Volume Index (SVI) for the term “FOMC", “employment situation", “producer price index" and
“industrial production" respectively, over the period January 2004 - September 2015.
Chapter 4
Conclusions
4.1 Outline
This thesis examines the post FOMC announcement impact of U.S. conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy on the U.S. market-wide (see Chapter 1) and cross-sectional (see Chapter
2) stock returns over the Jun-89 to Dec-14 sample. It also examines the impact of investor sen-
timent states on the market-wide stock price drift before the scheduled FOMC announcement
(see Chapter 3). We conclude this thesis by outlining in detail the contribution of each chapter
to the empirical literature. We also summarise potential avenues for future research.
4.2 Contribution of each chapter to the empirical literature
In Chapter 1 we investigate how investor sentiment states affect the response of market-wide
stock returns to monetary policy shocks. We find that, for the pre-ZLB period, FFR shocks af-
fect stock market returns only during the sentiment-correction periods, that is, when sentiment
is high at the start of the year but then falls. During periods of sentiment build-up, however, the
impact of FFR shocks is insignificant. The sentiment effects are not driven by economic reces-
sions, however, we find that the sentiment-based state dependence in the response of market-
wide stock returns to FFR shocks is stronger during monetary policy easing cycles. We also
find that the market response following periods of high sentiment is significant for expansionary
FFR surprises, but not tightening surprises. Third, our evidence indicates that accounting for
endogeneity does not alter our conclusions. Fourth, the effect of FFR surprises is predominantly
contemporaneous and displays only very short-run persistence. Fifth, the positive returns asso-
ciated with expansionary policy shocks are broad-based across U.S. industries and their pattern
is consistent with the implications of the CAPM. The industrial effects are also conditional on
the state of investor sentiment.
For the unconventional monetary policy at the ZLB period, we find that the impact of path
surprises is statistically significant only during periods when sentiment decreases. In contrast to
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the findings from FFR shocks prior to the ZLB, the effect of path surprises is not only driven
by expansionary news. We show that amongst liquidity facilities and LSAP announcements,
only those related to the establishment of central bank liquidity swaps matter. Conditional on
the state of investor sentiment, the stock market reacted positively to these announcements.
Finally, we show that our results remain strong and consistent to a host of robustness checks. A
possible explanation for these findings relates to the investors’ emotional state. When optimism
builds-up, investors tend to behave in a manner consistent with noise trading, by relying heavily
on heuristic processing of information and pushing the stock market above levels justified by
fundamentals. In contrast, during correction phases they engage in more systematic processing
of information and their sensitivity to news increases. Overall, our results are consistent with a
behavioural explanation.
Overall, Chapter 1 contributes to the existing empirical literature that seeks to incorporate
findings from behavioural finance to examine the stock market reaction to news, as well as the
established literature that studies the effects of the Fed’s conventional and non-conventional
policy actions on financial markets. We develop a new measure of sentiment states, based upon
changes in sentiment and show that it reveals important information about the trading behaviour
of investors during periods of sentiment adjustment. Hence, we extend the previous literature
on the asset pricing implications of sentiment, which overlooks the dynamic behaviour of senti-
ment. Our work is also related to the literature on state dependence in the relationship between
stock market and monetary policy. Several studies consider business cycle effects and show that
the stock market response is stronger during recessions ((Basistha and Kurov (2008); Perez-
Quiros and Timmermann (2000)). In contrast, our focus is on sentiment states, which have
small or zero correlation with the business cycle. Furthermore, sentiment corrections are not
solely associated with bear markets but also occur during bull markets. Hence, our analysis is
distinct from previous studies that condition the stock market response to policy surprises on
bull-bear regimes (Chen (2007); Jansen and Tsai (2010); Kurov (2010)).
This chapter also relates to a recent study by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), who ex-
amine whether stock price changes in response to firm-specific earnings surprises are affected
by lagged sentiment. They conclude that behavioral biases affect how information is impounded
into stock prices. Our work has a different angle by focusing on market-wide news that stem
from shifts in monetary policy, as opposed to firm-specific news. Another related recent study
is that of Garcia (2013), who also argues that investors’ sensitivity to news may be state de-
pendent. In Garcia’s (2013) analysis, however, this is related to the state of the business cycle,
with the sensitivity to news being stronger during economic downturns; whereas we focus on
sentiment downturns that, as we argue above, are distinct from recessions. Finally, this chapter
extends previous work by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Lucca and Moench (2015) and Savor
and Wilson (2014), among others, who find that the CAPM performs well on days associated
with monetary policy news. We show that the CAPM does a good job in explaining the observed
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cross-industry variation of FOMC announcement-day returns only during sentiment-correction
phases. Different from our event study analysis, Antoniou et al. (2015) use monthly data for
asset-pricing tests and show that the security market line is positively slopped only following
low sentiment periods.
In Chapter 2 we analyze the impact of investor sentiment states on the response of cross-
sectional stock returns to monetary policy news using an event study approach over the Jun-89
to Oct-14 sample period. We consider 15 portfolio sorts which are commonly used by previous
literature. Our results show that, in line with our results on market-wide stock returns in Chapter
1, conventional monetary policy news affect the cross-sectional stock returns only following
periods of high sentiment. Unconventional monetary policy affect cross-sectional stock returns
only during periods of decreasing sentiment. Importantly, the effect of monetary policy shocks
differs across the cross-section of stocks. We find that stocks which are more sensitive to investor
sentiment, are also more sensitive to monetary policy shocks.
This chapter enhances our argument in Chapter 1, that monetary policy shocks affect stock
returns only following periods of high sentiment or during periods of decreasing sentiment.
Also, previous studies that examine the impact of monetary policy shocks on the cross-sectional
stock returns mainly focus on portfolios constructed on the basis of fundamental characteristics.
Foe example, Thorbecke (1997) examine size portfolios, Jensen et al. (1997) and Maio (2014)
consider value and size anomalies, Kontonikas and Kostakis (2013) investigate portfolios sorted
by past performance. In this chapter, we extend the literature by investigating the responses of 15
stock portfolios. In addition, our evidence that the region of the cross-section of stocks that are
more exposed to investor sentiment are also likely to be more sensitive to monetary policy news
indicates the existence of a sentiment channel in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to
stock returns.
In Chapter 3, we examine the impact of investor sentiment on the pre-FOMC announcement
stock price drift over the period from February 1994 to October 2015. We show that, the state of
investor sentiment strongly affects stock returns over the pre-FOMC window, which we define
as one day before the scheduled FOMC announcement day, the last trading day before investors
can observe signals about policy decisions. We find that the positive drift of the S&P500 index
over the pre-FOMC window concentrates only on the sentiment-exuberance state. We investi-
gate several possible explanations for our findings and the evidence points toward a behavioral
channel, which relates to the investors’ optimism and their trading activity. During periods of
high sentiment, investors reduce investment in risk-free assets (short-term T-bills) and increase
exposures to risky assets (stocks) on the pre-FOMC window, as evidenced by more net-buying
activities on the pre-FOMC window, leading to the positive pre-FOMC announcement stock
returns.
Chapter 3 contributes to the developing standard of literature that how stock price changes
in anticipation of macro-economy and/or monetary policy announcement (Lucca and Moench
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(2015); Bernile, Hu, and Tang (2016); Kurov et al. (2017)). We extend the literature by in-
corporating insides behavioural finance. This chapter is the first to show that the positive drift
of the S&P500 index occurs only during periods of high sentiment. Our findings of the senti-
ment conditionality of pre-FOMC drift, together with the inability of the rational based stories
to explain the drift, points to a behavioural explanation. Our findings also relates to the studies
on pre-announcement drifts of individual stock returns before earnings announcements (see, for
example Lamont and Frazzini (2007)). Most of these studies point to the behavioral “attention-
grabbing" effect as a potential explanation. Our results offers a new angle by considering the
state of investor sentiment.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the effect of monetary policy shifts on stock
prices (Thorbecke (1997); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Chen (2007); Wright (2012); Swanson
(2015)). These studies mainly focus on the price effect on FOMC announcement days.
4.3 Avenues for future research
There are several potential avenues for future research following this thesis. Our results in
Chapter 1 and 2 show that monetary policy shocks affect both market-wide and cross-sectional
stock returns only following periods of high sentiment of during periods of decreasing sen-
timent. These findings shed important light into a sentiment channel in the monetary policy
transmission mechanism. For future research, it would be interesting to investigate the dynamic
relationship between monetary policy shocks and other asset prices (i.e. the corporate bond
returns), conditional upon the state of investor sentiment.
Previous studies demonstrate that the U.S. monetary policy have impact on foreign stock
returns (Hayo et al. (2010); Chortareas and Noikokyris (2017)). Because our evidence shows
that the U.S. investor sentiment plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to stock returns. It will be interesting to check whether the U.S. or domestic investor
sentiment states affect the global impact of the U.S. conventional and unconventional monetary
policy.
Additionally, in Chapter 3 we provide a behavioural explanation to the pre-FOMC puzzle
documented by Lucca and Moench (2015). We show that there is an increase in the U.S. stock
market returns one-day before the scheduled FOMC announcement days, only during periods
of high sentiment. In fact, according to Lucca and Moench (2015), international stock market
indices also feature significant pre-FOMC announcement drift. Thus, examine the impact of the
U.S. or domestic investor sentiment states on the international pre-FOMC puzzle will be another
possible avenue for future research.
Lastly, all the event studies we employed in this thesis are based on daily data. A future
investigation may consider expanding the analyses to include regressions based on intra-day
data around the FOMC announcements.
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Table A.1: FOMC meetings with negative and positive FFR shocks across sentiment states
This table shows the number of FOMC meetings associated with negative and positive unexpected FFR changes across sentiment states over
the full sample period (June 1989 - October 2014. ∆iut denotes unexpected FFR changes. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the
FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the
sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to
1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment
if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. SHDt is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year when sentiment starts at high level but then declines, and 0 otherwise. A year is
defined as of high at the start but then decreasing sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year exceeds the full
sample mean value and the sentiment proxy at the end of that year is lower than at the end of the previous year. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the
University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment
index, respectively.
SHt 1-S
H
t S
D
t 1-S
D
t S
HD
t 1-S
HD
t
CSI 55 33 58 30 36 52
∆iut < 0 CCI 49 39 57 31 35 53
BWI 48 40
CSI 32 21 29 24 22 31
∆iut > 0 CCI 27 26 29 24 22 31
BWI 26 27
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Table A.2: List of unscheduled FOMC meetings and meetings associated with employment
report releases before the zero lower bound
This table presents the dates of unscheduled FOMC meetings and meetings associated with employment report releases, along with the corre-
sponding FFR target rate changes (∆it ) and unexpected changes (∆iut ) expressed in basis points. The sample period is June 1989 - December
2008. During the zero lower bound period (January 2009 - October 2014) several unscheduled meetings occurred that were not accompanied
by a FOMC statement or other information.
Date ∆it ∆iut Employment Unscheduled
05/06/1989 -25 -4 No Yes
07/07/1989 -25 -3 Yes No
26/07/1989 -25 -6 No Yes
16/10/1989 -25 -21 No Yes
06/11/1989 -25 4 Yes Yes
13/07/1990 -25 -14 No Yes
29/10/1990 -25 -2 No Yes
07/12/1990 -25 -27 Yes Yes
08/01/1991 -25 -18 No Yes
01/02/1991 -50 -25 Yes Yes
08/03/1991 -25 -16 Yes Yes
30/04/1991 -25 -17 No Yes
06/08/1991 -25 -15 Yes Yes
13/09/1991 -25 -5 No Yes
31/10/1991 -25 -5 No Yes
06/12/1991 -25 -9 Yes Yes
20/12/1991 -50 -28 No Yes
09/04/1992 -25 -24 No Yes
02/07/1992 -50 -36 Yes No
04/09/1992 -25 -22 Yes Yes
18/04/1994 25 10 No Yes
15/10/1998 -25 -26 No Yes
03/01/2001 -50 -38 No Yes
18/04/2001 -50 -42 No Yes
17/09/2001 -50 -32 No Yes
22/01/2008 -75 -74 No Yes
08/10/2008 -50 -14 No Yes
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Table A.3: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - excluding employment releases
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, excluding meetings that coincide with employment report
releases, of the following model: Rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value weighted market returns in excess
of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting
occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy
at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s
Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The
sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, excluding meetings associated with the release of employment
reports, as well as the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 171 0.22∗∗ -1.52 −7.03∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.10) (1.44 (2.44)
CCI 171 0.21∗∗ -1.67 −7.21∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.10) (1.36) (2.58)
BWI 171 0.24∗∗ -1.46 −6.78∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.09) (1.47) (2.57)
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Table A.4: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - sample commences in February 1994
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate
and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that
starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of
the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment
index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period includes
FOMC meetings over February 1994 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 125 0.27∗∗ -1.67 −7.30∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.12) (2.55) (2.67)
CCI 125 0.26∗∗ -1.99 −7.48∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.12) (2.26) (2.78)
BWI 125 0.27∗∗ 1.64 −6.69∗∗ 0.15
(0.11) (5.17) (2.62)
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Table A.5: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks and path surprises - sentiment
states defined by PLS sentiment index
Panel A of this table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following
model: Rt =β0+β1(1− SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury
bill rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during
a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end
(December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. The sample period used in Panel A includes FOMC meetings
before the zero lower bound (June 1989 - December 2008), with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008
meeting. Panel B presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting days of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where patht denotes path surprises. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting
occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at
the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. The zero lower bound sample period used in Panel B is
January 2009 - October 2014. PLS denotes the sentiment index developed by Huang et al. (2015). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
Panel A: FFR shocks
PLS 180 0.23∗∗ -1.25 −9.81∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.10) (1.39) (1.57)
Panel B: Path surprises
PLS 47 0.32∗ -4.37 −2.42∗ 0.04
(0.16) (4.04) (1.36)
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Table A.6: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - robust estimates
This table presents MM weighted least squares estimates using the procedure of Yohai (1987), which is robust to the presence of outliers, over
FOMC announcement days, of the following model: Rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value-weighted market
returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if
the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment
if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the
University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment
index, respectively. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September
2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 178 0.16∗∗ -0.49 −6.85∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.07) (0.97) (1.00)
CCI 179 0.14∗∗ -0.64 −7.55∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.07) (0.94) (1.03)
BWI 178 0.17∗∗ -0.74 −5.39∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.07) (1.01) (1.00)
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Table A.7: Response of stock market returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound, during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment - robust estimates
This table presents MM weighted least squares estimates using the procedure of Yohai (1987), which is robust to the presence of outliers, over
FOMC announcement days, of the following model: Rt =β0+β1(1−SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote CRSP value-weighted
market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate and path surprises, respectively. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if
the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if
the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. CSI denotes the University of
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index. The zero lower bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings that
were not accompanied by a FOMC statement or other information were excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 47 0.17 0.56 −3.37∗∗ 0.16
(0.16) (1.66) (1.39)
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Table A.8: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - monthly classification of sentiment states
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SHMt )∆iut +β2SHMt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill
rate and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHMt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a month
that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A month is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end of the
previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment
index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The sample period includes
FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 180 0.23∗∗∗ -0.23 −6.95∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.09) (1.37) (2.09)
CCI 180 0.24∗∗ -0.41 −6.39∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.10) (1.46) (2.19)
BWI 180 0.23∗∗ 0.07 −6.22∗∗ 0.13
(0.09) (1.66) (2.39)
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Table A.9: Response of stock market returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound, during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment - monthly classification of sentiment states
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SDMt )patht +β2SDMt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury
bill rate and path surprises, respectively. SDMt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing
(increasing) sentiment month. A month is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end of that month is
lower (higher) than at the end of the previous month. CSI and CCI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and the U.S.
Consumer Confidence index, respectively. The zero lower bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings
that were not accompanied by a FOMC statement or other information were excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 47 0.32∗ -1.66 −2.69∗ 0.04
(0.16) (2.17) (1.43)
CCI 47 0.32∗ -0.68 −2.98∗ 0.05
(0.16) (1.54) (1.62)
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Table A.10: Response of stock market returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound, during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment - alternative changes-based sentiment dummy
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury
bill rate and path surprises, respectively. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing
(increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if, throughout it, the average monthly change of the
sentiment proxy is negative (positive). CSI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and Baker and Wurgler’s
(2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The zero lower bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings
that were not accompanied by a FOMC statement or other information were excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 47 0.39∗∗ -1.19 −12.32∗ 0.20
(0.16) (1.10) (6.88)
BWI 47 0.36∗∗ -1.16 −11.23∗ 0.19
(0.17) (1.15) (5.78)
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Table A.11: Response of stock market returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound,
following periods of high vs. low sentiment - alternative orthogonalization
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote CRSP value weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate
and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a year that
starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of
the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value. CSI, CCI and BWI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment
index, the U.S. Consumer Confidence index and Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) sentiment index, respectively. The additional macro-related
variables used for the orthogonalization of the sentiment indices include: the default premium, the term premium, the real interest rate, the
inflation rate, and the consumption-wealth ratio. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the
exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 180 0.21∗∗ 0.14 −9.35∗∗∗ 0.21
(0.10) (1.24) (1.58)
CCI 180 0.22∗∗ -0.42 −7.62∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.10) (0.83) (2.50)
BWI 180 0.24∗∗∗ -0.35 −7.10∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.09) (0.89) (2.61)
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Table A.12: Response of stock market returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound, during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment - alternative orthogonalization
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC announcement days, of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of the 1-month Treasury
bill rate and path surprises, respectively. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC meeting occurred during a decreasing
(increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment proxy at the end (December) of that year
is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year. CSI and CCI denote the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index and the
U.S. Consumer Confidence index, respectively. The additional macro-related variables used for the orthogonalization of the sentiment indices
include: the default premium, the term premium, the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and the consumption-wealth ratio. The zero lower
bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings that were not accompanied by a FOMC statement or other
information were excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
Obs β0 β1 β2 Ad j.R2
CSI 47 0.23 0.62 −4.56∗∗ 0.12
(0.15) (0.62) (1.74)
CCI 47 0.25∗ 0.45 −4.51∗∗ 0.11
(0.15) (0.64) (1.74)
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Table A.13: Response of stock market returns to LSAPs and liquidity facilities announcements,
during periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment - longer estimation window
This table presents the CRSP value-weighted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs (%)) using alternative event windows across periods
of decreasing sentiment (Panel A) and increasing sentiment (Panel B). Returns are in excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Abnormal returns
are calculated using the constant mean model and a 90-day estimation period that ends prior to the event window. We consider announcements
of expansionary nature by the Fed over the period December 2007 - October 2013 that reflect the initiation or continuation of Large Scale
Asset Purchases (LSAPs) and liquidity facilities programmes. There are 46 announcements related to liquidity facilities (LIQall ), including 13
announcements about central bank liquidity swaps (CB swaps), 13 announcements about the term auction facility (TAF) and 21 announcements
about other liquidity facilities (Other). 22 LSAPs-related announcements are also considered. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing)
sentiment if the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment index at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the
previous year. The statistical significance of CAARs is evaluated using the Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) test statistic that accounts
for event-induced increase in returns volatility.. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Event window CB swaps TAF Other LIQall LSAPs LIQall+LSAPs
Panel A: Decreasing sentiment
(-1, 3) 2.81 -2.02 -0.66 -0.23 2.37 -0.02
(-1, 1) 2.90∗∗ -0.80 0.15 0.50 2.40 0.49
(0, 0) 1.44∗∗ -0.44 -0.04 0.14 0.25 0.13
Panel B: Increasing sentiment
(-1, 3) 0.76 0.76 -0.15 0.03
(-1, 1) 0.21 0.21 -0.13 -0.06
(0, 0) 0.96 0.96 0.06 0.24
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Portfolio constructions
In order to examine the role that investor sentiment plays in the transmission of monetary pol-
icy news on cross-sectional stock returns, we consider daily returns on 15 portfolio sorts which
are commonly used by previous literature: accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age)),
book-to-market ratio (BM), cash to asset (CA), gross profitability (GP), investment-to-assets
(Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore), as-
set tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return
volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity (Size).
Age
Firm age is the first company characteristic we consider. Recent study of Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) suggests that firm age is an useful predictor of financial constraint levels, and
the relationship between monetary policy and financial constraint has been well documented
(see Basistha and Kurov, 2008;Kontonikas and Kostakis, 2013). Moreover, according to Baker
and Wurgler (2006), firm age is also an important variable to use for examining the relationship
between investor sentiment and stock returns. They find that young stocks are more sensitive to
investor sentiment compare to old stocks.
Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), we define firm age as the number of years since the
firm’s first appearance on CRSP, measured to the end of our sample, rebalanced annually at
the end of June. Decile 1 represents the youngest group, while Decile 10 represents the oldest
group.
Asset tangibility
We then consider asset tangibility. As mentioned by Baker and Wurgler (2006), tangibility
may proxy for the difficulty of valuation. Firms with more intangible assets are more sensitive
to fluctuations in sentiment since they are more difficult to value.
We measure asset tangibility as property, plant and equipment (data item PPEGT) over total
assets (data item AT), rebalanced annually at the end of June. Decile 1 is the group that with
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least tangible asset, while Decile 10 is the group that with most tangible asset.
Value
Previous literature on monetary policy indicate that value is an important characteristic to
help examine the balance sheet channel of the transmission of monetary policy (Kontonikas and
Kostakis, 2013). On the other hand, literature on invertor sentiment suggest that growth firms
are relatively hard to arbitrage, and so they are most affected by sentiment (Baker and Wurgler,
2006).
The value characteristic we consider is book-to-market ratio (BE/ME). Following Fama
and French (1993), BE/ME is measured as book equity from the previous fiscal year divided
by market equity from December of the previous year. Specifically, book equity is stockhold-
ers’ equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available, data item
TXDITC), minus the book value of preferred stock. We measure stockholders’ equity as book
value of assets (data item AT) minus total liabilities (data item LT). For the book value of pre-
ferred stock, we use the redemption (data item PSTKRV), liquidation (data item PSTKL), or par
value (data item UPSTK) in that order , depending on availability. Market equity is the market
price times shares outstanding. Portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of June. Decile 1
represents the group with lowest BE/ME/ (growth stocks) while Decile 10 represents the group
with largest BE/ME/ (value stocks).
Size
Firm size is another company characteristic we consider. On one hand, size premium has
been well documented in the asset pricing literature. Using a VAR approach, previous studies
on monetary policy find that small stocks are more exposed to monetary policy shocks (see
Thorbecke, 1997;Kontonikas and Kostakis, 2013). On the other hand, as Lee et al. (1991) state,
small stocks are disproportionately held by individuals as opposed to institutions, thus, firm size
represents a natural variable to use for examining the relationship between investor sentiment
and stock returns. Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find that stocks have lower return following
periods of high investor sentiment, and smaller stocks are more affected. Baker and Wurgler
(2006) also find low subsequent stock return following periods of high sentiment, but there is
no significant size effects. However, they find that following periods of low sentiment, smaller
stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment.
Following Fama and French (1993), we construct size-sorted portfolio at the end of each
June using the CRSP end of June price times shares outstanding, rebalanced annually. Decile 1
represents the smallest group, while Decile 10 represents the largest group.
Return volatility
We then consider return volatility. Drechsler et al. (2014) find that expansionary monetary
policy result in higher volatility. Literature on investor sentiment also document that stocks with
high return volatility are more sensitive to sentiment fluctuation (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006;
Chung, Hung, and Yeh, 2012).
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Following Baker and Wurgler (2006) we measure return volatility (Sigma) as the standard
deviation of monthly stock returns over the 12 months ending in June of year t, for firms with
at least 10 return observations. Rebalanced annually at the end of June. Decile 1 represents the
group with lowest Sigma, while Decile 10 represents the group with highest Sigma.
Momentum
The momentum effect, which refers to the phenomenon that high past recent returns forecast
high future returns, discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is one of the well documented
anomalies in asset pricing literature. Studies on monetary policy find that past losers are more
affected by policy shocks (Kontonikas and Kostakis, 2013). Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrah-
manyam (2013) also prove that the momentum effect is stronger when sentiment is high, and
they suggest this is because of the slow spread of bad news during high-sentiment periods.
We construct momentum portfolio following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). At the end of
each month, stocks are sorted based on their cumulated return from month t-12 to month t-2,
rebalanced monthly. Decile 1 represents past losers, while Decile 10 represents past winners.
Accruals
Accruals is another firm characteristic we consider. Sloan (1996) find that a firms with high
accruals generally earn lower returns on average than firms with low accruals. They suggest
that investors overestimate the persistence of the accrual component of earnings when forming
earnings expectations. Recent study on investor sentiment also prove that stock returns of firms
with high accruals are more exposed to investor sentiment (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012).
We construct portfolios sorted by accruals following Sloan (1996):
Accruals =
∆ACT −∆CHE−∆LCT +∆DLC+∆T XP−∆DP
(AT +AT−1)/2
(B.1)
where ∆ACT is the annual change in total current assets, ∆CHE is the annual change in total
cash and short-term investments, ∆LCT is the annual change in current liabilities, ∆DLC is the
annual change in debt in current liabilities, ∆T XP is the annual change in income taxes payable,
∆DP is the annual change in depreciation and amortization, and (AT +AT−1)/2 is average total
assets over the last two years. Rebalanced annually at the end of June. Decile 1 represents the
group with least accruals, while Decile 10 represents the group with most accruals.
Asset growth
We also consider the impact of monetary policy on stocks sorted by asset growth rate across
sentiment states. Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find that a firm’s annual asset growth rate is
a strong predictor of the cross-section of U.S. stock returns. Firms with high asset growth rate
earn lower subsequent returns. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) also find that firms with high
asset growth rate are more sensitive to investor sentiment fluctuations.
Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), we measure asset growth as the growth rate of
total assets (data item AT) in the previous fiscal year. Portfolios are formed on the end of June,
rebalanced annually. Decile 1 represents the group with lowest asset growth rate, while Decile
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10 represents the group with highest asset growth rate.
Distress
We then consider financial distress. Literature on monetary policy indicate that distressed
companies should be more sensitive to monetary news that may affect their cash flows. Stam-
baugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) find that distressed stocks are more exposed to investor sentiment.
The distress measure we consider is the O-score of Ohlson (1980). The O-score is calculated
as the probability of bankruptcy in a static model:
O− score =−1.32−0.407log(ADJASSET/CPI)+6.03T LTA−1.43WCTA+0.076CLCA
−1.72OENEG−2.37NITA−1.83FUT L+0.285INTWO−0.521CHIN
(B.2)
where ADJASSET is adjusted total assets calculated as total assets plus 10% of the difference
between market equity and book equity (ME-BE) following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi
(2008) to ensure that assets are not too close to zero. CPI is the consumer price index. TLTA
is the leverage ratio defined as the book value of debt (data item DLCQ plus data item DLTTQ)
divided by ADJASSET. WCTA is working capital divided by market assets (data item ACTQ -
data item LCTQ)/ADJASSET. CLCA is current liabilities (data item LCTQ) divided by current
assets (data item ACTQ). OENEG is one if total liabilities (data item LTQ) exceeds total assets
(data item ATQ) and is zero otherwise. NITA is net income (data item NIQ) divided by assets,
ADJASSET. FUTL is the fund provided by operations (data item PIQ) divided by liabilities
(data item LTQ). INTWO is equal to one if net income (data item NIQ) is negative for the last
two quarters and zero otherwise. CHIN is (NIt-NIt−1)/(|NIt |+|NIt−1|), where NI t is net income
(data item NIQ) for the most recent quarter (Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang, 2011). Rebalanced
monthly. Decile 1 represents the group with lowest O-score, while Decile 10 represents the
group with largest O-score.
Gross profitability
Gross profitability is another firm characteristic we consider. As suggested by Novy-Marx
(2013), gross profits scaled by assets is the cleanest accounting measure of true economic prof-
itability. Moreover, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) find that less profitable stocks are more
exposed to investor sentiment fluctuations.
We measure gross profitability as gross profits (data item GP) divided by the total assets (data
item AT) following Novy-Marx (2013). Portfolios are formed on the end of June, rebalanced
annually. Decile 1 represents the least profitable stocks, while Decile 10 represents the most
profitable stocks.
Investment-to-assets
Another firm characteristic we consider is the investment-to-assets ratio. Titman, Tompaidis,
and Tsyplakov (2004) show that there is an investment anomaly in the stock market, subsequent
returns are lower for firms with higher past investment. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) exam-
ine the predict power of investor sentiment on stocks sorted by investment-to-assets, however,
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they do not find a significant difference between the high past investment group and the low past
investment group.
Investment-to-assets is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equip-
ment (data item PPEGT) plus the annual change in inventories (data item INVT) scaled by
the lagged book value of assets (AT) following Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2007). Portfolios
are formed on the end of each June, rebalanced annually. Decile 1 represents the group with
lowest investment-to-assets ratio, while Decile 10 represents the group with highest investment-
to-assets ratio.
Profitability
We also consider profitability. According to Fama and French (2006), profitability is a pos-
itive predictor of future stock returns. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) find that less profitable
firms are more exposed to sentiment fluctuations.
Profitability characteristics include return on book value of equity and return on assets. Fol-
lowing Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011), we measure return on book equity as income
before extraordinary items (data item IBQ) divided by one-quarter lagged book value of equal-
ity. The quarterly book equity is measured in the same way following Fama and French (1993).
We measure return on assets as income before extraordinary items (data item IBQ) divided by
one-quarter lagged total assets (data item ATQ). Portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Decile 1
represents the group with lowest RoB(RoA) ratio, while Decile 10 represents the group with
highest RoB(RoA) ratio.
Net Operating Assets
Hirshleifer et al. (2004) find that firms with higher net operating assets predicts lower future
returns. In the study of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), they find that stock returns of firms
with higher net operating assets are more sensitive to investor sentiment fluctuations.
We measure net operating asset as the difference on the balance sheet between all operating
assets (OA) and all operating liabilities (OL) scaled by total assets (data item AT) following
Hirshleifer et al. (2004):
OA = AT −CHE (B.3)
OL = AT −DLC−DLT T −MIB−UPST K−CEQ (B.4)
where AT is total assets, CHE is cash and short term investment, DLC is Debt included in
current liabilities, DLTT is long term debt, MIB is minority interests, UPSTK is preferred stocks
and CEQ is common equity. Portfolios are formed on the end of each June, rebalanced annually.
Decile 1 represents the group with lowest net operating asset, while Decile 10 represents the
group with highest net operating asset.
Cash-to-asset
Finally, we consider the cash-to-asset ratio. The cash holding effect documented by Palazzo
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(2012) indicates that firms with high cash-to-assets ratios outperform firms with low cash ratios,
even after adjusting for the Fama and French’s (1993) three factors. Moreover, Li and Luo
(2016) find that the cash holding effect varies significantly across sentiment states.
We construct portfolios sorted by the cash-to-asset ratio following by Palazzo (2012). The
cash-to-asset ratio is measured as cash and marketable securities (data item CHEQ) over total
assets (data item ATQ). Rebalanced monthly. Decile 1 represents the group with lowest cash-
to-assets ratio, while Decile 10 represents the group with highest cash-to-assets ratio.
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Table B.2: Response of portfolio returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound, following
periods of high vs. low sentiment - CCI based analyses
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SHt )∆iut +β2SHt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote portfolio returns and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Portfolios formed on
the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity
(Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SHt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC
meeting occurred during a year that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A year is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sentiment
proxy at the end (December) of the previous year is above (below) the full sample mean value according to the U.S. Consumer Confidence index.
The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001 meeting and the
22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-statistic) are
reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 0.55 −11.05∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.14 −11.20∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.68 0.15 [0.69]
(1.06) (3.69) (1.30) (3.07) (0.79) (1.19)
Age -0.42 -2.98 [0.20] -0.48 −11.81∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.06 8.83∗∗ [0.04]
(0.93) (1.86) (1.09) (3.89) (0.78) (4.40)
AG 0.24 -2.63 [0.17] -0.35 −12.37∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.60 9.73∗∗ [0.03]
(0.98) (1.97) (1.23) (3.79) (0.59) (4.31)
BE/ME 0.03 −3.32∗ [0.15] -0.76 −10.67∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.76 7.21∗∗∗ [0.01]
(1.43) (1.92) (1.07) (2.95) (0.82) (2.44)
CA -1.13 −3.36∗ [0.26] 0.02 −12.03∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.15 8.66∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.97) (1.82) (1.28) (3.43) (0.96) (2.30)
GP -0.45 −5.80∗∗∗ [0.01] -0.53 −7.00∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.08 1.21 [0.41]
(1.05) (1.90) (1.10) (1.85) (0.54) (1.28)
Inv -0.74 -2.63 [0.30] -0.43 −11.03∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.32 8.40∗∗ [0.02]
(0.83) (1.65) (1.15) (3.46) (0.61) (3.57)
Mom -0.29 −5.32∗∗ [0.08] -0.68 −16.02∗∗ [0.01] 0.39 10.70∗∗ [0.04]
(1.34) (2.65) (1.26) (6.26) (1.03) (5.14)
NOA 0.24 −8.81∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.59 −9.97∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.82 1.16 [0.87]
(1.19) (2.68) (1.14) (3.67) (0.59) (2.10)
Oscore -0.41 −8.60∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.23 −4.87∗∗ [0.08] -0.17 −3.73∗∗ [0.05]
(1.02) (2.19) (1.08) (2.44) (0.85) (1.61)
PPE/A -0.55 -1.47 [0.56] -0.41 −14.24∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.14 12.77∗∗ [0.02]
(0.79) (1.91) (1.29) (4.58) (0.96) (5.13)
RoA -0.71 −7.20∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.05 −12.50∗∗ [0.01] -0.66 5.31 [0.18]
(1.15) (2.01) (1.17) (4.90) (0.66) (4.40)
RoB -0.82 −3.73∗ [0.20] -0.31 −12.58∗∗ [0.01] -0.52 8.86 [0.11]
(1.11) (2.10) (1.37) (4.93) (0.58) (5.79)
Sigma -0.97 -0.42 [0.78] 0.57 −16.83∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.56 16.41∗∗ [0.01]
(0.77) (1.91) (1.41) (5.66) (1.30) (6.71)
Size -0.60 -1.90 [0.50] -0.71 −8.17∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.11 6.27∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.69) (1.80) (1.01) (2.42) (0.94) (1.80)
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Table B.3: Response of portfolio returns to path surprises at the zero lower bound during
periods of decreasing vs. increasing sentiment - CCI based analyses
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1− SDt )patht +β2SDt patht +εt , where Rt and patht denote portfolio returns and path surprises, respectively. Portfolios formed on
the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity
(Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SDt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC
meeting occurred during a decreasing (increasing) sentiment year. A year is defined as of decreasing (increasing) sentiment if the sentiment
proxy at the end (December) of that year is lower (higher) than at the end of the previous year according to the U.S. Consumer Confidence
index. The zero lower bound sample period is January 2009 - October 2014. The unscheduled meetings that were not accompanied by a
FOMC statement or other information were excluded. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for equality of
coefficients (F-statistic) are reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 0.41 −4.25∗∗ [0.04] 0.30 −4.16∗∗ [0.06] 0.11 -0.09 [0.80]
(0.66) (2.09) (1.04) (2.09) (0.54) (0.45)
Age 0.42 −2.43∗ [0.08] -0.53 −3.70∗ [0.19] 0.94 1.27∗ [0.81]
(0.53) (1.42) (1.28) (1.98) (0.94) (0.74)
AG -0.69 -2.98 [0.30] 0.96 −4.04∗∗ [0.02] −1.65∗∗ 1.06∗∗ [0.00]
(0.96) (1.91) (0.78) (1.94) (0.72) (0.49)
BE/ME -0.43 −3.02∗∗∗ [0.22] 0.50 −9.02∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.94 6.00∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.82) (1.86) (1.17) (2.52) (1.16) (1.53)
CA -0.37 −3.63∗∗ [0.08] 0.48 −3.61∗∗ [0.05] -0.86 -0.02 [0.25]
(0.84) (1.58) (0.63) (1.75) (0.53) (0.53)
GP 0.33 −3.10∗∗ [0.04] 0.00 −5.33∗∗∗ [0.02] 0.33 2.23∗∗∗ [0.01]
(0.60) (1.45) (0.90) (1.85) (0.48) (0.62)
Inv 0.93 −4.75∗∗ [0.02] 0.93 −4.44∗∗ [0.01] −1.29∗∗∗ -0.31 [0.22]
(0.87) (2.40) (0.94) (1.78) (0.47) (0.61)
Mom 0.29 -2.75 [0.35] 0.02 −19.59∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.26 16.84∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.81) (2.66) (0.97) (4.76) (1.22) (6.04)
NOA 0.34 −3.16∗ [0.06] 0.48 −4.42∗∗ [0.01] -0.14 1.27∗∗∗ [0.05]
(0.83) (1.59) (0.66) (1.76) (0.62) (0.34)
Oscore 0.18 −2.83∗ [0.00] 0.85 −6.13∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.67 3.31∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.64) (1.67) (1.17) (1.85) (0.67) (1.18)
PPE/A -0.20 −3.04∗ [0.14] 0.11 −3.66∗∗ [0.06] -0.31 0.62 [0.24]
(1.03) (1.59) (1.05) (1.65) (0.44) (0.52)
RoA 0.29 -2.33 [0.15] 0.51 −5.58∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.22 3.24∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.82) (1.56) (0.93) (1.91) (0.55) (0.78)
RoB 0.36 -2.71 [0.13] 0.37 −5.78∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.01 3.07∗∗ [0.05]
(0.77) (1.79) (0.81) (1.77) (0.66) (1.19)
Sigma 0.05 -2.36 [0.15] 0.93 −4.56∗ [0.07] -0.87 2.20∗ [0.19]
(0.54) (1.44) (1.61) (2.41) (1.71) (1.28)
Size 0.26 −3.84∗∗ [0.02] 1.11 −5.93∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.85 2.09∗∗∗ [0.00]
(0.62) (1.54) (0.84) (1.68) (0.54) (0.41)
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Table B.4: Response of portfolio returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound, following
periods of high vs. low sentiment - monthly classification of sentiment states (CSI)
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SHMt )∆iut +β2SHMt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote portfolio returns and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Portfolios formed
on the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity
(Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SHMt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC
meeting occurred during a month that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A month is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the sen-
timent proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value according to the University of Michigan’s Consumer
Sentiment Index. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001
meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients
(F-statistic) are reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 0.01 −9.36∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.56 −9.68∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.57 0.32 [0.85]
(1.60) (3.49) (1.81) (2.85) (0.85) (1.11)
Age -0.11 −3.02∗∗ [0.13] -0.59 −10.57∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.48 7.55∗ [0.10]
(1.29) (1.48) (1.75) (3.48) (0.93) (4.21)
AG 0.20 -2.31 [0.22] -0.65 −10.87∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.85 8.57∗∗ [0.06]
(1.47) (1.48) (1.76) (3.51) (0.73) (4.10)
BE/ME -0.15 −2.97∗∗ [0.22] -0.53 −9.90∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.39 6.92∗∗∗ [0.00]
(2.06) (1.18) (1.56) (2.55) (1.07) (2.18)
CA -0.96 −3.30∗∗ [0.22] -0.12 −10.67∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.84 7.37∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.50) (1.27) (1.84) (3.12) (1.13) (2.36)
GP -0.54 −5.18∗∗∗ [0.02] -0.31 −6.58∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.23 1.40 [0.20]
(1.60) (1.32) (1.47) (1.47) (0.73) (1.06)
Inv -0.95 −2.24∗ [0.46] -0.49 −9.90∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.46 7.66∗∗ [0.02]
(1.29) (1.22) (1.76) (3.08) (1.09) (3.21)
Mom -0.62 −4.49∗∗ [0.16] 0.03 −15.17∗∗ [0.01] -0.66 10.68∗∗ [0.02]
(1.90) (2.12) (3.03) (5.09) (1.95) (4.43)
NOA 0.16 −7.83∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.92 −8.70∗∗∗ [0.01] 1.08 0.87 [0.92]
(1.71) (2.29) (1.61) (3.32) (0.62) (1.91)
Oscore -0.10 −8.08∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.75 −3.90∗∗ [0.08] 0.65 −4.18∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.43) (1.79) (1.92) (1.79) (1.18) (1.20)
PPE/A -0.54 -1.39 [0.65] -0.28 −12.98∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.26 11.59∗∗ [0.02]
(1.37) (1.37) (1.79) (4.18) (1.11) (4.89)
RoA -0.39 −6.86∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.72 −10.61∗∗ [0.04] 0.33 3.75 [0.42]
(1.59) (1.49) (1.82) (4.59) (0.83) (4.19)
RoB -0.54 −3.71∗∗ [0.14] -0.78 −10.90∗∗ [0.04] 0.24 7.18 [0.21]
(1.53) (1.63) (1.95) (4.57) (0.90) (5.54)
Sigma -0.40 -1.03 [0.75] -0.30 −14.23∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.10 13.20∗ [0.06]
(1.14) (1.63) (2.25) (5.45) (1.84) (6.70)
Size -0.79 -1.59 [0.66] -0.15 −7.97∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.64 6.39∗∗∗ [0.00]
(1.23) (1.35) (1.58) (1.81) (1.01) (1.54)
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Table B.5: Response of portfolio returns to FFR shocks before the zero lower bound, following
periods of high vs. low sentiment - monthly classification of sentiment states (BWI)
This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, over FOMC meeting dates of the following model:
Rt =β0+β1(1−SHMt )∆iut +β2SHMt ∆iut +εt , where Rt and ∆iut denote portfolio returns and unexpected FFR changes, respectively. Portfolios formed
on the following characteristics are considered: Accruals (Acc), asset growth (AG), firm age (Age), book-to-market ratio (BM/ME), cash to asset
(CA), gross profitability (GP), investment to assets (Inv), momentum (Mom), net operating assets (NOA), O-score of Ohlson (1980) (Oscore),
asset tangibility (PPE/A), return on assets (RoA), return on book value of equity (RoB), return volatility (Sigma) and market value of equity
(Size). Deciles which are more exposed to sentiment are defined as the short leg. SHMt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (0) if the FOMC
meeting occurred during a month that starts with high (low) sentiment level. A month is defined as starting with high (low) sentiment if the
sentiment proxy at the end of the previous month is above (below) the full sample mean value according to the Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007)
sentiment index. The sample period includes FOMC meetings over June 1989 - December 2008, with the exception of the 17 September 2001
meeting and the 22 January 2008 meeting. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. P-values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients
(F-statistic) are reported in square brackets. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Portfolios Long Leg Short Leg Long-Short
β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2 β1 β2 β1 = β2
Acc 1.00 −8.75∗∗∗ [0.01] -0.09 −8.74∗∗∗ [0.01] 1.09 -0.01 [0.38]
(1371) (3.46) (1.73) (3.10) (0.78) (1.04)
Age -0.49 −2.36∗ [0.37] -0.43 −9.29∗∗ [0.03] -0.05 6.93∗ [0.08]
(1.75) (1.22) (1.83) (3.64) (1.15) (3.85)
AG 1.01 −2.52∗ [0.09] -0.58 −9.50∗∗ [0.03] −1.59∗ 6.98∗ [0.18]
(1.63) (1.42) (1.91) (3.67) (0.82) (3.93)
BE/ME -0.82 -2.10 [0.62] -0.65 −8.51∗∗∗ [0.00] -0.18 6.41∗∗∗ [0.00]
(2.17) (1.47) (1.82) (2.79) (1.19) (2.02)
CA -0.68 −3.17∗∗∗ [0.22] 0.22 −9.44∗∗∗ [0.01] 0.90 6.27∗∗ [0.01]
(1.72) (1.18) (1.77) (3.53) (0.76) (2.79)
GP -0.75 −4.38∗∗∗ [0.11] -0.84 −5.33∗∗∗ [0.07] 0.09 0.95 [0.01]
(1.73) (1.57) (1.52) (1.98) (0.90) (1.05)
Inv -0.65 −2.27∗∗ [0.39] 0.26 −9.12∗∗∗ [0.00] 0.92 6.85∗∗ [0.02]
(1.49) (1.14) (1.94) (3.11) (1.22) (3.02)
Mom 0.84 −4.98∗∗ [0.03] 0.68 −13.51∗∗∗ [0.02] 0.15 8.53∗ [0.08]
(1.76) (2.19) (3.49) (5.18) (2.33) (4.37)
NOA 0.94 −7.27∗∗∗ [0.00] -1.04 −7.54∗∗ [0.08] 1.98∗∗ 0.27 [0.35]
(1.77) (1.77) (1.87) (3.21) (0.87) (1.62)
Oscore -0.61 −6.61∗∗∗ [0.00] 1.09 −4.75∗∗∗ [0.03] -1.70 −1.86∗ [0.94]
(1.74) (2.25) (2.06) (1.66) (1.91) (1.06)
PPE/A -0.48 -1.31 [0.67] -0.61 −10.98∗∗ [0.03] 0.13 9.67∗∗ [0.06]
(1.64) (1.19) (1.86) (4.45) (1.05) (4.86)
RoA -0.48 −5.89∗∗∗ [0.03] 0.06 −9.77∗∗ [0.04] -0.53 3.88 [0.00]
(1.73) (1.90) (1.86) (4.47) (1.12) (3.61)
RoB -0.90 −3.02∗∗ [0.35] -0.29 −9.83∗∗ [0.05] -0.61 6.81 [0.14]
(1.79) (1.53) (1.90) (4.55) (1.20) (4.93)
Sigma -0.38 -0.96 [0.76] 1.51 −13.56∗∗ [0.00] -1.89 12.60∗∗ [0.02]
(1.45) (1.35) (2.23) (5.38) (2.05) (6.22)
Size 1.28 −2.93∗∗∗ [0.02] -0.55 −6.61∗∗∗ [0.03] 1.83 3.68∗∗ [0.00]
(1.56) (0.91) (2.00) (2.08) (2.16) (1.52)
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